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I.

INTRODUCTION

On January 22, 1973, the United States Supreme Court handed
down its opinion in Roe v. Wade. 1 The seven-member majority seemed
confident it had authoritatively resolved the volatile controversy over
abortion. On December 14, 1987, the Court, by a vote split four to
four, left standing an appellate court decision in yet another in the
chain of cases spawned by Roe: Hartigan v. Zbaraz. 2 Only eight justices were on the Court, because the United States Senate had not yet
consented to the appointment of one of President Reagan's nominees to
replace retired Justice Powell. The continuing conflict in abortion jurisprudence results from continued adherence to the flawed analysis in

Roe v. Wade.
This is a critique of Roe v. Wade and its progeny, based on the
I. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987)(per curiam), affg by an equally divided Court 763 F.2d 1532 (7th
Cir. 1985 ). The unsettled nature of abortion jurisprudence may be seen in the table Chronology
1980-1986 in E. RuBIN, ABORTION, PoLITICS, AND THt: CouRTS: Rot: v. WAI>t: AND ITs AFTt:RMATH 193-204 (1987).
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anomalous judicial treatment of the right of abortion. The anomaly will
be demonstrated in two ways.
First, the tangent initiated by Roe will be examined. The degree of
its departure from precedent and the Constitution will be shown. By
following this tangent, subsequent abortion cases have diverged widely
from the normal rules and principles of law. This divergence will be
shown in the misuse of stare decisis in abortion cases, and in the extreme result achieved by the Court in the 1986 case, Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 3 the most recent
abortion case decided by the Court on the merits.
Second, areas of the law related to abortion-privacy rights, fetal
rights, medical regulation, and procedural and adjudicatory issues-will be examined in the context of abortion cases. As will be
seen, the normal rules in these areas are distorted when the case involves abortion. This abortion distortion factor is present throughout
abortion case law.
The distortions consistently occur in the direction of making the
abortion right more absolute. The special treatment for the abortion
right violates the principles underlying the rule of law, the foundation
stone of our constitutional system. Consequently, abortion jurisprudence should be reformed to conform it to the rest of the law. This
requires the reversal of Roe v. Wade:'

II.

Roe's

TANGENTIAL DEPARTURE FROM PRECEDENT

Roe v. Wade left the usual bounds of the law and set off on its
own tangent. This section deals first with the abrupt angle of that tangent: Roe's radical departure from the norm, shown through a review
of prior critiques, 11 and the abuse of stare decisis in subsequent abortion
decisions. Second, this section examines Thornburgh to reveal the distance from the norm achieved in abortion jurisprudence by following
the trajectory set by Roe. Thornburgh is the most recent word on abortion from the Court and the best example of the great rift achieved.
3. 476 U.S. 747 ( 1986).
4. Whether a Court holding comported with the Constitution might not be the only consideration of a justice in determining whether to reverse precedent. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 22,
1987, at A 1, col. 3 (Judge Bark, in Senate confirmation hearings, mentioned he would consider
several factors, including whether there was a basis for abortion rights in the Constitution.) This
article does not deal with issues such as moral and ethical arguments, but only with considerations
permitted by legal positivism, such as consistency and equal treatment of parties.
5. Detailed analysis of Roe's treatment of privacy rights, proeedural rules, and other aspects
of the law related to abortion jurisprudence will be dealt with in subsequent subsections. For
treatment of privacy rights see infra section III-A. For treatment of procedural rules see infra
section III-D.
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Roe v. Wade

As Roe v. Wade set the angle of departure from the rest of the
law, it is appropriate to begin with a review of Roe-its facts, holding,
and flaws.
1.

Facts

In 1970, an unmarried, pregnant woman, using the pseudonym of
Jane Roe, brought a class action in a federal district court in Texas. 6
She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas abortion statute was
unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement. 7 The Texas
statute allowed abortion only "by medical advice for the purpose of
saving the life of the mother." 8 A majority of the states had similar
statutes. 9

2.

Holding

Ultimately, the Supreme Court declared the statute a violation of
the right of privacy "founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept
of personal liberty." 10 However, the Court declared that the right of
privacy was qualified by compelling state interests. 11 This balancing of
the right of privacy against the state's interests resulted in a trimester
framework for legal analysis of state efforts to regulate abortion.
For the first trimester of pregnancy, no state interest was found to
be "compelling." Therefore, a woman was free to decide whether to
have an abortion, so long as she did so in consultation with her physician.12 This was so because, until approximately the end of the first
three months, the first trimester, medical science had demonstrated that
it was safer to have an abortion than to carry the fetus to term. 13 At the
end of this period, the state's interest in maternal health was considered
to be compelling. Thus, from the beginning of the second trimester, the
state could reasonably regulate abortion in order to promote maternal
health. 14
6. Roe, 410 U.S. at 120. A physician, James Hallford, MD, intervened in the case, and a
married couple, using the pseudonyms of John and Mary Doe, were also plaintiffs. The district
court granted standing to Dr. Hallford but denied it to the Does. /d. at 120-29. The appeal was
taken directly to the Supreme Court, which granted standing only to Jane Roe. /d.
7. Roe, 410 U.S. at 120.
8. /d. at 118.
9. /d.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

/d. at
/d. at
/d. at
/d. at
Jd. at

153.
154.
163.
149, 163.
163. Subsequent cases have allowed minimal health regulations in the first trimes-

RIGHT TO ABORTION

181]

185

At the point of viability, the Court held that the state's interest in
"potential life" became compelling. 15 Thus, for roughly the last trimester of pregnancy, the state "may go so far as to proscribe abortion ...
except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the
mother." 16 The fetus was held to have no rights of its own, because the
Court decided it was not a "person," within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. 17
The Texas statute was declared unconstitutional for sweeping too
broadly, by failing to distinguish among the stages of pregnancy and by
allowing only the exception for preserving maternal life. 18 The abortion
statutes of all of the states fell along with the Texas statute: Roe made
them unenforceable.

3.

Critiques

The radical departure of Roe from the norm was evident in its
rejection by legal scholars. So much ink has been spilled in the debate
over Roe that a comprehensive review of the literature is impossible
here. 19 Rather, a sketch of early classics will be given to provide background for the analysis in this article. The excellent analysis of these
early works has not been matched.
Some of these early critiques were philosophical in nature. For
instance, Charles Rice, in The Dred Scott Case of the Twentieth Century, 20 placed Roe at the apex of modern positivist jurisprudence and
then attacked the entire structure. Some of the more cogent critiques
from a philosophical-jurisprudential perspective appeared in Catholic
publications. 21 Nearly all early critiques of Roe featured prominent discussions of the personhood of the fetus. The philosophical literature,
likewise, especially emphasized the personhood arguments. Another
noteworthy aspect of this literature was the fear expressed that the
abortion precedent, because of its loose language and lack of constitutional roots, would expand into a precedent for infanticide and euthanasia. 22 It is at least arguable that the casual judicial attitude toward
teras well. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
15. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
16. /d. at 163-64.
17. /d. at 158.
18. /d. at 164.
19. By 1985, "Roe ha[d] been the subject of more than 200 law review articles published
since 1973." Wardle, Rethinking Roe v. Wade, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REV. 231, 237 n.39.
20. Rice, The Dred Scott Case of the Twentieth Century, 10 Hous. L. REv. 1059 (1973)
21. Similarly, Catholic legal scholars of the 1930's were a force in the reaction to Legal
Realism, of which Roe is clearly a product. See E. PuRcn.L, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 159-78 (1973)(ch. 9).
22. See, e.g., Rice, supra note 20, at 1065-67 (discussing Kelsen's "pure" theory of law as
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the rights of handicapped infants displayed in cases such as the Bloomington, Indiana, "Baby Doe" case is a function of Roe. 23
Other early Roe criticisms were from a positivist perspective.
Many were by supporters of abortion rights. John Hart Ely's The
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade 24 may be the most
insightful discussion of Roe's shortcomings as constitutional adjudication. After surveying its logical leaps and lapses, Ely concluded that
Roe was a "Lochnering" opinion much more dangerous than the previous activist opinions of the Warren Court. Roe, he concluded, might be
durable, but it was,
a very bad decision. Not because it [would] perceptibly weaken the
Court ... and not because it conflict[ ed] with [his] idea of progress ..
. . It [was] bad because it [was] bad constitutional law, or rather because it [was] not constitutional law and [gave] almost no sense of an
obligation to try to be. 25

Archibald Cox agreed that Roe was a bad decision, but he seemed
to disagree that Roe was durable.
My criticism of Roe ... is that the Court failed to establish the legiticited favorably in Byrn v. New York City Health and Hasps. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d
887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972)).
23. See In re The Treatment and Care of Infant Doe, No. GU-8204-004A, slip op. at 2
(Monroe County Cir. Ct., Ind. Apr. 12, 1983), Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition
denied sub nom. State of Indiana ex rei Infant Doe v. Monroe Circuit Court, No. 482S 140 (Ind.
Apr. 14, 1983), cert. denied, sub nom. Infant Doe v. Bloomington Hospital, 104 S. Ct. 394
(1983), reprinted in 2 ISSUES IN LAw & MED. 77 (1986). The "slippery slope" is also discernible
in the attitudes expressed in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395
(D.D.C. 1983)(infanticide); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom.
Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)(euthanasia); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App.
3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)(suicide). See also "wrongful life cases:" Turpin
v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982)(California); Harbeson v.
Parke-Davis, 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983)(en banc)(Washington), Procanic v. Cillo, 97
N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984)(New Jersey).
24. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
25. Id. at 947 (emphasis in original). Ely related a similar critique in DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST (1980). Cf Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
Ely's argument that the court was not engaging in constitutional law in Roe is bolstered by
recently released memoranda between members of the Roe majority written during consideration
of Roe. The memoranda, found in papers of Justice Douglas and released by the Library of
Congress, expressed concern that much of the opinion constituted "dicta" and questioned "the
desireability of dicta being quite so inflexibility 'legislative.'" The memoranda reveal the author
of Roe acknowledging that the opinion contained dictum and that the lines drawn were "arbitrary." Noticeably absent was discussion of the requirements of the Constitution; rather, the exchanges read like negotiations among members of a legislative conference committee seeking to
hammer out compromise legislation. Woodward, The Abortion Papers, The Washington Post,
Jan. 22, 1989, at D1, col. 1. The memoranda help put in context Justice White's charge that in
Roe and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the majority was engaged in an exercise of •· •.• w
judicial power." Id. at 222 (White, J., dissenting).
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macy of the decision by articulating a precept of sufficient abstractness to lift the ruling above the level of a political judgment .... The
failure to confront the issue in principled terms leaves the opinion to
read like a set of hospital rules and regulations, whose validity is good
enough this week but will be destroyed with new statistics upon the
medical risks of childbirth and abortion or new advances in providing
for the separate existence of a foetus .... Constitutional rights ought
not to be created . . . unless they can be stated in principles sufficiently absolute to give them roots throughout the community and
continuity over ... time .... 1111

As things now stand, it appears that Cox's viswn of the future was
more correct than the Roe Court's belief that the progressive forces of
history indicated the decision it delivered. 27
Alexander Bickel wrote a brief but telling analysis. Roe "may be a
wise model statute," he wrote, but he expressed reservations about the
Court's prohibition of "state regulation of the places where the abortion
[was] . . . performed. The state regulates and licenses restaurants and
pool halls and ... God knows what else in order to protect the public;
why may it not similarly regulate ... abortion clinics, or doctors' offices ... ?" 28 Ultimately, Bickel agreed with Ely: "One is left to ask
why. The Court never said. It refused the discipline to which its function is properly subject." 29
Richard Epstein also argued that "Roe . . . [was] symptomatic of
the analytical poverty possible in constitutional litigation. " 30 Epstein
criticized Roe's irrationality and the Supreme Court's activism, concluding that "we must criticize both Mr. Justice Blackmun in Roe v.
Wade ... and the entire method of constitutional interpretation that
allows the Supreme Court ... both to 'define' and to 'balance' interests
on the major social and political issues of our time. " 31 Epstein also
criticized the Court's laxness in procedural issues-Roe's standing and
the mootness of her case. Recognizing the procedural laxness as both a
symptom and a cause of the Court's generally slipshod activism, Epstein argued that Roe's case was moot and that she should have been
26. A. Cox, THE RoLE OF THE SuPREME CouRT IN AMERICAN GovERNMENT 113-14
(1976).
27. See Abortion, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 10, 1973, at 9 ("[I]f the Court's guess concerning the probable and desirable direction of progress is wrong, it will nevertheless have been imposed on all 50 states, and imposed permanently, unless the Court itself should in future change
its mind.").
28. A. BICKEL, THE MoRALITY oF CoNSENT 27 (1975).
29. ld. at 28.
30. Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SuP.
CT. REV. 159, 184.
31. !d. at 185.
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denied standing. 32 The presence of a doctor in the initial litigation
showed "that the Court was mistaken when it held that the mootness
requirement must be relaxed in the abortion cases because they present
questions which [would] constantly arise yet be incapable of review." 33
He added, "The criminal trial of a doctor would provide him with
every opportunity to challenge the abortion statute on its face. " 34 These
lapses on technical questions mark abortion jurisprudence to the present day. 3 "
Philip Heymann and Douglas Barzelay, defenders of Roe's result,
sought to rewrite the Court's opinion. They argued that "Roe was amply justified both by precedent and by those principles that have long
guided the court in making the ever-delicate determination of when it
must tell a state that it may not pursue certain measures .... " 36 However, the authors acknowledged that Justice Blackmun obscured the argument favoring a constitutional right to abortion. 37
Donald Regan noted that the precedent on which Heymann and
Barzelay depended was "a rag-tag lot."
Most of them either claim to be or are best understood as being primarily about something other than 'marriage, procreation, and childrearing.' It is not clear that they add up to anything at all, especially
when one remembers other cases in which colorable claims concerning
marriage, procreation, or child rearing have received short shriftas

Regan based his own support for abortion on the Good Samaritan doc32. /d. at 164-65.
33. /d. at 164.
34. /d.
35. See Brief for the United States Amicus Curiae at 2-6, 10-14, Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)(No.84-495). These rules serve a
useful purpose, just as substantive rules of law do. As will be discussed below, this recurrent
heedlessness in the abortion context is another source of instability in abortion jurisprudence. See
infra section III-D of this article for a further treatment of procedural and adjudicatory matters.
36. Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53
B.U.L. REV. 765, 765 (1973).
37. /d. ("The language of the Court's opinion in Roe too often obscures the full strength of
the ... argument that underlies its decision."). Heymann and Barzelay's thesis stands or falls on
their interpretation of the precedent cited in Roe. It is argued below that this interpretation is
impressionistic and unjustifiable. Perhaps in recognition of the fact that no matter how looselv the
privacy precedents are construed the abortion right does not follow. The authors argued for a
more open-ended jurisprudence. Yet, even if their fundamental values approach is accepted, it is
by no means clear that the abortion right is fundamental. The Supreme Court's skewed history in
Roe certainly casts doubt on this. /d. at 777-83. See also Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 CourM. L. REv.
1410 (1974).
38. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569, 1639 (1 979)(citing Sosna v.
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975)); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Baker v. Owen, 423
U.S. 907 (1975), summarily affg 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
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trine. 39 Applying an altered form of equal protection analysis, 40 he argued that the physical and psychological burdens imposed on the woman desiring an abortion were greater than those imposed on any other
potential Samaritan. 41 This basis, he argued, "provide(d] a better justification than the Court's for the result in Roe. " 42
Laurence Tribe has adduced a similar argument in his latest attempt to rewrite Roe. 43 Tribe is the embodiment of the confusion created by Roe's poor reasoning. He has developed and discarded several
alternative justifications for Roe in the past thirteen years. In Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 44
he argued that, in this century, only religious groups have purported to
decide when a human being with independent moral claims begins life.
Since this is the central question of the abortion debate, it cannot be
resolved without an unconstitutional entanglement of church and state,
he argued.' 5
Tribe has since conceded that this argument is faulty. 46 Subsequent to the religious entanglement argument, Tribe argued that Roe
could be justified based on a judicial right to intervene during a state of
moral flux to help a new consensus evolve.' 7
Finally, Tribe has concluded that the fundamental issue in abortion jurisprudence is power. 48 This issue has been obscured by discussions of privacy and physicians' rights, he claimed.' 9 According to this
analysis, pregnancy, at least the unwanted variety, enslaves women.
They are deprived of the equal protection of the laws. The ConstituRegan, supra note 38, at 1569.
/d.
/d. at 1572.
/d. at 1642. It is beyond the scope of this article to rebut all the alternatives offered in
Roe. A systematic rebuttal of the asserted alternatives may be found in Bopp, Will There
be a Constitutional Right to Abortion after the Reconsideration of Roe v. Wade, 15 J. CoNTEMP.
L. -- (1989). It is, however, a sign of how low Roe has fallen in legal opinion that the Good
Samaritan doctrine, with all its readily applicable exceptions, is considered a better foundation for
an abortion right than Roe's analysis. Cf Alexander, Modern Equal Protection Theories: A
Metatheoretical Taxonomy and Critique, 42 OHio ST. L.J. 3, 40 n.114 (1981)(arguing that Regan violated goal of avoiding moral issues).
43. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and
the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REv. 330, 335-36 (1985).
44. 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973).
45. /d. at 23-29.
46. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 928-29 (1978). See also McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
47. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269, 293 (1975); Tribe,
Childhood, Suspect Classifications, and Conclusive Presumptions: Three Linked Riddles, 39
LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 8 (Summer 1975).
48. Tribe, supra note 43, at 335-36.
49. /d. at 335.
39.
40.
41.
42.
place of
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tion, he argued, imposes affirmative duties to eradicate such inequality.50 Tribe cited the thirteenth amendment's prohibition of involuntary
servitude, from which he deduced certain inalienable rights which the
government must uphold. One of these, he claimed, was a federallyfunded abortion. 51
Michael Perry is another writer who is pro-abortion but critical of
Roe. 52 He attempted to defend its result by arguing that Roe was a
ratification of conventional morality. 53 That, he argued, is part of the
Court's function in policing legislation designed to regulate public
morality. 54
Thomas Grey argued that Roe was a ratification of "the stabilitycentered concerns of moderate conservative family and population policy."55 In effect, this approach amounts to the ratification of the personal prejudices of the Court's majority. Grey saw the abortion and
contraception cases (as well as Stanley v. Georgia, 56 an obscenity possession case) not as endorsing any liberty principles, 57 but as decisions
"dedicated to the cause of social stability .... " 58 He argued that these
cases represented "two standard conservative views: that social stability
is threatened by excessive population growth, 59 and that family stability
50. /d.
51. /d. at 335, 338.
52. Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of
Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REv. 689 (1976).
53. /d. at 733.
54. /d. at 694. It is arguable that the Court's assessment of conventionul morality is wrong in
the abortion cases, or was wrong in 1973. Is the function of the Court simply to ratify what it
perceives (perhaps not impartially) to be widely held values, even if these values are not tied to the
Constitution> /d. at 734. See Rice, supra note 20, at 1066. Certainly, the Legal Realists saw such
ratification as the function of juridical science. See, e.g., Danzig, A Comment on the jurisprudence
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621 (1975). But see Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429, 434 (1984)(The fact of widely-held "racial prejudice, however real, cannot justify a
racial classification removing an infant child from the custody of its natural mother .
."). It
seems that law-making and adjudication involve something more than the reading of historical
trends and the taking of informal opinion polls. Of course, Roe did not ratify the common consensus, even if it purported to do so. Justice Blackmun polled primarily the opinions of elite groups,
such as the American Medical Association and the American Bar Association. These groups have
their own biases. A majority of the voters in a majority of the states had voted otherwise through
their legislatures.
55. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 83, 90
(Summer 1980).
56. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
57. Grey, supra note 55, at 84 (contrary to allegations of contemporary disciples of John
Stuart Mill).
58. /d. at 88.
59. Indeed, the ideological origins of the pro-abortion movement lay in the population control
movement-a movement financed and propelled in large part by professionals and moderate to
liberal Republican-types, not unlike some members of the Court. See generally NATHANSON,
ABORTING AMERICA (1979) for the intellectual history of the pro-abortion movement. See also S.
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is threatened by unwanted pregnancies, with their accompanying fragile marriages, single-parent families, irresponsible youthful parents,
and abandoned or neglected children." 60
Given the intellectual history of the pro-abortion movement, the
background of key figures on the Court, and the language of Roe,
Grey's version of the mental processes behind Roe may be the most
accurate and honest explanation of that opinion. The great deference to
and preoccupation with medical opinion evident in Roe, 61 Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 62 and Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health 63 offer evidence that Roe reflects the
prejudices of a few representatives of the professional classes. Justices
Blackmun and Powell, the authors of those opinions, have strong ties to
the medical community. Blackmun was formerly general counsel to the
Mayo Clinic. Powell is from a family of obstetrician-gynecologists.
Grey's explanation of Roe has been avoided by others, despite its
reinforcement of the common charge that Roe is judicial legislation, and
despite its compatibility with the Legal Realism school. Perhaps this is
because verification requires some judicial "psychoanalysis," or because
it is impolite to suggest that Supreme Court justices are not objective. 64
Grey's analysis, nevertheless, has common-sense appeal, even if it is not
scientifically verifiable.
Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg in a 1985 essay continued the reanalysis of Roe. 611 She declared that "the Court ventured too far in the
KRASON, ABORTION: POLITICS, MORALITY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1984).
60. Grey, supra note 55, at 88. Grey went on to suggest that fornication and sodomy laws
would one day be invalidated for similar reasons. "Thousands of couples are living together today
outside of marriage. The fornication laws ... stand in the way of providing a stable legal framework for . . . these unions." !d. at 97. "Similarly, the homosexual community is becoming an
increasingly public sector of our society." !d. But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 476 U.S. 747
(1986)(declaring laws against sodomy constitutional).
61. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
62. 428 U.S. 52 ( 197 6 ).
63. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
64. See Dixon, The "New" Substantive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 85-87 (arguing that Roe resulted from the Court working out its
own legislative compromise among competing groups).
65. Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63
N.C.L. REV. 375 (1985). John Robertson has also sought to justify Roe v. Wade in a 1987
volume of the AMERICAN joURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE devoted to praising Justice Blackmun.
However, while seeking to justify Roe he differs with Roe's reliance on the burdens of childrearing
because those may be eliminated by adoption. Robertson, Gestational Burdens and Fetal Status:
Justifying Roe v. Wade, 13 AM. J. L. & Mm. 189, 193 (1987). His primary focus is on the
personhood of the unborn, seeking by a discussion of the stages of human d~velopment to demonstrate that a fetus is not a person. !d. at 194-202. For present purposes, his conclusion is relevant:
"Roe v. Wade has begun a dialogue ... that needs refinement and further elaboration." ld. at
212. While praising Justice Blackmun and Roe, Robertson notes Roe's "limited analysis" contained "defects." /d.
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change it ordered and presented an incomplete justification for its action."66 In place of Roe's "medically approved autonomy idea," Ginsburg implies that she would have substituted a "constitutionally based
sex-equality perspective." 67 She noted that Roe's "[h]eavy-handed judicial intervention was difficult to justify and appears to have provoked,
not resolved, conflict. " 68
The Court's attempt to anchor the abortion right in the history of
western civilization has also received numerous criticisms. A more detailed treatment of this aspect is found below in the discussion of privacy rights.
Two passages from the August 1979 Michigan Law Review, an
issue wholly devoted to abortion jurisprudence, summarize the critiques
well. In the first, Richard Morgan observed:
Rarely does the Supreme Court invite critical outrage as it did in Roe
by offering so little explanation for a decision that requires so much.
The stark inadequacy of the Court's attempt to justify its conclusions
... suggests to some scholars that the Court, finding no justification
at all in the Constitution, unabashedly usurped the legislative
function. 69
In the second passage, the editors of the law review, surveying the
literature on Roe, concluded, "[T]he consensus among legal academics
seems to be that, whatever one thinks of the holding, the opinion is
unsatisfying. " 70
The great doubt about Roe's validity, and the wide disagreement
among scholars on an acceptable substitute for Justice Blackmun's
opinion, suggest that Roe cannot be satisfactorily modified and should
be overruled.

B.

Stare Decisis Abuse

The deviation of abortion case law from the usual rules of law is
also evident in the abuse of the doctrine of stare decisis in Roe and the
subsequent abortion cases. The soundness of Roe's analysis and the
doctrine of stare decisis have been invoked as the twin justifications of
post-Roe decisions dealing with legislative attempts to regulate abortion. 71 Justice Powell stated this explicitly in Akron:
66. Ginsburg, supra note 65, at 376.
67. ld. at 386.
68. /d. at 385-86.
69. Morgan, Roe v. Wade and the Lesson of the Pre-Roe Case Law, 77 MICH. L. REV.
1724, 1724 (1979).
70. Editor's Preface, 77 MICH. L. REv. (no number)(1979).
71. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 420 n.1 (1983).
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There are especially compelling reasons for adhering to stare decisis
in applying the principles of Roe v. Wade. That case was considered
with special care .... Since Roe was decided ... the Court repeatedly and consistently has accepted and applied the basic principle that
a woman has a fundamental right to make the highly personal choice
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 72

This language may have signaled only a desire to adhere to the
basic principle of Roe-that the privacy right includes a fundamental
abortion right-and not the whole trimester framework. 73 The Akron
Court may actually have been backing away from certain aspects of
Roe, as Akron seemed to represent a modification of the Roe framework.74 Yet, even where the Court seemed to back away from the language of Roe, it took pains to formally re-affirm the Roe trimester standard. That standard, claimed Justice Powell, "continues to provide a
reasonable legal framework for limiting a State's authority to regulate
abortions. " 76
This adherence to Roe on the dual and distinct grounds of inherent soundness and stare decisis is significant. Roe's analysis is criticized
even by those who accept the substantive result of that decision. 76 Roe is
probably the most rewritten (by critics) opinion in Supreme Court history. Despite such general criticism, Roe endures. This indicates that it
is the doctrine of stare decisis, not the intrinsic soundness of the opinion, that preserves Roe. 77 However, the analysis employed in Roe, and
72. /d.
73. Wardle has argued this. Wardle, supra note 19, at 251-52. However, Wardle acknowledged that the abortion privacy doctrine alone is sweeping in the regulations it prohibits, quite
apart from the trimester scheme. /d. at 249.
74. See, e.g., Comment, Abortion: From Roe to Akron, Changing Standards of Analysis, 33
CATH. U.L. R~:v. 393 (1984). The author charged that the Court in Akron retreated from the
"bright-line" trimester scheme in the name of physician discretion. In Akron the Court refined its
trimester scheme in light of new standards established by the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists. Akron, 462 U.S. at 437. But see Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64 (1976)("[I)t is not the proper function of the legislature or the courts to
place viability, which essentially is a medical concept . . . . "). There seems to be some tension
between the Supreme Court's imposition of the trimester rule and its affinity for physician discretion. Compare Akron, 462 U.S. at 429-31 with Akron, 462 U.S. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
and Comment, Abortion: From Roe to Akron, Changing Standards of Analysis, supra, at 415-17
with Comment, Toward Constitutional Abortion Control Legislation: The Pennsylvania Approach, 87 DicK. L. Rt:v. 373, 377 (1983).
75. Akron, 462 U.S. at 429 n.ll.
76. See, e.g., Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and
Law, 87 HARV. L. Rt:v. I (1973); L. TRIBE, supra note 46; Ely, supra ~ote 24; Regan, supra
note 38. See also Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 36.
77. In a recent poll of federal judges, only 33 percent thought Roe "was correctly decided,
although an additional 31 percent said that despite their disagreement with the decision, they
would not overturn it." The View from the Bench, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 10, 1987, at S12.
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developed in subsequent decisions, is fundamentally antithetical to the
values that underlie the doctrine of stare decisis. 78

1.

Traditional view of the doctrine of stare decisis

The doctrine of stare decisis is essential to a system founded upon
the rule of law. Justice Powell acknowledged this in Akron: "[T]he
doctrine of stare decisis, while perhaps never entirely persuasive on a
constitutional question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a society
governed by the rule of law. " 79
The rule of law is one of the foundation stones of American society. The concept is crucial to the debate over Roe. A preliminary examination of political and jurisprudential theory 80 will demonstrate why
this 1s so.
a. The American rule of law. The debate over the optimum system of governance has raged for millenia. Aristotle pointed out the
weakness of a constitutional system incorporating the rule of law with
an analogy:
The advocates of kingship maintain that the laws speak only in general terms, and cannot provide for circumstances; and that for any
science to abide by written rules is absurd. In Eqypt the physician is
allowed to alter his treatment after the fourth day, but if sooner, he
takes the risk. Hence it is clear that a government acting according to
written laws is plainly not the best. Yet surely the ruler cannot dispense with the general principle which exists in law; and that is a
better ruler which is free from passion than that in which it is innate.
78. Abortion jurisprudence undermines the rule of law and stare decisis in many ways, as
shown below. For example, Akron suggested that state legislators keep abreast of the latest medical standards and techniques. Akron, 462 U.S. at 431 (The state may not "depart from accepted
medical practice."). By so doing they may have some hope of constitutionally regulating abortion.
/d. Yet, the Akron Court ignored the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(ACOG) standards, on which it relied so heavily in evaluating maternal health interests, when it
came to Akron's informed consent provision. ACOG recommended that "sufficient time for reflection" be allowed a woman seeking an abortion, yet the Court struck down a codification of this
notion. Akron, 462 U.S. at 473 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)(citing ACOG STANDARDS FOR OBSTETRIC-GYNECOLOGICAL SERVICES 54 (5th ed. 1982)). There is no guidance by the Court as to
when a legislator should follow current medical opinion and when to ignore it.
79. Akron, 462 U.S. at 419-20 (emphasis added).
80. While juridical science is not identical to political science, it is a part of political science.
This is an ancient notion given fresh impetus by Legal Realists, Critical Legal Studies (CLS)
adherents, and others, who acknowledge the link between politics and judicial decision-making.
Most modern theorists tend to subjectify politics and devalue political theory, while CLS seems to
identify politics and judicial decision-making. However, it is impossible to gain a proper appreciation of abortion jurisprudence without placing it in its proper political context. The problems
created by Roe are more than logical puzzles for lawyers and law professors. They are moral and
political problems. Indeed, Roe has had an impact on American mores and has hastened the transformation of American politics.
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Whereas the law is passionless, passion must always sway the heart
of man. Yes, it may be replied, but then on the other hand an individual will be better able to deliberate in particular cases. 81

This statement is emblematic of the argument against a constitution based on the rule of law: as it is folly for a physician to treat a
patient according to fixed rules, so it is folly to tie the hands of rulers
with fixed, pre-determined laws. Each situation is different. Discretion
is required. There are too many contingencies for fixed rules to apply.
It is noteworthy, however, that Aristotle concluded the above discussion
with a comment that, where one feared for his safety at the hands of a
physician, one "would be more inclined to seek treatment by the rules
of a text-book." 82 The American revolutionaries had seen the "physician," the English monarch, in action and feared for their safety.
Rejecting the arguments for giving wide discretion to political authorities, our founding fathers set out to create a rule of law regime par
excellence. The Declaration of Independence set forth the principle
along with a catalogue of the abuses of royal prerogative. The new
republic had practical experience with the evils of discretionary rule.
The Constitution set forth a rule of law in its enumeration of powers
and fundamental rights. This was reinforced by the Bill of Rights.
These were safeguards against the types of abuses the framers of the
Constitution observed in the mercurial legislatures of the day. 83 In the
debate over rule of law versus rule of men, the prudent, practical judgment of American statesmen has usually been for the rule of law.
In our constitutional system, the rule of law means that the law,
duly enacted by the representatives of the people, governs. No official
may exercise power not granted to him or her by law. The rule of law
operates on two levels, on the rulers and on the ruled.
Rules are imposed on rulers to guide them in their duties and to
curb their discretion in likely areas of abuse. For example, the Constitution prohibits ex post facto laws. 84 Likewise, the first amendment
guards an area of traditional abuse. There may be excellent reasons to
retain the power of censorship in the hands of the ruler. However, the
Constitution reflects the practical judgment that, despite its advantages,
e.g., in national emergencies, censorship should not be allowed. It is
safer to generally prohibit such censorship, with judicial oversight of
81. ARISTOTLE, PoLITICS 1286A, lines 10-22 (2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
2042 (Barnes ed. 1984)).
82. /d. at 1287a, lines 37-38 (2 Tm: COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE at 2043).
83. See, e.g., G. WooD, THt: CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969);
B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967).
84. U.S. CoNS'!'. art. I, § 9, cl.3.
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any possible exceptions. 811
The essence of self-government is a sharing of the activities of ruling and being ruled. Rulers are not above the law and are required to
maintain the rule of law. Rulers must impose rules of conduct on "private" societal actors when the public good requires it. Such regulation
is only tolerated where essential, due to the favored status of individual
discretion in our individualistic society.
The most novel aspect of the framers' new scheme of politics was
their preference for regulating private conduct through an invisible
hand mechanism-many factions competing and cancelling each other
out. 86 The federalist system envisioned a similar mechanism operating
at the level of society's rulers-a system of ambition checking ambition.87 This striving all takes place within a framework of constitutional rules, regulating the conduct of the rulers.
Such rules were intended to apply to the judiciary as well. As
Judge Robert Bork has observed, "[T]he Court's power is legitimate
only if it has, and can demonstrate in reasoned opinion that it has, a
valid theory derived from the Constitution .... " 88 If the Court chooses
rather to pretend it has a theory (or offers none at all), while imposing
its own "predilections, the Court violates the postulates of the Madisonian model that alone justifies its power." 89 Furthermore, any theory
which the Court employs must not only be neutrally applied but also
neutrally defined and neutrally derived from the Constitution. 90 Otherwise judges are simply "imposing their values on the rest of us." 91
In places the language of the Constitution is ambiguous. This allows for some modification of the rules in light of changing circumstances.92 The Constitution also provides a formal amendment process
85.
86.
87.
88.

See, e.g., New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
THE FmERAI.IST No. 10 (J. Madison).
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison).
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.

L.J.

I, 3

(1971).

89. Jd.
90. Jd. at 7.

91. I d. Cf Wolfe, How the Constitution Was Taken Out of Constitutional Law, 10 HARV.
& PuB. Pm.'v 596 (1987).
92. Some textual indeterminacy, however, is not a general warrant for the unbridled discretion of any branch, least of all the judiciary. As Ely has noted, even the wildest pre-Roe activism
entailed some effort to trace the holding to some pre-existing constitutional rule. The Roe Court
paid lip service to this requirement by citing some privacy precedents. Ely, supra note 24, at 94749. Bork gives as an example of this type of modification the case of Brown v. Board of Education.
Bork, supra note 88, at 14. As those who initiated the fourteenth amendment stated only the
principle of racial equality as an objective, but were divergent as to the implications of this principle, the Court could only follow "the majestic and ambiguous formula: the equal protection of the
laws." ld. The Court could not impose the missing "detailed code" which might allow equality in
one .case but not another, as some were advocating. Id. Thus, as Bork declared, "the no-state-
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for more substantial changes. Beyond these, there IS no authority for
additions to or deletions from the Constitution.
However, the temptation is always strong for the Supreme Court
to act to resolve apparently urgent societal dilemmas. Such an urgent
need for intervention was felt by the Court in the early part of the
twentieth century. State and federal governments had decided that laissez-faire economics was not working. Social welfare legislation was enacted to curb business discretion. The Supreme Court responded by
striking down the legislation, in the name of freedom of contract (where
state regulation was involved) 93 or by narrow construction of the commerce clause (where federal regulation was involved). 94
The cases of this period are symbolized by Lochner v. New York. 911
In Lochner, the Court struck down state legislation limiting the hours
that bakers could be required by their employers to work. The ten
hours per day and sixty hours per week limitation was enacted, under
the states' traditional police power, to protect the health of bakers. The
tool employed by the Court to overthrow such legislation was substantive due process. The Court read its laissez-faire economic philosophy
into the "liberty" of the fourteenth amendment, in order to find a fundamental right to contract unfettered by government regulation. 96
This approach was strongly rejected by critics, by dissenting justices,97 and, eventually, by the Court itself. In 1963, the Court noted
the use of substantive due process in the past:
There was a time when the Due Process Clause was used by this
Court to strike down laws which were thought unreasonable, that is,
unwise or incompatible with some particular economic or social philosophy. In this manner the Due Process Clause was used, for example, to nullify laws prescribing maximum hours for work in bakeries,
outlawing "yellow dog" contracts, setting minimum wages for women,
and fixing the weight of loaves of bread. This intrusion by the judiciary into the realm of legislative value judgments was strongly objected
to at the time .... Mr. Justice Holmes said,
I think the proper course is to recognize that a state legislature can do
whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some express prohienforced-discrimination rule of Brown must overturn and replace the separate-but-equal doctrine
of Plessy v. Ferguson." /d. at 15.
93. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
94. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1
(1936); Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Rail;oad Retirement Bd. v.
Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
95. 198 u.s. 45 (1905).
96. /d. at 53.
97. See, e.g., id. at 74-75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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bition m the Constitution of the United States or of the State, and
that Courts should be careful not to extend such prohibitions beyond
their obvious meaning by reading into them conceptions of public policy that the particular Court may happen to entertain. 98

The Court then observed that the doctrine, "that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely, [had] been discarded." 99 The Court concluded, "We have returned to the original constitutional proposition
that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the
judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws." 100
It is noteworthy that this rejection of substantive due process was
not limited to economic matters, as some have argued, but extended to
"social" matters as well. 101 Further, the fact "that the 'right to abortion,' or noneconomic rights generally, accord more closely with 'this
generation's idealization of America' than the 'rights' asserted in ...
Lochner," makes no difference, declared Ely. 102 "[T]hat attitude," he
observed, "is precisely the point of the Lochner philosophy, which
would grant unusual protection to those 'rights' that somehow seem
most pressing, regardless of whether the Constitution suggests any special solicitude for them." 103
The Court has often been accused of "Lochnering" in Roe. 104
However, the parallels are more numerous than they first appear. Both
Roe and Lochner appear result-oriented, unjustified by the Constitution, and designed to protect a certain profession, rather than all interested parties. 1011 The reasoning process behind both sets of cases is analogous. Both reflect the clear biases of the justices. Both dealt with issues
that seemed especially pressing and important at the time (less so in a
broader historical perspective), but were not mentioned by the framers.
The Lochner Court was clearly sympathetic to, and allied with,
American business. It believed that sound policy dictated unfettered
business. Business discretion could be trusted to bring about the best
98. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963)(footnotes and citations omitted).
99. /d. at 730.
100. /d. (emphasis added). See also Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron &
Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 533-37 (1949).
101. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1961).
102. Ely, supra note 24, at 939 (footnotes omitted).
103. Id. (emphasis in original). Ely adds, "The Constitution has little to say about contract
[footnote omitted], less about abortion, and those who would speculate about which the framers
would have been more likely to protect may not be pleased with the answer." /d.
104. Ely, supra note 24, at 937-43; Epstein, supra note 30, at 168.
105. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense
and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 809, 812-21 (1935).
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state of affairs. The Court was willing to strain to find constitutional
support for this position. The justification for this faith was a belief in
equal bargaining power and identity of interests between business and
labor. 106 The Lochner model posited two free and equal
adults-employer and employee-entering into a mutually beneficial
agreement. By protecting the interests of the employer, the Court purported to protect the employee's interests. 107 Also bound up in the
Lochner argument was the notion of an independent right to earn a
living as one chooses. 108
Roe contained dicta reminiscent of this latter notion. 109 The Roe
Court was clearly sympathetic to the medical profession and believed in
its sound exercise of discretion. 110 The Roe model of the doctor-patient
relationship was predicated on an identity of interests between the physician and his patient. Because it was assumed that their interests exactly coincided with that of their patient, doctors have long been trusted
to define their own standard of care. Both physician and patient
benefitted from the patient's health. A physician's interest in more patients and payment of his fee would compel him to do justice. This
positive view of the doctor-patient relationship is analogous to the
Lochner Court's view of the employer-employee relationship. It was
assumed that the physician would offer his best judgment and advice in
assisting the woman to come to the best possible decision. 111
Just as the Lochner Court believed that state regulations were disrupting its model system, the Roe Court believed that state regulation
would disrupt the doctor-patient relationship. Doctors were to be left
unfettered. This model of the doctor-patient relationship is unrealistic,
especially in the abortion context, just as the Lochner Court's model of
labor relations was unrealistic at the time. 112
The states have responded to the breakdown of the "family physician" model of medical care just as they responded to perceived busi106. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 55, 57, 61.
107. /d.
108. /d. at 53.
109. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165-66. See also, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197 (1973).
110. Roe, 410 U.S. at 141-47, 156, 165-66; Bolton, 410 U.S. at 197; Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983). Akron relied heavily on the customs of the medical
profession and placed great faith in the doctor-patient relationship. /d. at 437, 450-51. See also
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 61, 65 n.4, 73-75 (1976).
111. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165-66; Bolton, 410 U.S. at 195-200; Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S.
379, 387 (1979). See also Wood & Durham, Counseling, Consulting, and Consent: Abortion and
the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 783, 785.
112. Wardle, supra note 19, at 244-45 n.72; Nathanson, Deeper Into Abortion, 291 N. ENG.
J. MED. 1189 (1974); Zekman & Warrick, The Abortion Lottery, Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 14,
1978, at 11-13.
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ness abuses. Statutes designed to limit abuses by physicians, such as
those at issue in Thornburgh, were, in this regard, similar to the state
regulations of the Lochner era. Federal abortion funding restrictions
and attempts to amend the Constitution to protect the unborn are analogous to New Deal reform attempts. Those attempts to reform or work
around the Supreme Court opinions of the Lochner era were thwarted
by the High Court.
Eventually, the Supreme Court recognized that the imposition of
its economic philosophy on the country was inappropriate. It acknowledged that stare decisis was not a compelling argument for adhering to
opinions that lacked the essentials of law. The Court recognized that
the rule of law was consistent with the regulation of private actors. 113
Hopefully, the Supreme Court will relearn the Lochner lesson,
recognize the unconstitutionality of its holding in Roe, and overturn
Roe. The rule of law in our Constitutional scheme requires such selfcorrection by the Court when the Court has transgressed the bounds of
its lawful authority.
Abortion jurisprudence, then, may be seen as antithetical to the
rule of law. It is so in several senses. First, it is based upon an unwarranted Constitutional theory. As shall be seen, the right to abortion
may not be logically derived from substantive due process, even if such
analysis were appropriate. The Court has never demonstrated the connection between the Constitution and the Court-created right to choose
abortion. Thus, the Court has transgressed a fundamental principle of
the rule of law-that all are bound by the law, even justices. They may
not lawfully exercise power where it IS unauthorized by the
Constitution.
Second, abortion jurisprudence is antithetical to the rule of law
because it grants an unwarranted degree of disrretion to a powerful
elite-physicians. By allowing this discretion, the Supreme Court has
impeded a primary function of the rule of law-to ensure impartiality
113. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)(acknowledging the reality of uneven
bargaining power); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)(permitting federal
regulation of labor relations). It might be argued that these opinions were inconsistent with the
rule of law, because they paved the way for a bureaucratic welfare state in which tremendous
power is delegated to unelected executive personnel. Nevertheless, the doctrine of Schecter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)(limiting standardless delegation of discretionary powers to the executive and to a private elite), still stands as a safeguard. Moreover, the history of
administrative law reveals persistent impositions of rule-of-law constraints to limit the discretion
of administrative agents. See, e.g., Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REv. 1669 (1975). While our constitutional scheme might have been modified in light
of changed circumstances, a distrust of unfettered discretion has remained constant. Today, however, three powerful groups seem to possess such discretion: the U.S. Supreme Court, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and physicians who perform abortions.
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among powerful social actors and that rulers and ruled act out of reason, principle, and the common good, rather than from passion and
self-interest.
Third, abortion case law is antithetical to the rule of law because
it undermines the ability of the state legislatures to enact generally applicable rules. This is an essential rule-of-law function. In the abortion
context, the Court has mandated physician discretion, requiring case by
case treatment of abortion. The Court has done this despite the fact
that abortion patients generally are not given individualized treatment
but are treated on a wholesale basis. The legal principle of treating like
cases alike is violated. By so doing, the Court undermines a rule-of-law
constraint on adjudication-the requirement of reasoned, principled decision-making. As will be demonstrated, the Court fails to treat abortion the same as other privacy rights, analogous medical procedures,
and other legal issues involving the unborn.
Fourth, the rule of law also requires statutes, regulations, and judicial pronouncements to be susceptible to obedience. Yet, it is often
difficult for state legislatures to determine just what regulation of abortion is permitted. A ready example is the Court's confusing pronouncements on post-viability regulations. Is the trimester scheme a "brightline" framework, or does the physician have discretion to adjust these
lines according to his own determination of viability?
Fifth, a corollary principle is the importance of stability in the
law. Despite invocation of Roe as a polestar for creating and reviewing
abortion regulation, abortion law has been marked by instability and
uncertainty. As will be shown, the Supreme Court's pronouncements
have been far from clear. As a result, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
predict what the Court will do with any given regulation.
b. Stare Decisis. To allow obedience to and stability in the law,
the rule-of-law doctrine of stare decisis has been developed. One of the
essential aspects of the rule of law is that laws must be known in order
to be followed. Thus, we have statute books. Where courts make law,
the decisions of the courts are written and published. Where questions
of law arise in subsequent cases, prior opinions are consulted for the
controlling rules of law. Unless a prior decision is overruled as incorrect, the precedent is binding on subsequent cases. Judges are bound by
the laws they have made before, unless they provide rationale for overturning them. They may not make ad hoc dispositions of cases.
If employed properly, the doctrine makes it possible to predict,
with reasonable accuracy, what a court will decide in future cases
which raise similar issues. As will be shown next, abortion jurisprudence undermines the rule of law by neglecting the proper application
of the doctrine of stare decisis in abortion cases.
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Court neglect of stare decisis in abortion cases

It is ironic that, while claiming to follow Roe, the Court has systematically gutted Roe to allow the current desired result. The doctrine
of stare decisis presupposes a precedent with content to be followed. By
emptying Roe of content, the Court's appeal to stare decisis is now an
appeal only to the skeletal concept that a woman may have an abortion
whenever she desires, for whatever reason.
The Court indicates this to be the core and substance of the precedent it follows. It has struck down any meaningful attempt to codify the
restrictions allowed in Roe and abandoned key elements of the Roe
formula when convenient. It is clear, then, that, while the Court raises
the cry of stare decisis, it has not in fact followed its own precedent,
except in the most skeletal fashion. Illustrations abound. Some are set
forth below.
a. Erosion of Roe's "bright line" trimester analysis. In Roe, the
Court adopted its famous trimester scheme.U 4 In the first trimester, the
state could impose little regulation. "[T]he abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician." 1111 In the second trimester, the state could
regulate abortion to protect its compelling interest in maternal
health. 116 Beginning with viability (roughly the third trimester), the
state's interest in the fetus became compelling, and it could even proscribe abortion, with exceptions to protect the life or health of the
mother. 117
In Gary-Northwest Indiana Women's Services v. Bowen, 118 an Indiana District Court adhered to the precedent in Roe. At issue was a
statute requiring hospitalization for second trimester abortions. 119 The
plaintiffs argued that, since the D & E (dilation and evacuation) abortion techniques had improved since Roe, the hospitalization requirement was no longer rationally related to maternal health for at least the
first half of the second trimester. 120 They argued that the second trimester should be split in half and clinic abortions allowed through
eighteen weeks. 121
The trial court rejected such argument, saying that "[ t ]o adopt the
114. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-66.
115. ld. at 164.
116. !d.
117. !d. at 164-65.
118. 496 F. Supp. 894 (N.D. Ind. 1980) affd sub. nom. Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's
Servs. v. Orr, 451 U.S. 934 (1981).
119. !d. at 896.
120. !d. at 897.
121. !d.
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plaintiffs argument would require this Court to controvert the express
language of Roe. " 122 The court noted that Roe had specifically addressed the issue, and quoted Roe, emphasizing the relevant portions:
Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are requirements as to the qualifications of the person who is to perform the
abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility in which
the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital .... 123
The district court then continued:
The language is clear. A hospitalization requirement for second trimester abortions is constitutional. Indiana and many other states have
relied on this interpretation of the language. This Court has "an obligation to follow the precedents of our highest Court." (Citation omitted.] This Court is bound by the language of Roe. This Court may
not controvert specific rulings of the Supreme Court of the United
States. The express language of Roe mandates that Indiana's second
trimester hospitalization requirement be found by this Court to be
constitutional. 124
The district court went on to indicate that splitting the second trimester would require "some cutoff other than the end of the first trimester. The Roe language clearly demonstrates the intent of the Supreme Court to encourage, indeed force, states to use the end of the
first trimester as a cutoff point for regulations designed to protect maternal health." 1211 The court noted Roe's implied requirement that trimesters be treated as units and not broken up. 126
The Gary-Northwest court also rejected the argument that "Roe
allow[ed] regulation not of second trimester abortions, but only of abortions more dangerous than childbirth." 127 The court answered this
argument:
The specific ultimate rulings in Roe with regard to the various stages
of pregnancy were somewhat arbitrary judgments necessitated by a
wide variety of factors. This Court must respect Roe's specific ultimate rulings. If this Court does not respect the specific ultimate rulings in Roe, those rulings will lose their usefulness .... (S]tates will
be hard pressed to pursue their legitimate, compelling, interests in
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

/d. at 898.
/d. at 899 (emphasis in original); Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
Gary-Northwest, 496 F. Supp. at 899.
/d.
/d. at 900.
/d.
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protecting maternal health. 128

The court noted that making the rule depend on whether childbirth was more dangerous than abortion would require a case by case
determination of constitutionality, because the facts of each pregnancy
differ. 129 Further, "[i]f the Supreme Court had intended the test ... to
be the safety of the abortion relative to childbirth, the Supreme Court
would have so stated the test." 130 It did not, the district court noted, but
selected as the test the chronological stage of the pregnancy .131
Finally, the district court stated:
It would be impractical for the constitutionality of a second trimester
regulation to depend on a factual question, such as whether the regulation in fact reduced maternal morbidity and mortality. [This] would
require relitigation of the regulation's constitutionality with each
change in the availability of abortions, with each improvement in
abortion technique, and with each publication of statistics showing
that abortion skills had improved. Such an interpretation of Roe
would result in repeated relitigation of the constitutionality of the
same statute. It is the policy of the Supreme Court to avoid, if possible, the creation of rules of law which increase litigation. 132

Therefore, the court held that, since it was reasonably related to promoting maternal health, the second trimester hospitalization requirement was constitutional. 133 "A contrary ruling would controvert Roe,"
it concluded. 134
The Gary-Northwest case gave a clear example of stare decisis in
practice. As indicated in Gary-Northwest, many states relied on this
interpretation of Roe. 135 The United States Supreme Court summarily
affirmed the decision on appeal. 136 Not surprisingly, this was widely
interpreted as indicating the Court's continued approval of statutes requiring hospitalization for abortions after the first trimester. 137
128. /d.
129. /d.
130. /d.
131. /d.
\32. /d. at 901.
133. I d. at 902.
\34. /d.
135. /d. at 899.
136. Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs. v. Orr, 451 U.S. 934 (1981).
137. The view was not unanimous, however. See, e.g., Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F.
Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980)(Margaret S. (/));Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La.
1984)(Margaret S. (//)). Margaret S. (II) found Gary-Northwest not to be binding. Interestingly,
one distinction it employed was that Indiana had a broader definition of "hospital" than did Louisiana, thereby making second and third trimester abortions "more readily accessible in Indiana."
Margaret S. (//), 597 F. Supp. at 656. However, the court also cited the jurisdictional statement of
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With this clear statement of Roe, the precedent seemed clear. A
post-first trimester hospitalization requirement was constitutional. The
city council of Akron, Ohio, codified this precedent. 138 However, the
Supreme Court abandoned the doctrine of stare decisis in reviewing the
regulation.
The doctrine of stare decisis required the Supreme Court merely
to examine its own precedents and follow them. The district court in
A.kron did so/ 39 and the court of appeals affirmed. 140 The Supreme
Court reversed, because the American Public Health Association
(APHA) and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(ACOG) had altered their positions. 141 At the time of Roe, 142 and when
the Akron ordinance was enacted/ 43 APHA and ACOG recommended
hospitalization after the first trimester. By 1982, they did not. 144 The
Gary-Northwest, which set forth one of the three issues as, "[ w ]hether the district court abused its
discretion in preliminarily upholding the second trimester hospital restriction, when the overwhelming majority of Indiana hospitals ban all abortion services, and there is no compelling
health reason for mandatory hospitalization." /d. at 654 (capital letters removed). The distinction
based on accessibility seems a rather weak one at best. More importantly, as Margaret S. (II)
conceded, this issue "could possibly be characterized as substantive." /d. at 655 (other issues were
definitely procedural). The Margaret S. (II) court argued, however, that, since only a preliminary
injunction had been sought, this "was not tantamount to a decision on the merits on the constitutionality of a post-first trimester hospitalization requirement since it is clear that different standards apply in the granting of preliminary and permanent injunctions." /d. (citations omitted).
While this assertion of different standards is correct, it is not dispositive. As Margaret S. (II)
noted, one must show a "likelihood of success" (rather than "success") on the merits for a preliminary injunction. Thus, it is apparent that the Supreme Court did not believe that the district court
abused its discretion in finding it likely that the state would prevail at a trial of its post-first
trimester hospitalization requirement (even though one is not required to prove all one's case at a
preliminary injunction hearing). /d.
It is unlikely that the Supreme Court would have summarily affirmed if it had believed that a
second trimester hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional. The case was not entirely procedural, and the substantive aspect revolved around the sole issue of the hospitalization requirement. There was little doubt that the case would be widely perceived as placing the Court's endorsement on the hospitalization requirement. Indeed, this was the case with the Akron district
and appellate courts. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 426 (1983).
If the Supreme Court did not intend to affirm a post-first trimester hospitalization requirement, it
should have avoided the use of a summary affirmance, which certainly left such an impression.
There is strong evidence that the Court still felt the hospitalization requirement was constitutional
in 1981, because the American Public Health Association (APHA) and American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), its authorities, had not yet agreed on a change. In 1981,
APHA published its revised viewpoint, and ACOG's 1982 standards included its shift of opinion.
!d. at 437. Thus, the shift in medical opinion was just then in progress and was not yet completed.
138. Akron, Ohio, CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 1870.03 (1978)(requiring that all abortions after the first trimester be performed in a hospital).
139. Akron, 462 U.S. at 426.
140. /d.
141. !d. at 435-37.
142. /d. at 435.
143. !d. at 431.
144. /d. at 437.
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Court said the state (or its cities) may not "depart from accepted medical practice. " 145
The state may no longer look to the precedent of the Court, but
must now keep track of shifting medical opinions and follow them in
order to legislate constitutionally. The "bright-line" trimester approach
was abandoned. 146 The Court, by its "diligent research," 147 decided
that abortions in clinics were safe through the sixteenth week of pregnancy because of improvements in the D & E abortion technique. 148
Therefore, the state may no longer treat the trimester as a unit but
must fine-tune its legislation to the latest APHA and ACOG pronouncements. Of course, the Court's latest guideline at sixteen weeks
may not be safe for a legislator to follow, because ACOG now says
eighteen weeks is the proper place to draw the line. 149 One is left not
knowing whom to follow. In Akron, the Court followed medical organizations rather than its own pronouncements. 150

145. /d. at 434 (citations omitted).
146. See id. at 455 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
147. /d.
148. /d. at 436.
149. /d. at 437.
ISO. /d. The Akron Court attempted to find precedent for its holding in Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179 (1973). See Akron, 462 U.S. at 433. Bolton rejected a state requirement of hospitalization in accredited hospitals, for abortions in all three trimesters. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 194 (1973).
However, the Akron Court rewrote the Bolton precedent in so doing. The Bolton Court held
specifically the following: "We hold that the hospital requirement of the Georgia law, because it
fails to exclude the first trimester of pregnancy, see Roe, ... at 163, is also invalid." /d. at 195.
The Akron Court not only failed to clearly quote its holding in Bolton, but it relegated it to a
passing comment at the end of a footnote. Akron, 462 U.S. at 434 n.l9. The Bolton Court also
cited the state's failure to adduce enough evidence to support its hospital requirement for abortions
in all trimesters. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 195. This the Akron Court presented as the primary reason
for invalidation, rather than the first trimester infringement clearly indicated in the Court's own
statement of its holding. Akron, 462 U.S. at 433. In any event, the Supreme Court's subsequent
affirmation of Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs. v. Bowen, 496 F. Supp. 894 (N.D. Ind.
1980) ajj'd sub. nom. Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs. v. Orr, 451 U.S. 934 (1981), which
dealt with the issue of a second trimester hospitalization requirement, should have been dispositive
of any question of the required level of proof. The Gary-Northwest district court opinion supported the hospitalization requirement on rationality grounds:
Clearly, it is reasonable for a state to conclude that a hospitalization requirement will
promote health. It cannot be seriously disputed that medical risks accompany abortions.
It is therefore eminently reasonable to require that abortion be performed in a hospital.
Hospitalization may be the most obviously reasonable health-related regulation that
there is. [Citation omitted.] That is probably why the Supreme Court of the United
States expressly stated that hospitalization would be a regulation reasonably related to
maternal health. Indiana's determination that a hospitalization requirement would promote maternal health can be supported by reason.
Gary-Northwest, 496 F. Supp. at 902.
The Supreme Court affirmed Gary-Northwest, including the prominent statement by the
District Court that the "ultimate test" was "whether the legislature acted reasonably in determining that the regulation would promote maternal health." /d. Specifically rejected in Gary-North-
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In a footnote, Akron referred to Gary-Northwest, noting that the
court of appeals believed itself bound by this precedent. m The Supreme Court dismissed the case as not being binding. 1 ~ 2 It asserted this
by reading into Gary-Northwest an alternative decisional basis: that the
plaintiff did not prove the safety of second trimester abortions outside of
hospitals. 1 ~ 3 However, the district court in Gary-Northwest held that
"even if the plaintiffs could prove birth more dangerous than early second trimester D & E abortions," that would not affect the constitutionality of the statutes. 1 ~ 4 As Justice O'Connor observed, the Court simply
ignored this fact. 1 ~~
Thus, the Supreme Court first held post-first trimester hospitalization requirements constitutional (in keeping with APHA and ACOG
holdings) and then said they were not. This is a failure to observe the
doctrine of stare decisis. Even if the Court really meant one must keep
up with the latest rulings of medical panels, that also is a failure of
stare decisis, for, in Roe, trimesters were set forth as units, and now the
lines are being blurred. Surely stare decisis presupposes neutral principles "sufficiently absolute to give them roots throughout the community
and continuity over significant periods of time." 1 ~ 6 Finally, stare decisis
surely requires adherence to decisions by the courts and not to the moving target of changing medical opinions.
The approach of the Akron majority to stare decisis wreaks havoc
with the principles of the doctrine, especially consistency, susceptibility
of obedience and amenability to generally applicable laws. How may a
legislator predict what will be held constitutional under such a High
Court approach? Of course, this emphasizes again the fallacy of the
trimester approach, based as it is on the shifting sands of medical technology rather than on the bedrock of the Constitution.
Thus, stare decisis was abandoned in the same case (Akron) in
which it was declared to be controlling. The Court in Akron followed
what it wished in Roe and ignored what was inconvenient. In so doing,
it distorted stare decisis and made the abortion right more absolute.
b. Ignoring physician consultation requirements in abortion
cases. A second key concept of Roe was the requirement that the woman make the abortion decision "in consultation" with her physician,
west was the test of "whether the statute has the statistically demonstrable result of decreasing
maternal morbidity or mortality for specific groups of abortions." Id.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Akron, 462 U.S. at 433 n.18.

Id.
See id.
Gary-Northwest, 496 F. Supp. at 903 (emphasis added).
Akron, 462 U.S. at 455 n.3.
A. Cox, supra note 26, at 114.
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who must find "that, in his medical judgment, the pregnancy should be
terminated." 157 The Court so held because the Court considered the
abortion decision "inherently, and primarily, a medical decision. " 158
The medical judgment of the physician was thus tied to the woman's
freedom which the Court left in place during the first trimester. In an
era when physicians, clinics, and corporate franchises make their living
from abortion, this is not a very substantial check. However, the Court
envisioned a traditional doctor-patient relationship and required consultation in Roe. 159
In Akron, the Court restated the principle that a woman, during
the first trimester, "must be permitted, in consultation with her physician, to decide to have an abortion and to effectuate that decision ...
160
."
The Court added that informed consent requirements would be
permissible if they leave "the precise nature and amount of this disclosure to the physician's discretion and 'medical judgment.' " 161 The
Court even noted that "in Roe and subsequent cases we have 'stressed
repeatedly the central role of the physician, both in consulting with the
woman about whether or not to have an abortion, and in determining
how any abortion was to be carried out.' " 162 However, the Court
broke with its precedent and held that someone else could consult with
the woman besides her physician (or any physician). 163 The Court
noted that the "practice" at abortion clinics was not to have the physician consult with the patient and, therefore, held that requiring the
physician to do so was unconstitutional. 164 The Court held that "it
[was] unreasonable for a State to insist that only a physician [was] competent to provide the information and counseling relevant to informed
consent. " 165
Again, the Court violated the doctrine of stare decisis. While purporting to follow Roe, it emptied Roe even further of content. Once
more the "precedent" of medical practice ruled over the precedent of
the Court.
c. A pattern of stare decisis abuse. Other illustrations show a dis157. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
158. /d. at 166.
159. See id.
160. Akron, 462 U.S. at 429-30 (emphasis added).
161. See id. at 447 (emphasis added).
162. /d. at 447 (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387)(emphasis added).
163. /d. at 448.
164. Id. at 447-48.
165. /d. at 449. Interestingly, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetrics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), still employed the physician consultation language. Along with abandoning the requirement of physician counseling went the concept that abortion was to be based on
medical judgment. /d. at 762, 764.
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turbing and consistent pattern of stare decisis abandonment. In
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, recordkeeping
was clearly allowed. However, in Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstretics & Gynecologists, the Court struck down comparable recordkeeping req uirements. 166
In Poelker v. Doe, the Supreme Court noted that the personal motives of the ones promulgating the law are irrdevant. 167 In Thornburgh, the Court recited the history of Pennsylvania's attempts to pass
constitutional abortion legislation "as if it were evidence of some sinister conspiracy." 168
The Supreme Court approved of informed consent requirements in
Planned Parenthood Association v. Fitzpatrick, 169 Danforth, 170 and
Guste v. Jackson. 171 However, in Thornburgh, it struck down similar
requirements which carefully steered clear of the hazards found in
Akron. 172
In Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, the Court held
that parental consent may be required for certain minors before an
abortion may be performed. 173 Though no court procedural rules had
yet been promulgated, the Court said, "There is no reason to believe
that Missouri will not expedite any appeal consistent with the mandate
in our prior decisions." 174 In Thornburgh, a virtually identical statute
under virtually identical circumstances was enjoined until procedural
rules were adopted. 1711
Finally, as noted by Justice O'Connor, the Court has even
changed some of its tests. For example, in Akron, it failed to apply the
usual threshold inquiry for fundamental rights analysis of whether the
right was "unduly burden[ed]." 176 Also, at one point, the Akron Court
abandoned the usual "reasonable relationship" test for a newly created
"vital state need'' test. 177
166. See Planned Parenthood of Central !vlissouri v. Danforth, 42~ L.S. 52 ( 1976); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretics & Gynerolo~ists, 47(, ll.S. 767 ( 1986). This subject is
further developed in infra section III-C-5
16 7 . Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977). See a/.1u C:1ty of Las Vegas v. Foley, 747
F.2d 1294, 1298 (9th Cir. 1984 )(rejecting the use of kgislativc motives).
168. Thornburgh. 476 US. at 751-52, 798 (White, J, dissenting).
169. 401 F. Supp. 554, 583 (E.D Pa. 1975), affd sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428
U.S. 901 ( 1976).
170. J)anforth, 428 U.S. at 67.
171 429 C S. :l'!'), 400 (1977)(per curiam)
172. A detailed discussion is found in the informed consent discussion infra section III-C-3.
173. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 4(,2 U.S. 47(,, 490-'!3 (1983).
174. !d. at 491 n.16.
175. Thornburgh. 476 li.S. at 758 n.9.
176. i\kron, 462 US. at ·l(,(J.
177. !d. at 471 n.l'l.
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d. Consequences of stare decisis abuse. The result of this vacillation is that abortion jurisprudence appears result-oriented. Stare decisis
is adhered to when convenient and abandoned when not. Stability, predictability, and consistency-important purposes of stare decisis-are
set aside, leaving legislators and the public puzzled as to what the law
is on abortion.
Indications that the Court is playing politics in its abortion decisions compound this unpredictability. The abortion funding cases 178
and H.L. v. Matheson 119 might be interpreted as an effort to soften the
political outrage at other decisions seeming to strengthen the protection
of abortion. Given the Court's previous decisions, these latter holdings
were not predictable. Indeed, they have been criticized as anomalous. 180
Finally, abortion jurisprudence displays a cultural bias by the Supreme Court and a favoritism toward an elite group- physicians who
perform abortions. Such bias is unseemly in a rule-of-law regime.
The rule of law has been discussed by many scholars. Different
components have been stressed by different writers. Differing purposes
have been set forth, such as securing democratic liberalism, securing
maximum freedom, protecting property, or curbing irrational, arbitrary
and corrupt rule. 181 The focus here is not to enter this debate but to
observe that rule of law serves highly desirable ends. Among these are
the securing of good government and the happiness of the citizenry.
In Akron, Justice Powell acknowledged that ours is a society "governed by the rule of law." He also noted that stare decisis is an important means to implementing such rule. 182 However, Roe and its progeny have been shown to be at war with the principles of the rule of
law. The application of stare decisis to such precedent, thereby upholding the right to abortion, undermines the rule of law.

17R. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
179. 450

us

398 (1981).

I HO. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 43.
181. The literature is voluminous. See, e.g., J. LocKt:, St:COND TRt:A'riSt: OF (;ovt:RNMt:NT, chap. 7 (R. Cox. ed. 1982); F. HAYt:K, THt: PouTICAL lm:AL oF THt: Ruu: oF LAw,
Lerture lil (1955); j. RAWLS, A THEORY OF jUSTICE 235-43 (1971); j. RAZ, Tm: AUTHORITY
oF LAw: EssAYS ON LAw AND MoRAI.ITY, chap. 11 (1979); R. UN<:t:R, LAw IN Mont:RN
Socit:TY: TowARD A CRITICISM oF SoCIAL THt:<>RY (1976); L. FULLER, THt: MoRAI.ITY oF
LAw (rev. ed. 1969). See also Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. Lt:<;AL Snm. 351 (1973); D.
EPSTEIN, THt: PoLITICAL THt:ORY OF THt: Ft:I>t:RAI.IST (1984). Of course, ARISTOTLt:'s, POI.ITICS, and Ptxro's, Rt:Pl!BI.IC, STATESMAN, and LAWS remain the most insightful discussions. See
also PLATO, CRrro.
182. Akron, 462 U.S. at 420.
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The wide divergence of abortion case law from the usual rules of
law is also evident in the extreme result reached by the Court in
Thornburgh. 183 This 1986 case demonstrates the problem states have
in predicting and conforming to the Court's boundaries. As Justice
O'Connor wrote in her dissent to Akron, the "bright lines" have become "blurred." 184
The following discussion is an overview of Thornburgh. Certain
elements of the decision will receive further treatment in the later discussion of the different aspects of abortion law.

1.

Background to Thornburgh: The statutes and the lower courts

In Thornburgh, the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Abortion
Control Act was at issue. The challenged provisions included a requirement of a second physician in post-viability abortions to preserve the
life of the fetus, if possible. 1811 The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit found this unconstitutional because it lacked an explicit emergency exception. 186
Another Pennsylvania provision required use of the abortion technique most likely to preserve fetal life, unless it would cause significantly greater risk to the mother. 187 The Third Circuit found this unconstitutional by interpreting it to require an impermissible trade-off
between maternal health and fetal rights. 188
The Pennsylvania Act included an informed consent provision. It
required physicians to make available state-prepared information concerning alternatives to abortion, available assistance for alternatives,
and objective information regarding fetal characteristics and the possibility of fetal survival. 189 The physician was required to disclose (1) the
possibility of unforeseeable psychological and physical risks of abortion/90 (2) the availability of medical assistance benefits for prenatal
care, childbirth, and neonatal care, 191 (3) the liability of the father for
183. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
184. Akron, 462 U.S. at 455 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
185. 18 PA. CoNS. STAT.§ 3210(c)(1983).
186. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283,
300-01 (3d Cir. 1984) affd 476 U.S. 747 (1986). But see Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft,
462 U.S. 476, 485 n.8 (1983). See also Brief for the United States, supra note 35, at 5-6.
187. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT.§ 3210(b) (1983).
188. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 300. See Co)autti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1979).
189. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 3205(a)(2)(iii) (1983).
190. /d. § 3205(a)(l )(ii).
191. /d. § 3205(a)(2)(i).
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child support, 192 and (4) the probable gestational age of the fetus. 193
The court of appeals invalidated all of these provisions on the basis of
Akron. 194
Pennsylvania also included a parental consent provision which essentially codified the Supreme Court's holding in Bellotti v. Baird
(Bellotti (II)). 195 The appeals court enjoined enforcement of this until
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court promulgated implementing
regulations. 196
The Pennsylvania Act also required physicians to provide reports
with a variety of data for statistical purposes. 197 Included was a report
of the basis for the physician's determination that the fetus was not
viable or "that the abortion [was] necessary to preserve maternal life or
health." 198 The court of appeals invalidated these requirements because
they were too extensive and complicated and, hence, were likely to increase the cost of an abortion and possibly have a chilling effect on
physicians' willingness to perform abortions. 199
Another Pennsylvania provision required health insurers to make
available policies that excluded elective abortion coverage (except in the
case of rape or incest). These policies would have been mandatorily
priced less than policies with abortion coverage. 200 The appeals court
invalidated this as an unjustified barrier to a woman's access to
abortion. 201

2.

Reasoning of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court's holding in Thornburgh had major procedural implications. The Court affirmed the appellate court's decision to
go to the merits of the case, even though no final judgment had been
192. Id. § 3205(a)(2)(ii).
193. !d. § 3205(a)( I )(iv).
194. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 295-96. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 444-45. But see Brief for the
United States, supra note 35, at 7-8.
195. 18 PA. CoNS. STAT.§ 3206 (1983). See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)(Bellotti

(II)).
196. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 297. But see Brief for the United States, supra note 35, at 4-

5.
197. 18 PA. CoNS. STAT. § 3214 (1983)(requiring information including the physician's
name, location of facility, woman's age, race and marital status, type of abortion procedure, and
any complications).
198. !d. § 3211.
199. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 301-02. But see Brief for the United States, supra note 35, at
9-10.
200. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 3215(e) (1983).
201. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 303. But see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1980);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
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rendered below. 202 The trial court had only denied a preliminary mjunction from which this appeal was taken. 203
The Thornburgh opinion also contained substantive rulings regarding informed consent, reporting requirements, and regulations
designed to preserve the lives of viable, aborted fetuses. The Court invalidated almost every regulation Pennsylvania had passed, and it did
so with a hostile, summary attitude.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's finding of unconstitutionality regarding the informed consent provisions, holding
that they were designed to persuade women to withhold consent. 204 It
added that the required giving of information "intrude[d] upon the discretion of the pregnant woman's physician," the two-week interval descriptions of fetal development was overinclusive, and requiring such
disclosure was "contrary to accepted medical practice." ~ The Court
likened the Pennsylvania statute to Akron's "parade of horribles"
(which it had found unconstitutional) and declared it facially unconstitutional because it "cannot be saved by any facts that might be forthcoming at a subsequent hearing." 206 Finally, the Court refused to sever
the defective portions, claiming the result would bear little resemblance
to what the legislature intended. 207
The Supreme Court also invalidated the provisions which required
physician reports of the basis for a determination of nonviability or
medical necessity (where abortions have been performed) and other information for statistical purposes. 208 These had been invalidated by the
appellate court because of possible added expense and a chilling effect.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, but on a different
rationale. It found that "identification [was] the obvious purpose of
these extreme reporting requirements." 209
The Pennsylvania requirements of a second physician to care for
the fetus at abortions after viability 210 and the use of the abortion
method most likely to preserve fetal life, unless it would cause significantly greater risk to the mother, 211 were clear efforts to assert the
State's compelling interest in the viable, unborn fetus which Roe de20

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
Jd.
See id. at 764.
/d. at 762.
See id. at 7 60-64.
Jd. at 764-65.
Jd. at 766.
Jd. at 767.
18 PA. CoNs. STAT.§ 3210(c) (1983).
Jd. § 3210(b).
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clared. 212 However, the Court affirmed the appellate court and struck
down the latter provision as requiring an impermissible "trade-off' between maternal health and fetal rights, 213 and the former as having no
emergency section. 214
The Supreme Court also allowed a temporary injunction to stand
against the enforcement of the parental consent provision. Although no
defect in the provision itself was found, the statute was enjoined pending promulgation of procedural rules by the state courts to implement
it.21~

Thornburgh further demonstrates the Court's abandonment of
stare decisis. Roe declared that states have compelling interests in maternal health, from the second trimester on, and in fetal life, after viability. Stare decisis would require continued recognition of those interests and sympathetic treatment of regulations seeking to implement
them. The Court has not done this. Rather, the Court has struck down
virtually every legislative attempt to assert these "compelling" interests.
Thornburgh indicates the extremes to which the Court will go in
avoiding its own precedent in Roe.
Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Thornburgh observed how these
state interests had been ignored. First, he noted the state's compelling
interest in maternal health which Roe established. He declared, "Yet
today the Court astonishingly goes so far as to say that the State may
not require that a woman contemplating an abortion be provided with
accurate medical information concerning the risks inherent in the medical procedure . . . . " 216 Second, he pointed out the state's compelling
interest in viable fetal life established by Roe. He then argued that the
Court's willingness to strike down a second physician requirement (to
care for viable aborted children) made the conerns of the Court in Roe
"mere shallow rhetoric." 217 He added, "Undoubtedly the Pennsylvania
Legislature added the ... requirement on the mistaken assumption that
this Court meant what it said in Roe concerning the 'compelling interest' of the states . . . ." 218
Thornburgh is indicative of the problems Roe engenders. "The
212. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
213. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 768-69.
214. /d. at 770-71.
215. /d. at 758 n.9.
216. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 783 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). This subject is further developed in the informed consent discussion infra section 111-C-3.
217. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 784 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Supreme Court struck
down this statute because it lacked an emergency clause, though a construction allowing one was
fairly possible. This is further developed in infra section 111-D-3.
218. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 784 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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soundness of our holdings must be tested by the decisions that purport
to follow them," observed Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent in
Thornburgh. 219 While Roe rejected abortion on demand, 220 Thornburgh indicated that virtually no meaningful state abortion regulation
would survive-even a requirement that the choice be informed. 221
While Roe recognized a "compelling" state interest in viable fetal
life, 222 Thornburgh indicated that any assertion of that interest would
be met with hostility. 223 The Thornburgh majority was defensive, intransigent, 224 and so restrictive, even by Roe standards, that Chief Justice Burger, who concurred with the majority in Roe, dissented in
Thornburgh and called for a reexamination of Roe. 2211
In sum, as Justice White observed, the majority viewed Pennsylvania's efforts to codify what the Court previously said was allowable
regulation as "some sinister conspiracy" 226 and "change[ d] the rules to
invalidate what before would have seemed permissible." 227 In the process, as noted by Justice O'Connor, the Court trampled on accepted
procedures and rules developed over years of judicial consideration, 228
creating a climate of instability, unpredictability, inconsistency, unworkability, and unfairness 229 -the antithesis of the values sought to be
promoted by stare decisis and the rule of law.
Throughout the opinion, references were made to Roe. The majority saw Roe as controlling and reaffirmed its "general principles." 230
The dissenters saw Roe as the initial flaw leading to the hostile tone 231
and the unacceptable results of Thornburgh. 232
This emphasis on Roe as the heart of the matter is significant.
219. /d. at 785.
220. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154-155. See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 208 (1973)(Burger,
C.J., concurring)("Plainly, the Court today rejects any claim that the Constitution requires abortions on demand."); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 783-84 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
221. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 783-84 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)("We have apparently already passed the point at which abortion is available merely on demand. If the statute at issue
here is to be invalidated, the 'demand' will not even have to be the result of an informed choice.").
222. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
223. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 814 (White, J., dissenting). Especially noticeable in the opinion was the hostility toward the legislature for its "duplicity," signalling a new focus on the state
legislature's motives. Comment, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians: Return to
Roer, 10 HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'v 711, 724 (1987).
224. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 814 (White, J., dissenting).
225. !d. at 785.
226. /d. at 798 (White, J., dissenting).
227. /d. (White, J., dissenting).
228. /d. at 815 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
229. /d. at 821, 826-27 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
230. /d. at 759.
231. !d. at 788 (White, J., dissenting).
232. E.g., id. at 785 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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Despite sixteen years and numerous decisions, Roe remams the center
of the controversy.
Significantly, Roe was decided by seven justices with two dissenting.233 Akron was decided by a six to three majority. 234 In Thornburgh
the margin was narrowed to five to four, and, in Hartigan, the eight
member Court divided evenly on the subject of abortion. 235
Chief Justice Burger, in Thornburgh, declared that the Court had
left its original consensus of no abortion on demand and, with it, had
left him behind. 236 As shall be demonstrated in the detailed sections
below, Thornburgh is an excellent illustration of why Chief Justice
Burger's call for reexamination of Roe was appropriate. 237
The most significant aspect of Thornburgh was that, in failing to
overrule (or clarify) Roe, the Supreme Court failed to lead the courts
and the nation from the moral and political storm in which they have
trudged since the winter of 1973. 238 However, the Thornburgh case did
233. Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 115 (1973).
234. Akron, 462 U.S. at 418.
235. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 749; Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987).
236. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 782-83 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
237. /d. at 785 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
238. Roe truly has blown out the moral lights around us creating great confusion about the
proper solutions to the problems an unwanted child conjures up: familial decay, sexual. promiscuity, the plight of women and the poor and the collapse of community. The great change in American politics-the rise of conservatism and the search for new answers to the social conundrums
spawned by bankrupt liberalism-if not itself a solution is at least evidence of problems that Roe
has failed to resolve and to which it has, in fact, contributed. Certainly the currents of contemporary American politics gained impetus from the reaction to Roe and its consequences. As of 1985,
approximately 17.5 million abortions have been performed since Roe. Henshaw, Forrest, & Van
Vorl, Abortion Services in the United States, 1984 and 1985, 19 FAM. PLAN. PERSPS. 64, table
I (1987). Abortion is the most common operation performed in this country at about 1.5 million
per year. F. jAFFE, B. LINDHEIM, & P. LEE, ABORTION POLITICS: PRIVATE MORAI.ITY AND
PUBLIC Poucv 7 (1981 ); Henshaw, Forrest, & Blaine, Abortion Services in the United States,
1981 and 1982, 16 FAM. PLAN. PERSPS. 119, 120 table I (1984). Approximately one-third of all
pregnancies end by abortion, and, in many cities, abortions exceed live births. Henshaw, Forrest,
Sullivan & Tietze, Abortion in the United States, 1979 and 1980, 14 FAM. PLAN. PERSPS. 5, 6
table I (1982). The problem of teen pregnancy is also an abortion problem; one-third of all abortions are performed on teenagers. Henshaw, Forrest, Sullivan, & Tietze, Abortion in the United
States, 1978-1979, 13 FAM. PLAN. PERSPS. 6, 17 table 10, 18 table II (1981). The easy availability of abortion may be a cause of family and community decay. While this is not dear, it is clear
that easy availability of abortion has reinforced broader social trends leading to this unfortunate
state of affairs.
Moreover, this superficial solution (abortion) prevents families and society from confronting
the personal and economic problems involved in unwanted pregnancies. Rather than offering compassion and resources to a woman confronted with the dilemma of childbirth or abortion, society
has elected the easy solution. Perhaps abortion should not even be called an attempted solution. It
is an attempt to annihilate the problem.
Widespread abortion has also acted to prevent new, committed family units from developing,
by depriving numerous couples of an adoptable child. See Wardle, supra note 19, at 243 n.63.
Other ill effects include women psychologically scarred from the abortion experience and a grow-
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cast some light on the long road out of the national cns1s created by
Roe. It cast this light indirectly, by providing further evidence that "the
seminal opinion of Justice Blackmun" 239 is not sufficiently principled
to withstand either the test of time 240 or the test of reason. 241
Thornburgh provided further evidence that any judge who takes
Roe as a "polestar" 242 is assured of getting hopelessly lost in a jurisprudential jungle of ill-considered ideas. Roe is neither a measure nor a
rule of action, 243 so perhaps the common argument that Roe is bad law
is wrong. Perhaps it ought not to be considered law at all. In many
respects, Roe does not possess those characteristics commonly thought
essential to law, or it possesses them only minimally. Roe (and its progeny) lacks legal rationality. It claims legitimacy by historical correctness
rather than by justice. Abortion jurisprudence after Roe is primarily a
ratification of what is, not a prescription of what ought to be. It ratifies
what certain doctors and patients do (and what certain "forward-looking" elites think) rather than discussing how they ought to act.
The doctrine of stare decisis sometimes commands us to obey even
bad law. 244 Should it require us to adhere to Roe? In an unusual action, the United States Justice Department said no, 1s amicus curaie in
Thornburgh, calling for the reversal of Roe. The government argued
that "where a judicial formulation affecting the allocation of constitutional powers has proven 'unsound in principle and unworkable in
practice,' where it 'leads to inconsistent results at the same time that it
disserves principles of democratic self-governance' [the] Court has not
hesitated to reconsider a prior decision. " 2411
This article argues that Roe is such a case. Roe's analysis is fundamentally antithetical to the values that underlie the doctrine of stare
decisis-the rule of law, logical consistency, practical workability, stability, predictability, and fairness. It is both paradoxical and countering callousness toward children and other "inconvenient" persons. See id. at 243 n.64.
239. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 291
(3d Cir. 1984) rev'd, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
240. A. Cox, supra note 26, at 114; Akron, 462 U.S. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
241. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 24; Rice, supra note 20.
242. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 290-91.
243. See T. AQUINAS, SuMMA THEOLOGICA 1-11, Question 90, Art. 1 (giving this definition
of law).
244. Hence we infer that sometimes and in certain cases laws should be changed; but
when we look at the matter from another point of view, great caution would seem to be
required. For the habit of lightly changing the laws is an evil, and when the advantage
is small, some errors both of lawgivers and rulers had better be left; the citizen will not
gain so much by making the change as he will lose by the habit of disobedience.
ARISTOTLE, supra note 81, at 2014, 1269a, lines 12-17.
245. Brief for the United States, supra note 35, at 21 (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985)).
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productive to invoke stare decisis to perpetuate doctrines that undermine the achievement of the ends to which adherence to precedence is a
means.

III.

THE LEGAL ANOMALIES OF

Roe

AND ITS PROGENY

The Roe decision and the subsequent abortion cases, which followed Roe's tangential departure from the rest of the law, contain numerous legal anomalies. Some of these have already been demonstrated
in the discussions of the critiques of Roe, the misapplication of stare
decisis in abortion law, and the extreme position taken by the Court in

Thornburgh.
This section further demonstrates the divergent nature of abortion
jurisprudence by comparing it with areas of the law relating to abortion. For example, the right to abortion is categorized by the Supreme
Court as a privacy right. Yet, it is not treated the same as other privacy
rights. Similar anomalies occur when abortion touches other areas of
the law, such as fetal rights, medical regulations, and procedural and
adjudicatory rules. Each of these areas will be discussed individually
below to demonstrate the disparities.
As will be seen, the "abortion distortion effect" on the law is consistently making the right to abortion more absolute. This is ironic, as
the Supreme Court in Roe made much of the fact that the right to
abortion was not absolute. Justice Blackmon noted that Jane Roe and
some amici claimed "that the woman's right is absolute and that she is
entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way,
and for whatever reason she alone chooses." 246 The Court disagreed,
holding that the states had compelling interests in "safeguarding health,
in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life" at
certain points in a woman's pregnancy. 247 The Court declared, "The
privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute." 248
However, John Hart Ely had more insight and foresight than the
Court. He observed, in 1973, that the Supreme Court had granted the
abortion right a "super-protected" status. 249 He characterized the protection given abortion as "far more stringent" than that accorded any
other right, "so stringent that a desire to preserve the fetus's existence is
246. Roe, 410 US. at 153.
247. /d. at 154.
248. /d. See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 US. 179, 208 (1973)(Burger, C.J., concurring)("! do
not read the Court's holdings today as having the sweeping consequences attributed to them by the
dissenting Justices .... Plainly, the Court today rejects any claim that the Constitution requires
abortion on demand.").
249. Ely, supra note 24, at 935.
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unable to overcome it-a protection more stringent ... than the present
Court affords the freedom of the press explicitly guaranteed by the
First Amendment." 2110
Today, abortion enjoys even greater protection. It is more protected than any other privacy right. Less protection is provided the fetus in the abortion context than in any other context. Abortion is subject to less regulation than any other medical procedure. The
abortionist-patient relationship is more sacrosanct than the doctor-patient relationship. The progeny of Roe have consistently rejected attempts by the states to assert their "compelling" interests, steadily making the abortion right more absolute. Today, abortion is available
virtually on demand throughout the whole nine months of pregnancy.
Apart from minor health regulations, the right to abortion has become
absolute.

A.

Privacy Rights

The anomalies of abortion jurisprudence may be seen in a comparative study of the abortion privacy right and other privacy rights.
The Court observed in Roe: "The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy." 2111 Yet, the Supreme Court has recognized a
variety of rights subsumed under the general right of privacy. The privacy analysis in Roe culminated in the assertion that "the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision." 2112 Therefore, the examination of abortion as a privacy right analogous to other privacy rights is
an essential starting point to determine the permissible scope of state
abortion regulation. 2113

1.

Roe's privacy analysis

In brief, Roe's privacy analysis consisted of citations to several
cases covering a wide variety of subjects (from the fourth amendment
bar to unwarranted search and seizure to the right to make a living as a
German teacher), the conclusion that these cases constituted a constitutional right of privacy, the conclusion that the privacy right is broad
enough to include abortion, an impressionistic discussion of the
problems of unwanted pregnancy, an assertion that the abortion right is
not absolute, and a make-weight argument based on prior state court
250.
251.
252.
253.
(1976)

/d.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
/d. at 154.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 60-61
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abortion decisions. 254
The cases cited by the Court did not clearly constitute a right of
privacy. Two of the precedents cited were search and seizure cases, 2511
two involved telephone taps, 256 one involved a court-ordered physical
examination in a negligence action, 257 and one involved the possession
of obscene matter in one's home. 258 Of this group, none was related to
abortion.
The other cases, cited as precedents in Roe, were only slightly
more related-in the sense that they were related to marriage, family,
and procreation- to the issue of abortion. Two involved parental rights
to direct rearing of their own children, 259 one involved a prohibition on
children selling goods in public (with parental permission), 260 one involved state prohibition of interracial marriage, 261 one involved state
sterilization of repeat felony offenders, 262 and two entailed the use and
dispensing of contraceptives. 263
Richard Epstein commented on the Court's effort to derive a constitutional right of privacy from these cases. He remarked, "It is difficult to see how the concept of privacy linked the cases cited by the
Court, much less ... explains the result in the abortion cases." 264 John
Hart Ely echoed this opinion: "The Court has offered little assistance
to one's understanding of what it is that makes [the privacy "precedents"] a unit." 265 He concluded, "Instead it has generally contented
itself with lengthy and undifferentiated string [cites] .... [You] can say
a bunch of words, but a constitutional connection [should] require
something more than this." 266
To support its shaky precedential foundation, the Court sought to
anchor its privacy right, including the right to abortion, in the Constitution. It mentioned various constitutional provisions alleged by others

254. Ror, 410 U.S. at 1 52-'iY. Thi; latter argument demonstrated only that previous state
court decisions were divided.
255. Terry v. Ohio, 392 l: S. I (!%H), Boyd v. t:nited .'itates, 111, trs. 616 (1HH6).
256. Katz v. United States, 3K'J U.S \47 11967), Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S 438
(1928)
257. t:nion Pac. R). v Bot>lonl, 141 t:.S 250 (1891).
(;eor~ia. 394 U.S. 557 (I %9).

258. Stanley v.

259. Pierce v. Societv of Sisters, 268 l 1 S. 510 (1'J2'J), Meyct v "ir·braska, 262 U.S. 390

(1923)
260. Prince v. Massachusetts. 321 U.S

l.'lH 11944 ).

261. Loving v. Virginia. 3HH l1 S. 1 ( 1% 7).
262. Skinner v. Oklahoma, ·;I(; U.S 5:\5 ( 1942).
263. Eisemtadt v. Bairn, 41" U.S 4\B (1972); Criswold v. Connecticut . .1KI U.S

479

(1965)
264. Epstein. supro nnte :lil. ;,t 170.
265. Ely, Foreword: On /Ji,,-overing Fundamental Value.\, '!2
266. /d.

BAR\'

l. RFv. S ( 1978).
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to provide such an anchor. The Court selected substantive due process,
"founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty,"
as the source of the Constitutional right of privacy. 267 As discussed earlier in this article, such analysis is highly suspect-as violative of the
rule of law and the constitutional separation of powers-and had previously been rejected by the Court and legal scholars. 268
However, the Court not only failed to show how the cases it cited
added up to anything, but it also failed to show how a right of privacy,
if indeed such a right existed, could include a right to abortion. It further failed to demonstrate, using its chosen form of analysis (substantive
due process), how a right to abortion could be established from such
analysis.
Rather, the Court simply declared that "[t]his right of privacy ...
is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy." 269 No logical connection was given.
Instead, the Court switched immediately to policy arguments. The
majority fretted that:
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental
and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the
distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and
there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable .
. . to care for it. In other cases ... [the] stigma of unwed motherhood
may be involved. 270

As Ely remarked of this reliance on policy argument, "all of this is true
and ought to be taken very seriously. But it has nothing to do with
privacy in the Bill of Rights sense or any other the Constitution
suggests. " 271
Next, the Roe Court rejected the argument that the abortion right
ought to be absolute. In addition to noting compelling state interests in
maternal health, medical standards, and fetal life, the Court observed
that one does not have "an unlimited right to do with one's body as one
pleases .... " 272 Justice Blackmun cited Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 273
which allowed compulsory vaccination, and Buck v. Bell, 274 which allowed non-consensual sterilization of mental incompetents, and ob267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

272.
273.
274.

Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
See supra section 11-B-1-(a).
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
/d.
Ely, supra note 24, at 932.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
197 U.S. II (1905).
274 us 200 (I 927).
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served: "The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this
kind in the past." 2711
Finally, the Supreme Court cited the decisions of a number of
lower federal and state courts. 276 This was inconclusive, and showed
only that the courts were divided on the issue of abortion. It lent no
credibility to the Court's discovery of a right to abortion.
Despite the cruciality of the privacy right, the Roe Court's privacy
analysis was singularly slipshod-a methodological precedent to which
the Court has adhered in Roe's progeny. The Court failed in Roe, and
in the subsequent cases, to link abortion and other privacy rights in a
precise or convincing manner. The sole connection between Roe's discussion of privacy rights and an abortion right was the bald assertion
that the former was "broad enough to encompass" the latter. 277 The
logical link was missing.
Although this point has been made repeatedly since Roe, the Court
has been content to parrot its original conclusion. It has recently done
so in an even more abbreviated form, substituting a few post-Roe privacy cases for some of the more questionable precedents cited in Roe. 278

2.

Disparate treatment of privacy rights

The Court's unwillingness or inability to restructure its privacy
analysis has left it with some tortuous jurisprudential puzzles. For example, the central issue of Bellotti v. Baird 279 was how to choose between mutually exclusive privacy rights: the fundamental right of parents to raise their children according to their own lights 280 and the right
of the child to have an abortion. The difficulty of the choice was enhanced by the Court's repeated claims that both rights were fundamental and fundamentally similar, and that the abortion privacy right
sprang from the familial privacy right. As applied by the Court, the
abortion rights of minor children supercede parental rights within the

275. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
276. /d. at 154-55.
277. !d. at 153.
278. "Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies a promise that a certain
private sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of government." Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986)(citing Carey
v. Population Servs. lnt'l (1977), Moore v. East Cleveland (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska (1923);
Whalen v. Roe (1977)(citations omitted)). See also Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416, 426-27 (1983).
279. 443 US. 622 (1979)(Bellotti (II)).
280. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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family. 281
This disparate treatment of the abortion right, as compared with
other privacy rights, is typical. If abortion is a privacy right similar to
other privacy rights, then it should be treated similarly to other privacy
rights rather than being super-protected. Further comparison of judicial
treatment of abortion with other privacy rights demonstrates the
incongruity.
In Roe, the Court began its privacy discussion with a citation to
Union Pacific Railway v. Botsford. 282 In Botsford, the Court held that
"in a civil action for an injury to the person, the court [had no legal
right or power to] ... order the plaintiff, without his or her consent, to
submit to a surgical examination as to the extent of the injury sued
for." 283 The underlying rationale for the Botsford holding was that
every individual has a right "to the possession and control of his own
person. " 284
However, the Botsford Court acknowledged that an exception existed at common law which limits the precedential value of this case for
a right to abortion. The exception was the "writ de ventre inspiciendo. " 2811 This writ authorized examination of a woman, without
consent, to determine whether she was pregnant. It was issued when a
woman was convicted of a capital crime "in order to guard against the
taking of the life of an unborn child for the crime of the mother." 286
Professor John Gorby states that, though this case may indicate a common law right to privacy, "the common law not only acknowledged a
right to life in the fetus but also recognized precedence of this right over
the common law right of privacy." 287
Of course, Roe's own citation of Jacobson and Buck indicates that
the privacy right to control one's own person is not absolute. In fact,
the Court suggested that the abortion right might be subject to more
strictures than other privacy rights because fetal rights must be added
to the traditional privacy paradigm. 288 However, the Court has not allowed more restrictions on abortion than other privacy rights but, in
fact, has allowed fewer.
As Justice White observed in his Thornburgh dissent, the Court
281. Bellotti (II), 443 U.S. at 622.
282. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152; Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
283. 141 U.S. at 251.
284. /d.
285. /d. at 253.
286. /d.
287. Gorby, The 'Right' to an Abortion, the Scope of Fourteenth Amendment 'Personhood,'
and the Supreme Court's Birth Requirement, 1979 S. ILL. U.L.J. 1, 19 & n.95.
288. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
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has abandoned the application of the Jacobson principle to abortion. 289
He noted that Jacobson demonstrated that "a compelling state interest
may justify the imposition of some physical danger upon the individua\."290 According to Roe, the state interest became compelling after
viability. 291 Applying the Jacobson principle, a state ought to be able to
legislate in the interest of protecting the fetus, even at the risk of some
increase in danger to the woman.
The Pennsylvania legislature applied this principle in enacting a
requirement that physicians use the abortion technique most likely to
allow fetal survival, unless it would impose "significantly greater medical risk" to the mother. 292 The Thornburgh majority declared this unconstitutiona\.293 Justice White noted that, according to the majority,
the state's "compelling interest [could not] justify any regulation that
impose[d] a quantifiable medical risk upon the pregnant woman." 294
He argued that this was a direct contradiction of Roe's holding that the
state had a compelling interest so strong that it could "forbid all
postviability abortions except when necessary to protect the life or
health of the pregnant woman." 2911 The implication of Thornburgh is
that the privacy right at stake in Jacobson is now absolute (and Jacobson is overruled sub silentio), or the Court has abandoned its previous
holding that abortion is limited, as are other privacy rights. Likewise,
Chief Justice Burger argued that the Court had left its consensus
against abortion on demand, 296 and Roe's recognition of "another important and legitimate interest ... protecting the potentiality of human
life. " 297 As he noted, the concern of Roe "for the interests of the states"
had been rendered "mere shallow rhetoric" by Thornburgh. 298
In fact, the only part of the Roe privacy analysis that retained any
certain validity after Thornburgh was the reference to Buck. The approval of sterilization for the mentally retarded and uneducated poor in
BucP 99 parallels the fear in Thornburgh that informed consent re-

289. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 809
(1986)(White, J., dissenting).
290. /d. (White, J , dissenting).
291. Roe, 410 U.S at 163.
292. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 768.
293. /d.
294. /d. at 808 (emphasis in original).
295. /d. at 809 (emphasis in original).
296. /d. at 782-83 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
297. /d. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162 (emphasis in original).
298. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 784 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
299. A recent article demonstrated that Carrie Buck and her daughter were not "imbecilic"
or "feeble minded." Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, 2 CoNST. CoMM. 331 (1985).
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quirements might discourage abortions. 300 Both promote the same
theme: The Constitution greatly values unburdening society of the unwanted and undesirable. Today, the right to privacy seems to stand less
for a right of individuals to a sphere of purely personal or intimate
activity 301 than for the right to pursue nineteenth century theories of
eugenics and social Darwinism. 302 In his Thornburgh dissent, Justice
White observed that Roe "[was] not premised on the notion that abortion [was] itself desirable (. . . as a matter of . . . social policy). " 303
However, apart from H.L. v. Matheson, 304 Harris v. McRae, 3011 and
Maher v. Roe, 306 the Court's subsequent abortion decisions have
strongly suggested that, at least for some of the Court's members, abortion holds extra-constitutional intrinsic value. 307 Indeed, Justice White
went on to demonstrate that the Court had not adhered to Roe's premise that abortion was permissible, but undesirable, by its overreaching
to invalidate legislation that would have been allowable under the Roe
rule. 308
After citing Botsford, the Roe opinion moved to more contemporary cases, and found privacy rights in various constitutional provisions:
the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments, as well as the
"penumbras of the Bill of Rights." 309 Most of the rights cited there had
clear roots in the common law and the text of the Constitution. Taken
together they did not constitute a right broad enough to encompass the
abortion decision. Unlike the abortion right, these other rights have remained limited and hedged with exceptions justifying state regulation.
For example, the Roe Court's lone first amendment privacy case
was Stanley v. Georgia. 310 Stanley stood for the proposition that possession of obscene material within one's home was protected, even
though the first amendment did not protect its distribution. 3 n This argument, based on the traditional notion that a man's house is his castle,
was similar to arguments advanced by the Court in certain search and
300. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763.
301. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
302. See Ely, supra note 24, at 947 n.139.
303. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 797 (White. J., dissenting).
304. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
305. 448 U.S. 297 ( 1980).
306. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
307. Cf Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 796-97 n.5 (White. J., dissenting).
308. /d. at 797-814 (White. J., dissenting). See also id. at 783 n* (B~rger, C.J., dissenting).
309. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
310. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
311. "Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not
think they reach into the privacy of one's own home." /d. at 565.
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seizure cases 312 and in Griswold v. Connecticut. 313
It is possible to read Stanley as a simple first amendment case
with little or no implication for a right of privacy. 314 However, Stanley
and other Supreme Court holdings do evince a fear of governmental
intrusion into precincts traditionally considered private. Nevertheless,
the right to pornography is very circumscribed. 31 ~ Viewing of pornography outside the home, as well as the distribution of pornography, are
subject to various regulations. 316
The Stanley opinion is sometimes read as standing for a right to
receive information. 317 However, just as compelling state interests may
justify restrictions on the right to convey certain forms of information,
they necessarily justify restrictions on the right to receive information.
Zoning ordinances burden the rights of purveyors of pornographic films
as well as their audience. Indeed, the right to receive information may
be abridged altogether, given a strong enough interest. Child pornography may not be distributed even if it meets the Miller v. California 318
obscenity test. 319 School children have no right to deliver lewd speeches
to their classmates, even if the remarks may be otherwise protected, 320
nor are their first amendment rights unrestricted in school newspapers.321 Clearly, under the family privacy cases, parents may abridge
the same interest in privacy at stake in Stanley by denying to their
children the freedom to view pornography. Although the Supreme
Court does not treat children as adults when it comes to first amendment rights, it very nearly does so when the right at stake is
abortion. 322
Under Stanley's "right to receive information" language, a state
could presumably protect this right for both minor and adult females
regarding abortion information. If a state reasonably perceived a lack of
information or information imbalance endangering this right, it should
312. See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)(holding that a warrantless arrest of
a "driving while intoxicated" suspect in his home violated the fourth amendment).
313. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
314. See Ely, supra note 24, at 930 n.71; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (indicating
that activity in one's bedroom is not automatically constitutionally protected).
315. See, e.g., United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 126
(1973).
316. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41 (1986); New York v. P. J. Video,
Inc., 475 U.S. 868 (1986); Young v. American Mini-Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Young and Renton upheld the zoning of adult theaters.
317. See Board of Educ. v. Pica, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982).
318. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
319. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
320. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
321. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 479 U.S. 1053 (1988).
322. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at, 74; Bellotti, 443 U.S. at, 642-44.
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be able to mandate the giving of certain information by a physician to
his patient. 323 Of course, the state could not require the physician to
mouth state slogans, 324 make speculations, 325 or relate matters of dubious veracity. 326
Pennsylvania perceived that women (minors and adults) who
sought abortions were not getting all the information they needed to
make an informed choice. They were not being told enough about the
maternal health implications of abortion, nor were they being fully informed of programs designed to effect the state's permissible interest in
"potential life." In response, the state designed neutral, objective information to be made available to women who requested it. It was not to
be forced on anyone. The legislation was accurately tailored to effect
the woman's right to receive information. It did not force her or her
physician to adhere to or mouth any official state views.
Yet, the Supreme Court held that Roe compelled the conclusion
that this legislation placed an unconstitutional burden on the woman's
privacy right. 327 It seems odd that a right flowing from Stanley v.
Georgia would compel such a result, when Stanley was used to support
the abortion right.
When Roe was decided, John Hart Ely observed that abortion was
accorded more stringent protection than the first amendment right to
freedom of the press, protection "so stringent that a desire to preserve
the fetus's existence [was] unable to overcome it. " 328 Ely cited
Branzburg v. Hayes 329 to illustrate this point.
In Branzburg, the state's interest in protecting its citizens, through
efficient criminal investigations, overrode the first amendment right of a
journalist to withhold the identity of a source. In Thornburgh, by way
of contrast, the Court refused to give any scope to the state's equally
compelling interests in protecting "potential life," maternal health, and
informed consent. Furthermore, when the abortion right actually
clashed with the free speech rights of picketers, the outcome was predictable. In Bering v. SHARE, the Supreme Court of Washington, citing the need to protect the right to make a choice for abortion set forth
in Roe, affirmed an injunction limiting the free speech of abortion pick-

323. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)(requiring certain information disclosure by attorneys).
324. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (l977)(New Hampshire license plate slogan
case).
325. See Akron, 462 U.S. a! 444.
326. /d.
327. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 759.
328. Ely, supra note 24, at 935.
329. 408 U.S. 665 ( 1972).
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eters, even including limits on words that could be used. 330 Even the
foundational right of free speech, without which a democracy cannot
maintain ordered liberty, was subordinated to the abortion right. Ely's
assessment is as true today as it was sixteen years ago.
The other privacy rights, which the Roe Court cited along with
Stanley, were subject to a wide variety of burdens and abridgements by
various compelling state interests. The fourth and fifth amendment
opinions illustrate this well. The Court cited Terry v. Ohio, 331 Katz v.
United States, 332 Boyd v. United States, 333 and Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States. 334
Justice Brandeis' dissent is often noted for its description of "[ t ]he
protection guaranteed by the [fourth and fifth] Amendments . . . . " 336
These amendments, he believed, "protect[ ed] Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations," conferring "as
against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. " 336
The accuracy of his statement is dubious, in light of the constitutional text and the views of the framers. 337 Men who love their privacy
may love community as much or more. In fact, the very notion of civilization involves some necessary interference with individual privacy. 338
Moreover, this was a dissenting view of the law in 1928, and it is a
dissenting view today. 339 The Court's fourth and fifth amendment privacy decisions make clear that there are limits to this sphere of personal
autonomy. So it is with all of the other privacy rights as well, with the
exceptions of Roe and its progeny. While the abortion privacy right has
expanded since Roe, fourth and fifth amendment privacy rights have
remained limited and, indeed, have been further restricted. 340
330. 106 Wash. 2d 212, 721 P.2d 918 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 940 (1987).
331. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
332. 389 u.s. 347 (1967)
333. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
334. 277 us. 438, 471 (1928).
335. !d. at 478.
336. !d.
337. Even assuming the accuracy of Brandeis' legal argument, it is evident that his assertion
about the universal love of privacy among civilized men is a rhetorical exaggeration, along the
lines of his colleague's catchy dictum in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927)(Holmes declared,
"Three generations of imbeciles are enough.").
338. The current Governors of New York and Massachusetts support both a woman's right
to have an abortion and the states' right to force drivers to wear seat belts. What do they value
most? The right to be left alone' The right to life? The right to live in a eivilized and safe
community?
339. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986)(Blackmun, j., dissenting).
340. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 122 (1986)(Brennan, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part).
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Boyd v. United States ,341 cited in Roe, 342 prohibited "a compulsory production of a man's private papers to establish a criminal charge
against him, or to forfeit his property . . . . " 343 The case contained a
long discussion of an English precedent, Entick v. Carrington. 344 According to the Court, the case laid down far-reaching principles, applying to "all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of
the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." 345
However, there was no indication that the Boyd Court thought its
statement extended beyond the facts of the case. Further, Boyd had
been repeatedly distinguished and limited, and much of the opinion had
been dismissed as dicta. 346 In United States v. Doe, 347 Justice
O'Connor noted that "[ t ]he notion that the Fifth Amendment protect[ ed] the privacy of papers originat[ ing] in Boyd" was overturned in
Fisher v. United States 346 and that "'[s]everal of Boyd's express or implicit declarations [had] not stood the test of time.' " 349
Katz v. United States, 350 also cited in Roe, 351 held that electronic
surveillance of private phone calls by the government constituted a
fourth amendment search and seizure. The Court also cited Terry v.
Ohio, 352 which held constitutional a weapons search without probable
cause, provided it proceeded from a reasonable inference and was properly limited to a search for weapons only. 3113 The privacy right underlying these cases remains; that is, unreasonable searches are barred.
However, the privacy right is not absolute; exceptions to this traditional
form of privacy, outlined in these cases, have been created. It should
also be noted that Terry, also holds that other state interests may justify
abridging the right in certain circumstances. 354
Examples of the exceptions include the holding by the Court that
electronic surveillance might be undertaken, without warrant, where
341. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
342. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
343. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 622.
344. 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765) reprinted in MAY's CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF ENGLAND, Vol. 3, (American ed. Vol. 2) chap. 11 (1977).
345. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
346. See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 471 (1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387
US. 294,301 (1967).
347. 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
348. 425 U.S. 391 (1976)(contents of business records ordinarily not privileged).
349. Doe, 465 U.S. at 618 (O'Connor, J., concurring)(quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 407).
350. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
351. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
352. /d. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
353. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
354. !d. at 29.
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there was no reasonable expectation of privacy. 366 Also, the Court has
held that "[ t ]he seizure of property in plain view involve[ d] no invasion
of privacy and [was] presumptively reasonable, assuming that there
[was] probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity."366 No warrant is needed to search a car, including compartments
not in plain view, when the car is legitimately stopped and there is
probable cause to believe that contraband is concealed there. 367
Minors' privacy rights are also subject to special infringement in
this context. No warrant is needed for searches by educators in schools.
The searches need only satisfy a reasonableness requirement. 368 Finally, remedies for violations of these rights have been truncated-weakening the exclusionary rule. 369
The point of this analysis is that the justifiable limitations on first,
fourth, and fifth amendment privacy rights are numerous and significant. The limitations allowed on the abortion right are few and insignificant. The absolute right to be secure in one's person and possessions
may be abridged by g~tting a warrant. It may even be abridged without
a warrant in certain circumstances.
Nevertheless, if the state has "probable cause" to believe that it
could protect both potential life and maternal health by requiring two
physicians to be present at postviability abortions, it might be prohibited from doing so. 360 This, and the striking down of most of the abortion regulations, seems inconsistent with the permissible limits on other
rights as noted above.
Following the citations of these search and seizure cases, the Roe
majority noted, citing Griswold v. Connecticut, that the privacy right
had also been found in the ninth amendment and in the "penumbras"
355. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). See also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705 (1984); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
356. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980). See also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730
(1983).
357. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986); United States v. Ross, 665 F.2d 346 (5th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 919 (1982).
358. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
359. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). See also United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433 (1976).
360. Such a provision was upheld in Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476
(1983), but the Thornburgh Court seemed to suggest that this ruling should be overturned, if it
was not a dead letter already. The Thornburgh majority went out of its way to indicate that the
Ashcroft ruling was "by a 5-4 vote, but not by a controlling single opinion .... " Thornburgh,
476 U.S. at 770. The Court then proceeded to deliberately misread the Pennsylvania provision,
obviously compatible with Ashcroft, so as to create a constitutional problem with it. Id. at 812
(White, J., dissenting). Thus, the Thornburgh discussion created more unpredictability, not in
keeping with the principles underlying stare decisis. See discussion of statutory construction infra
section 111-D-3.
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of the Bill of Rights. 361 Griswold, like the first, fourth, and fifth
amendment cases above, can best be understood as protecting "the sacred precincts of the marital bedroom." 362
The Roe decision also cited Eisenstadt v. Baird 363 as authority for
its abortion right. 364 John Noonan, Jr., now judge on the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, has argued that Eisenstadt is Roe's only true precedent. 36 ~ He observed this was because Eisenstadt, by extending a right
formerly "based on the special position of the married" to individuals,
married or not, "repudiated the legally privileged position of marriage."366 By so doing, the Court "turned the liberty on its head,"
claimed Noonan. 367 He added that Eisenstadt was "decided after Roe
v. Wade had been argued to the Court, so that its revolutionary rationale was probably invented with Roe v. Wade in view." 368
If the right to abortion truly has its roots in marital privacy, one
would expect that marriage and abortion would be treated similarly.
However, in contrast to the virtually nonexistent restrictions allowed on
abortion, there are many common restrictions on the right to marry.
This is so even though another Supreme Court decision, cited by
Roe, 369 found marriage to be a "fundamental" civil right of man. 370
Restrictions on marriage include licensing by the state, physical examinations, blood tests (including rubella tests), submission of personal
data for recordkeeping, number of spouses (no polygamy or bigamy),
waiting periods, residency requirements, and restrictions on who may
be married due to age, prior marriage, insanity, sex (homosexual and
transexual marriage may be barred), membership in the human race
(no marriage to horses), blood relationship, or possession of certain ailments (including venereal diseases, impotence, drug addiction, alcoholism, epilepsy, and pulmonary tuberculosis). 371 For minors, parental
consent is required with certain state-created exceptions, and, in one
state, a court may order premarital counseling for minors, focusing on
social, economic and personal aspects of marriage, in addition to gener361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
(1979).
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
(1980).

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86; Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
/d. at 485.
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
j. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE, ABORTION IN AMERICA

IN THE SEVENTIES

21

Id.
/d.
/d.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
See generally H. CLARK, CASES AND PROBLEMS

ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS

130-54
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ally applicable three to five day waiting periods. 372 Regulation of marriage ceremonies and the persons performing ceremonies is also allowed.373 The state imposes duties, including support obligations, and
presumptions, such as that of paternity, based upon marital status. 374
Dissolution of the marital relationship is also controlled by the state
and subject to its regulations. 375
The contrast with permissible regulation of abortion is remarkable. For example, while states may require marriages to be licensed,
Bolton declared that states could not require hospitals performing abortions to be licensed. 376 Although waiting periods of three to five days
from the time of receiving the marriage license to the time of the ceremony are common, Akron held unconstitutional a twenty-four hour
waiting period extending from the time a woman contacted an abortionist until the abortion was performed. 377 Despite residency requirements for marriage and divorce, Bolton rejected state residency requirements for abortion. 378 Ignoring the requirement of parental consent for
minors to marry, Danforth struck down a state statute requiring parental consent for minors to obtain abortions. 379 While extensive recordkeeping is permitted in marriage regulation, Thornburgh declared state
recordkeeping regulations for abortion unconstitutional, even though
confidentiality was guaranteed in the statute. 380 And, despite the medical examinations and tests required for marriage, Akron struck down a
statute requiring a physician to tell a woman "( t]hat according to his
best judgment ... she is pregnant" before performing an abortion procedure on her. 381
Of course, there are limits on restrictions a state may impose on
the fundamental right of marriage. 382 However, this fundamental right
372. /d. at 93.
373. /d.
374. /d.
375. /d. at 185-238, 779-1110.
376. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 194 (1973).
377. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 451 (1983).
378. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 200.
379. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
380. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 766
(1986).
381. Akron, 462 U.S. at 423 n.5. See also Women's Medical Center of Providence v. Roberts, 530 F. Supp. 1136 (D.R.I. 1982)(holding unconstitutional a provision requiring that a woman be told whether she was pregnant and receive a copy of her pregnancy test prior to any
abortion procedure).
382. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). Zablocki struck down a Wisconsin
statute requiring state permission to remarry for non-custodial parents required to make child
support payments. Permission was predicated on proof that support obligations were current and
that new obligations of the marriage would not jeopardize the pre-existing obligation of support.
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of marriage has not been made absolute, as has the abortion right.
The Roe Court also cited the fundamental liberty of procreation,
as seen in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 383 to support the right to abortion. 384
However, the Court's application of this right has not been absolute, as
has been the application of the right to abortion. John Noonan observed the extinction of the liberty to procreate when it confronted the
liberty to abort and argued the incongruity of such logic. 385
Noonan employed a number of prior Court holdings in his argument. He noted that Skinner "had held that Oklahoma could not sterilize a recidivist chicken thief-the right to procreate was so fundamental
that it could not be arbitrarily taken by the state. " 386 This right, N oonan said, "could reasonably be argued ... [to] include the protection of
the child procreated throughout pregnancy." 387 Noonan continued his
argument, stating that Loving's right to marry "could reasonably be
argued ... to include liberty to have children." 388 He observed that the
Court had held that a divorced mother "could not constitutionally arrange for the adoption of a child in her custody without giving notice to
the child's father. " 389 From this it could be argued that a father should
be entitled to a hearing before losing his child in the mother's womb. 390
The Court also held that an unwed father had special status in adoption proceedings simply because of his biological connection to the
child. 391 "It could reasonably be argued," said Noonan, "that, if biology
conferred rights, a father has as much interest in an unborn child of
eight weeks as in an infant of eight months." 392 However, when the
Court decided the issue of paternal rights versus abortion rights in
Danforth, it was held that since the State itself lacked the power to veto
abortion, "the State cannot delegate authority to any particular person,
even the spouse, to prevent abortion . . . . " 393 The Court missed the
whole point. The father's right was not derivative from the state, but
was rooted in familial rights, from whence, purportedly, also sprang
the right of abortion. The abortion right was found to be absolute,
however, and overrode all other privacy rights.
383. 316 U.S. 535 ( 1942)
384. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
385. J. NooNAN, supra note 365, at 90-95.
386. Id. at 90.
387. !d. Otherwise, the right is a mere "liberty to fertilize an ovum ... a good deal less than
full freedom to procreate." !d.
388. !d. at 90.
389. !d. at 90-91 (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965)).
390. !d.
391. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
392. J. NooNAN, supra note 365, at 91.
393. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69.
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It might be argued that abortion is fundamentally different from
these more limited rights and was, therefore, properly given greater
protection. However, this undercuts the Roe privacy analysis. If the difference was that fundamental, then the Roe Court was in error in adducing these other privacy rights as precedent for the abortion right.
Moreover, the Roe Court acknowledged the differences between the
rights it cited as precedent and the abortion right, but indicated that
these differences (including the interests of the unborn fetus) cut in
favor of limiting the abortion right, not removing most limitations, as
the Court has subsequently done. 394

It might be argued that the intrusion of the state into the abortion
decision is greater than the intrusion involved in an unwarranted
search and seizure. The felon, incarcerated on the basis of evidence
seized without a warrant, may have great difficulty in seeing the distinction. So, also, might the subject of a "Terry" search. 3911 Indeed, the
Court has never articulated a principle to discriminate between various
forms of governmental intrusion. It noted that Terry involved "a serious
intrusion on the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken
lightly." 396
Of course, some women refused abortions experience hardship
during pregnancy and childbirth. But abortion certainly involves a serious intrusion on the bodily integrity of the fetus, which is arguably
greater than the hardships on its mother. Again, it seems that the presence of the fetus complicates the traditional privacy rights paradigm so
as to justify greater state monitoring of the abortion right.
Taken as a whole, these cases constitute a discrete right of privacy
in certain relationships (marital and familial) and in certain places
(primarily the home). This right may be overridden, given a sufficiently important interest, and sufficient safeguards against abuse. 397
The Roe Court never articulated the rationale for extrapolating the
abortion right from these cases. Nor has the Court subsequently provided a principled rationalization for its disparate treatment of abortion
and the more traditional privacy rights.

394. "The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privary. She carries a ... fetus .
The situation therefore is inherently different from marital intimacy ... or procreation .... " Roe,
410 U.S. at 159. The Court concluded that a "woman's privacy is no longer sole and any right of
privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly." /d.
395. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
396. /d. at 17.
397. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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Disparate substantive due process analysis

The anomalous treatment of the abortion privacy right is also evident in the Roe Court's employment of its chosen constitutional analysis; substantive due process. Following a cite to Griswold, the Court
cited Meyer v. Nebraska, 398 one of the few Lochner-era due process
cases still recognized as good law. 399 However, the Meyer case held only
that a statute forbidding the teaching of German to school children violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment by depriving
Meyer of his liberty to engage in his occupation of teaching. 400 While,
perhaps, lending support to the employment of substantive due process,
Meyer cannot be precedent for an abortion right.
The Griswold case itself, with its revival of substantive due process, is at the core of the problem. 401 As Judge Bork has demonstrated,
the Constitution protects the rights of majorities in some areas-by
leaving certain decisions to majority vote-and the rights of minorities
in other areas-by forbidding majority rule. 402 The role of the Supreme
Court is to determine, by interpretation of the Constitution, whether a
matter falls in the realm of majority or minority freedom. 403 "Society
consents to be ruled undemocratically within defined areas by certain
enduring principles believed to be stated in, and placed beyond the
reach of majorities by, the Constitution." 404 Thus, the Court only has
legitimate power to employ theories given in the Constitution, and the
imposition of Court members' own value choices is unconstitutional. 40 ~
Logically, then, the selection of certain values as "fundamental,'' which
are not constitutionally mandated, and extending constitutional protection to them, makes the Court a "perpetrator of limited coups

d'etat. '' 408
However, even if substantive due process 1s employed by the
398. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
399. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
400. As a result of subsequent distortion worked by cases such as Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 ( 1972), and Roe, many commentators have come to see Meyer as they see Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965): A case standing for the broad principle of "freedom of choice
regarding an individual's personal life" or at least for the idea that the "right to private decision
making regarding family matters [is] inherent in the concept of liberty." J NowAK, R. RoTUNDA, & J YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 685 (3d ed. 1986). Some dicta in Meyer may
suggest the latter reading, but a fair reading of Meyer makes it clear that the only problem considered in Meyer was whether Meyer had a right to teach and whether the right was violated. See
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 298-99.
401. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
402. Bork, supra note 88, at 3.
403. /d.
404. /d.
405. /d.
406. /d. at 6.
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Court, the abortion privacy right does not result from an application of
the usual analysis. In effect, the Court employed an unconstitutional
method of analysis, in violation of the usual rules of that analysis, to
achieve the abortion privacy right.
The Roe Court's citation of Palko v. Connecticut407 indicated a
clear reliance on substantive due process. Substantive due process analysis first requires the finding of a fundamental right (to be weighed
against the state interest in regulation). The Court noted the Palko test
for "fundamental" rights: only those rights "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" were "fundamental" and, thus, protected by the guarantee of personal privacy, rooted in the liberty concept of the fourteenth
amendment. 408 This implied that "to abolish" the right to abortion
would "violate a 'principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' " 409 The
Palko test served as a bridge between the Court's constitutional analysis
and the lengthy historical survey that immediately preceded it-a survey apparently designed to show the fundamentality of abortion practice to liberal regimes! 10
407. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
408. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (citing Palko, 302 U.S. at 325).
409. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
410. The Court never explicitly identified the purpose of its historical survey. However, the
Court did express the belief that its history of abortion afforded insight into appellant's argument
that abortion was a right guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the
penumbras of the Bill of Rights, or the ninth amendment. Roe, 410 U.S. at 129. See Tribe,
Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. Rt:v. at 3
n.13. The prominence of the historical discussion and the constant straining to distinguish away or
minimize evidence that the practice of abortion was disputed or condemned indicated that the
Court meant this history to serve as a proof of fundamentality.
Furthermore, under its own precedent, cited in Palko, the Court had a duty to demonstrate
that abortion practice was "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental," Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934)) or that the abortion right was "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." /d. As
observed by Justice White, "a free, egalitarian, and democratic society does not presuppose any
particular rule or set of rules with respect to abortion." Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 793 (1986)(White, J., dissenting). This, he noted, is reinforced by "the fact that many men and women of good will and high commitment to constitutional
government place themselves on both sides of the abortion controversy." !d. Thus, the Court had
the obligation to demonstrate that abortion rights had roots in our traditions and collective conscience. The Court's own historical sketch in Roe refuted that argument. /d. The Court's failure
to be more explicit about the purpose of its history has led to some confusion about the role of
history in privacy jurisprudence as a whole. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (Blackmon, J, dissenting); infra this section, the discussion of Bowers.
The Roe Court concluded from its historical research that about any regime of ordered liberty
worth recognizing (excluding the American regime for over a century before Roe) had provided
abortion rights, at least in the initial stages of pregnancy, which had historically been somewhat
limited by concerns for fetal life (i.e., the "quickening" distinction) and maternal health. Roe, 410
U.S. at 139-42. Though the Court never explicitly linked the historical sketch to the rest of the

181]

RIGHT TO ABORTION

237

Interestingly, the Roe Court chose to rely on the older Palko language, as a test of fundamentality, rather than that of the more recent
(1968) case of Duncan v. Louisiana.'m In Duncan, the Palko question
of whether the principle was "essential to a scheme of ordered liberty"
was modified. The Duncan test was whether the principle was "necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty." 412 The Court
did not expressly extend Duncan to substantive due process until the
1977 case of Moore v. City of East Cleveland. 413 However, as John
Hart Ely observed, Palko was of "questionable contemporary vitality"
when Roe was decided. 414
The Palko test is somewhat artificial 416 and difficult to apply. It
requires the Court to imagine whether there would be a regime of ordered liberty if the particular right or procedure at issue did not exist.
Of course, this almost always requires references to historical particulars, but the analysis is free-wheeling and not tied to the history of any
particular liberal regime. The Duncan case limited this to AngloAmerican practice and Moore further limited it to institutions "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 416
It should be noted that Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman417 is often cited in the Court's discussions of the test of fondamentality. In Poe, Harlan wrote that the content of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment consisted of "the balance which our
Nation ... has struck between ... liberty and the demands of organized society." 418 It "is the balance struck by this country, having regard
to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as
well as the traditions from which it broke." 419 Read as a whole,
Harlan's opinion seems to consider American history as dispositive.
Applying the Harlan or Moore 420 tests to abortion, the proper
analysis would have required the Court to determine how abortion has
traditionally been treated in this country, including deeply-rooted
opinion, it gave the strong impression that it felt it important that history and constitutional law
be brought into close harmony. The Court's conclusions on history coincided rather conveniently
with its constitutional conclusions.
411. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
412. /d. at 149-50 n.14.
413. 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 n.12 (1977)(noting the "abstract formula" of Palko, and the more
restrictive, historically based test of Duncan). The Moore Court followed Duncan. /d.
414. Ely, supra note 24, at 931 n.79.
415. L. TRIBE, AMF.RICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw § 11-2, at 773 (2d ed. 1988).
416. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (emphasis added).
417. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961).
418. /d. at 542.
419. /d.
420. The test of Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), cited in Palko, 302 U.S.
at 325, gives the same result.
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American traditions which represented a break from Old World traditions. 421 A test rooted in American history, while it may not totally
prevent "judges from roaming at large in the constitutional field," 422
would at least "impose[] limits on the judiciary that are more meaningful than any based on the abstract formula taken from Palko .... " 423
Under the Court's own tests, if faithfully followed, it is impossible to
make a case for an abortion right.' 24 This nation's history will not allow it. A survey of the history shows Roe's illegitimacy.' 26
As the Roe Court's own evidence showed, from the mid-nineteenth
421. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 790-91 (White, J., dissenting).
422. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 502 (Harlan, J., concurring).
423. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503-04 n.12.
424. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 791-92 (White, J., dissenting).
425. /d. As argued by the United States, "[d]ue process analysis ... must ... seek a connection with the intentions of those who framed and ratified the constitutional text." Brief for the
United States, supra note 35, at 25. However, "the period between 1860 and 1880 witnessed 'the
most important burst of anti-abortion legislation in the nation's history.'" /d. (quoting J. MoHR,
ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POI.ICY, 1800-1900 at
200 (1978)). Further, the laws were clearly aimed at protecting unborn life and not just maternal
health. /d. at 26 (citing J. MoHR, supra, at 35-36). The United States' brief declared "that those
who drafted and voted for the fourteenth amendment would have been surprised indeed to learn
that they had put any part of such subjects beyond the pale of state legislative regulation." /d. at
26.
The historical context is very relevant to the interpretation of the due process clause in that it
reveals the intent behind the clause. !d. This search for contemporaneous understanding has been
conducted by the Court in establishment clause cases such as Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984). Similarly, the Court has employed historical analysis in eighth amendment evaluation of
the death penalty, fifth amendment treatment of self-incrimination, and sixth amendment evaluation of trial by jury issues. Brief for the United States, supra note 35, at 26-27. In contrast to the
straightforward use of history in these cases, argued the United States, the use of history in Roe is
unclear and "it reaches a conclusion in direct variance with the historical facts recited." /d. at 27.
The United States, as amicus curiae, also noted the other ways history has been used. First, it
has been "invoked . . to take account of developments in society and the law." /d. Under this
approach history has been used as a vector showing the proper application of the original understanding to undreamed of developments such as wire-tapping. The original intent is used "for
developing values implied and inchoate at the point of origin." /d. However, the brief argued that
whether the vector pointed to a right to travel or a right to attend criminal trials, "the Court has
always taken pains to trace its point of origin back to specific constitutional provisions by a route
either inferential or historical." /d. By contrast, Roe omitted these connections. /d. Indeed, the
fourteenth amendment has been shown to have arisen during a period of "particular stringency"
in abortion laws. /d. (emphasis in original). Thus, the "historical trajectory" did not support Roe.
/d. at 28.
The inferential route, likewise, fails to support Roe. /d. The "germ of a theory" was missing
from any constitutional passage to support a "general and fundamental right" to abortion. /d.
Even such an "inferential extrapolation" must be "directly rooted in textually specified constitutional values." /d. Griswold included the notion of a connection "to what went before." /d. (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965)). By contrast, Roe was not "anchored
in text, history, or precedent" but was "an abrupt departure from the Court's prior decisions." /d.
at 28. All the cases purported to support a "privacy" right "were applications of accepted principles . . . . " /d. at 28-29. Therefore, Roe abandoned the normal use of history in constitutional
analysis.
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century forward, American statutory law began to break from the common law tradition in the abortion area. 426 The states enacted stringent
prohibitions on abortion which remained in effect until the Court's ruling in Roe. 427 Even where the law was liberalized, it was much stricter
than what the Court imposed in Roe. 428 Certainly, American abortion
rights were not, in the language of Duncan, "fundamental in the context of the criminal processes maintained by the American States." 429
Of course, even under the wider-ranging historical test of Palko,
the case for the fundamentality of abortion fails. Virtually every aspect
of the Court's recitation of history has been challenged, either for its
factual accuracy or for the legitimacy of the inferences which the Court
drew from its facts. The Court's view of history, as a whole, has been
thoroughly refuted by a number of scholars. 430
426. Roe, 410 U.S. at 139.
427. /d. at 140.
428. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 205 (1973)(citing MonEL PENAL ConE§ 230.3 (proposed official draft, 1962)(reproduced as Appendix B)).
429. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 (1968).
430. As one commentator has noted, "It was only by concentrating on ... the outdated and
biologically incorrect notions of when human life begins held by our ancestors [the concept of
"quickening"] that [the Roe Court] was led to assert that historically 'abortion was viewed with
less disfavor than under most American statutes currently.' " D. Horan, Roe v. Wade: It's Facts
and Logic Cannot Stand (no date)(unpublished manuscript on file at author's office). In addition,
the Court relied on dated and skewed evidence of ancient attitudes on abortion. See S. KRASON,
ABORTION: POLITICS, MoRALITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION 120-48, 441-83 (1984); Arbagi, Roe
and the Hippocratic Oath, in ABORTION AND THE CoNSTITUTION: REVERSING Rm: V. WADE
THROUGH THE CoURTS 159 (D. Horan, E. Grant & P. Cunningham ed. 1987). The Court cited
Book V of Plato's Republic as authority for the proposition that abortion was commended by the
ancients. Roe, 410 U.S. at 131. An actual examination of the passage and its context makes it
doubtful that Socrates was even speaking of abortion, let alone endorsing it, in the argument cited
by Plato. See S. KRASON, supra, at 124-31. In fact, an examination of Aristotle's argument in
Book VII of THE LAWS shows he opposed abortion for population control, gave the right, when
exercised, to the state, not the woman, and opposed it from the point at which his scientific understanding indicated that life had begun (40 days for males, 90 days for females). S. KRASON, supra
at 130.
The Supreme Court's discussion of historical Christian views and the common law suffered
from similar defects. While a detailed critique of Roe's historical material is beyond the scope of
this article, much material is available on the subject. A survey of this literature is sufficient to
indicate the overwhelming evidence against the Roe Court's view of abortion history. See generally
Connery, The Ancients and the Medievals on Abortion: The Consensus the Court Ignored, in
ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: RF.Vt:RSING Rm: V. WADE THROUGH THt: CoURTS at 123;
j. CONNERY, ABORTION: DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVE (1977); S.
KRASON & W. HaLLBERG, THE LAW AND HISTORY OF ABORTION: THE SUPREME CoURT
REFUTED (1984); Brown, What the Supreme Court Didn't Know: Ancient and Early Christian
Views on Abortion, I HuM. LIFE REv. 5 (Spring 1975); Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 FoRDHAM L. REv. 807 (1973); Dellapenna, The History of Abortion: Technology, Morality, and Law, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 359 (1979); Horan, Forsythe, &
Grant, Two Ships Passing in the Night: An lnterpretavist Review of the White-Stevens Colloquy
on Roe v. Wade, 6 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 229 (1987); Noonan, An Almost Absolute Value
in History, in THE MORALITY OF ABORTION: Lt:GAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 1 (j.
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Even taking the Roe history at face value, however, there is still
considerable doubt that it established abortion as fundamental. Under
Palko, if the Court could imagine a scheme of ordered liberty that did
not include the abortion right, the right was not fundamental. The
American system discussed in the Court's history presented just such a
scheme. Ely concluded that the Court's survey "surely d[id] not seem to
support the Court's position, unless a record of serious historical and
contemporary dispute was somehow thought to generate a constitutional mandate. " 431
However, the invocation of Palko enabled the Court to multiply
examples of permissible abortion: to roll the constitutionally relevant
history all the way back to ancient Greece. 432 This maneuver provided
a few more allegedly pro-abortion precedents for the Court and bolstered the impression that approval of abortion had roots deep in Western history. Moreover, the expansion of the relevant history enabled the
Roe Court to portray the enactment of tough anti-abortion statutes, in
effect in America for over a century before Roe, as freak developments
in the history of ordered liberty. 433
In sum, the Roe Court's substantive due process analysis, truncated as it was, was anomalous in comparison with the application of
the analysis in other privacy cases. This may also be seen from the
Court's treatment of another privacy claim: Bowers v. Hardwick. 434

4.

Roe v. Wade contrasted with Bowers v. Hardwick

In Bowers v. Hardwick, 436 the Court, employing a history of
Western attitudes toward sodomy, concluded that there was no fundamental right to commit sodomy under either the Palko or the Moore
test. 436 Yet, the historical case for the fundamentality of abortion is no
more convincing than the historical case for sodomy. The Roe majority
Noonan ed. 1970).
431. Ely, supra note 24, at 925 n.42. See also Epstein, supra note 30, at 167; Thornburgh,
476 U.S. at 793 (White, J., dissenting).
432. It actually reached back to the Persian Empire, "where criminal abortions were severely
punished." Roe, 410 U.S. at 130. But, since Persia was a "tyranny," its history was presumably
irrelevant to any test concerned with "ordered liberty."
433. The Court adduced contemporary opinions of elite groups, such as the AMA and ABA,
as further evidence that the American practice regarding abortion before the 1970's was on the
wrong side of history. Roe, 410 U.S. at 141-47.
434. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
435. /d.
436. ld. at 192. Cf The Supreme Court /985 Term, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4, 215
(1986)("Hardwick indicates that rather than protecting an individual's freedom to make decisions
fundamental to herself or himself, the right of privacy is limited to particular, traditional categories of private life.").
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cited Plato's REPUBLIC as evidence of abortion's deep roots in our cultural traditions! 37 The Bowers majority apparently did not deem this
sort of evidence as worthwhile! 38 Plato's dialogues contain numerous
allusions to the practice of homosexual sodomy among the ancients. 439
The Roe approach suggested that a shift of opinion, in favor of
abortion, among selected elites and in a few states was constitutionally
significant. The Bowers opinion saw little constitutional significance in
the lack of enforcement of sodomy laws generally and repeal of such
laws in many states. 440 These trends did not indicate a fundamental
right. The comparison of the historical analysis employed in Roe with
that used in Bowers indicates that, if the Texas abortion law challenged
in Roe were subjected to the same analysis as the Georgia sodomy statute in Bowers, the abortion law would have been upheld. The Bowers
analysis was more rigorous than that of Roe. The grasping at historical
straws besmirching Roe was absent in Bowers. The Bowers history was
certainly not complete, but it was not glaringly inaccurate. Nor did it
have to be complete. It need only have shown that the practice was not
rooted in the traditions of this nation nor essential to a scheme of ordered liberty.
The Bowers and Roe cases were inconsistent. in other respects. As
demonstrated above, traditional privacy precedents placed limited protection around places where privacy could reasonably be expected. This
protection was provided where the interest of the government in intruding in those places, without proper safeguards, was outweighed by the
potential of abuse inherent in the intrusion. The privacy right claimed
by the plaintiff in Bowers fit much more easily into this line of cases
(e.g., Stanley, Katz, and Griswold) than the privacy right claimed by
Jane Roe. 441 All other things being equal, the right to privacy cannot
logically justify unlimited access to abortion and, nevertheless, permit
local police to selectively enforce long dormant sodomy statutes by entering into a private home.
Under privacy jurisprudence as it now stands, the government
may not involve itself in the abortion decision in any meaningful way.
Yet, it may completely abridge the decision to engage in certain consen-

437. Roe, 410 U.S. at 131.
438. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193-94 (no mention whatsoever of instances in ancient texts where
the practice of homosexuality is condoned).
439. See PLATO, PHAEDRUS. Cf Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone & Balch, Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DuQ. L. REV. 1 (1985)(employing a Roe and Bowers type of historical analysis
to find no constitutional right to suicide despite some approval of the practice in some parts of the
ancient world).
440. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193-94.
441. See id. at 195.
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sua! sexual encounters-encounters that directly affect the legitimate
interests of other non-consenting parties to a much lesser extent than
the abortion decision.
By any prudent measure, the state's interest in regulating abortion
is at least as great as its interest in nabbing homosexuals in flagrante
delicto. As the Roe Court noted, a responsible and responsive government must necessarily be permitted to regulate abortion for a variety of
compelling reasons. Government has a legitimate interest in protecting
potential life, in maintaining medical standards, and in preserving maternal health, including mental and physical well-being.
The social implications of the mass practice of abortion as an alternative form of birth control are grave. The government is necessarily
desirous of minimizing these ill effects. On the other hand, the practical
reasons for upholding the Georgia sodomy law seem no more compelling. True, upholding sodomy laws has a symbolic value. The health
implications of sodomy practice are legitimate state concerns, but the
Court gave these no overt consideration in the Bowers decision. Moreover, even if a sodomy right were declared a fundamental privacy right,
the state would be free to show that these interests were compelling
enough to justify abridgement of the right.
It might be argued that the inconsistency between Bowers and
abortion jurisprudence is more apparent than real. Four of the five
members of the Bowers majority were dissenting in Thornburgh; the
four Bowers dissenters have consistently voted to reaffirm Roe. It appears that only Justice Powell's position as a supporter of both a broad
privacy right in Thornburgh and a circumscribed privacy right in Bowers is inconsistent. 442
However, the consistency of the dissenters in Bowers should not be
readily presumed. It is interesting to note that the author of Roe, Justice Blackmun, who relied so extensively on history and the sanction of
custom to justify that opinion, completely renounced the historical approach of Bowers. 443 He rejected the history of Anglo-American sodomy laws as irrelevant because of "[ t ]he theological nature of [their]
origin." 444 Since much Anglo-American law has a theological origin, it
appears that, for the Bowers dissenters, Anglo-American legal history is
442. !d.

ill

197 -9R.

44.1. In this, Justice Blarkmun was joined by Justices Brennan ilnd Marshall, two original
subscribers to Roe, as well as Justice Stevens, a latecomer to the pro-abortion majority, but a
strong defender of Roe. Justice Blackmun asserted, "I cannot agree that either the length of time a
majority has hrld its conviction or the passions with which it defends them can withdraw legislation from this Court's scrutiny." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 210.
444. !d. at 211-12 & n_(,
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no guide to the determination of fundamental rights. 446
Another Bowers dissenter, Justice Stevens, has argued forcefully
for an historical approach and has "conscientiously, indeed passionately, sought to discern and apply the Framers' intent in construing a
constitutional provision." 446 One of three cases where he forcefully argued for such an approach, Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 447
was decided two weeks after the Thornburgh abortion case, in which
Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, ridiculed such an approach by
Justice White in the abortion context. Thus, Justice Stevens is a powerful advocate for interpretivism, except where it interferes with abortion or homosexual practice. It has been observed that this inconsistency
boils down to a "whose-ox-is-gored" approach, which "is neither a
principle of constitutional construction nor a principled manner of interpreting the Constitution." 448
Apart from these apparently anomalous rejections of the worth of
historical analysis, other inconsistencies are present. In Bowers, Justice
Blackmun rejected theologically based law as a guide. However, in Roe,
he approvingly cited ancient religious attitudes as well as canon law
treatment of the unquickened fetus as evidence of an historical acceptance of abortion, at least in the early stages of pregnancy. 449 Moreover,
the Roe opinion impliedly analogized from this history to the constitutional conclusion that the abortion right cannot be abridged at all in the
first trimester. 460
In the light of Bowers, one wonders anew about the purpose of
Justice Blackmun's historical survey in Roe. Did he believe it was relevant? Was it simply an elaborate mystification disguised to cloak the
real policy reasons for Roe and the lack of traditional constitutional
analysis? There is some evidence for this.
445. See H.

BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE fORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL

TRADITION ( 1983).

446. Horan, Forsythe, & Grant, supra note 430, at 263.
1 (1986)
447. 478
448. Horan, Forsythe, & Grant, supra note 430, at 267.
449. Roe, 410 U.S. at 133-34, 160-61.
450. Such "acceptance" of early abortion in the historical survey made the first trimester
regulations seem normative. The Court failed to draw the logical conclusion from the quickening
distinction that for centuries the unborn were protected from the earliest time when the science of
the day indicated that human life existed. In the nineteenth century, when science discovered that
life existed from conception, doctors led the way in persuading the legislatures to push abortion
protection back to conception. This latter approach was consistent with the quickening distinction
of the common law, as the Roe approach was not. The Court conveniently overlooked this powerful evidence that abortion laws were written to protect fetal life, and not just to protect maternal
health. /d. Of course, the science of conception has not been altered. The underlying rationale of
the abortion laws remains unchanged. However, the ruling members of the medical profession
have altered their positions, apparently for reasons other than scientific facts.
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First, the history in Roe does not prove what the Court suggests it
proves. Second, the Court never explicitly says it is supposed to prove
anything. Finally, in Bowers, Justice Blackmun claims that the principle linking abortion and other fundamental privacy rights is their centrality to the lives and importance to "the happiness of individuals." 41n
In doing so, he implies that this factor is what makes these rights fundamental, not their importance in our history or collective conscience.
Of course, the test for fundamentality has never been, and cannot
be, the Supreme Court's own estimate of a right's importance. The
right to an education is as important as these other rights, perhaps
more important. Yet the Court has never recognized it as fundamental.4112 Other important needs, such as the need for economic security,
have never been recognized as fundamental.
Justice Blackmun's language in Bowers suggests that the most important part of the Roe Court's privacy analysis is the paragraph lamenting the problems of unwanted pregnancy. Yet, the Supreme Court
could never have submitted an opinion grounded solely on this reasoning. It needed a legal analysis that included an historical justification of
the fundamental status of abortion. Since the analysis the Court
achieved was insufficient, the Court left the purposes of the various
parts of its argument vague. As noted above, the opinion does not reason to a result as much as it evokes one. The upshot of this analysis is
that Roe cannot stand without an historical argument of fundamentality
and it cannot stand with one. The argument that Roe's historical analysis was a result-oriented mystification seems compelled if we take Justice Blackmun's Bowers dissent seriously.
It is clear that the position of Justice Blackmun and the other
three who joined him in the Bowers dissent is no more consistent with
the analysis of Roe than the position of the Bowers majority. The Bowers opinion has compounded the problems of abortion jurisprudence.
The Thornburgh opinion rendered the abortion right more incoherent,
but Bowers expanded the analytical gulf between abortion jurisprudence and the privacy jurisprudence to which it is purportedly linked.
Even more disturbing is the confusion over the proper test for
fundamentality evident in Bowers-confusion likely stemming in part
from the vagueness of Roe on this point. Is the Palko test appropriate?
Is Moore? Or is history irrelevant, as the Bowers dissenters suggest?
This confusion reminds us that the fundamentality of the abortion
right has not been satisfactorily determined under any test. The argu451. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackrnun, J., dissenting).
452. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973); cj: Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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ment put forward in Roe convinced none of the commentators. The
analysis employed by the Bowers majority suggests that the abortion
right could not have passed muster if Justice Powell had voted consistently with Bowers. Finally, no satisfactory alternative rationale for the
fundamentality of abortion has ever been offered by its Supreme Court
defenders (nor by other writers).
Indeed, a recent exhaustive analysis of abortion history and law
demonstrated that an abortion right has never been "a liberty in American Law or tradition," ~ 3 let alone a fundamental liberty. The writers
of that analysis added, "To the contrary, it is the protection of the life
of the unborn child as a human being that is 'deeply rooted' in American Law. Roe v. Wade cannot be supported by any values that are
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.""~"
In light of this, the Court owes the country a re-evaluation of Roe
with a plausible, reasoned justification and more principled guides to
the regulation of the abortion right. Failing this, Roe should be overruled and the regulatory authority over abortion should revert to the
states.
There is nothing in the Roe privacy analysis, or in the privacy
jurisprudence as a whole, to justify continued adherence to Roe. The
citation of cases in Roe, involving marriage, family, sex, and procreation, are insufficient to justify a fundamental right to abortion. The
development of these rights has been so inconsistent with the development of the abortion right that a rethinking of the current approach to
abortion jurisprudence is now needed.u~
4

453. Horan, Forsythe, & Grant, supra note 430, at 311.
454. !d.
455. Perhaps the best illustration of the disparity between the traditionally cited privacy
rases and abortion jurisprudence is found in the treatment of the family. As has already been
noted, when the fundamental right of parents to direct the rearing of their children collided with
the fundamental right of the child to have an abortion, the latter right prevailed.
In abortion rontexts, the family has been painted in the bleakest possible terms to make the
rejection of a parental consent or notice requirement seem reasonable. For example, in Hodgson v.
Minnesota. 827 F.2d 1191 (8th Cir. 1987)(reh'g granted, vacated, 835 F.2d 1545, rescinded 835
F.2d 1546) the Eighth Circuit recently held that a state may not require notification (whenever
possible) of both parents, prior to their child obtaining an abortion. The appellate court upheld
the district rourt's findings that there was a large number of divorces in Minnesota, that many
minors did not live with their parents, that many minors were from "dysfunctional families [and]
'live in fear of violence by family members,' " that notification would "only add to the magnitude
of the problem of family violence,'' and that notifying a non-custodial parent could be harmful. /d.
at 1198 (quoting Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 768-69 (D. Minn. 1986)).
Ironically, this bleak view of the family is in stark contrast to the rosy picture painted of the
physician-patient relationship. The Supreme Court consistently rejects evidence that some abortion-clinic dortors are greedy, unscrupulous, and unsafe. Instead, it consistently portrays the whole
mediral profession in an idealistic fashion.
A second stark contrast is the portrayal of the family in other contexts. In Parham v. J. R.,
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Fetal Rights in Legal Contexts Other Than Abortion Law

The anomalies of abortion jurisprudence may also be seen by a
comparison of the rights of the unborn in abortion law with their rights
in other legal contexts. Before reviewing fetal rights in these other contexts, here is a brief criticism of the legal status of fetal life which Roe
perpetuated.
The Court referred to the legal status of fetal life in three contexts:
( 1) An inconclusive history of the legal treatment of the fetus, 456 (2) A
discussion of personhood in the Constitution, 457 and (3) An analysis of
the legitimate state interest in protecting "potential" life. 458 Subsequent
Supreme Court opinions concerning the legal status of fetal life in any
of the three contexts have not been rigorously principled. Nor have they
adequately given effect to that legal interest especially given the extent
to which fetal rights are protected in tort, property and criminal law! 119
Furthermore, despite having imposed national guidelines on abortion,
the Court has brought no rationality to laws regulating treatment of the
fetus. On the contrary, it has made a consistent and principled policy of
protecting unborn life almost impossible. The Court has quite possibly
aborted the nascent trend toward legal recognition of the dignity of unborn life. As Justice O'Connor has argued, the treatment accorded fetal
life in abortion jurisprudence is illogical 460 since the state's interest in

442 U.S. 584 (1979), the Court rejected a district court's holding that an adversarial, judicial-type
hearing was required by due process for parental commitment of minor children to mental institutions. !d. at 607. The Court noted that such a hearing to challenge the parent's decision posed a
danger of "significant intrusion into the parent-child relationship." !d. at 610. The Court added:
"Pitting the parents and child as adversaries often will be at odds with the presumption that
parents art in the best interests of their child." ld. This presumption seems non-existent in abortion cases.
Finally, the contrast is also observable in Bowen v. American llosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610
( 1986), in which the Court repeatedly referred to decisions for nontreatment by parents of handicapped newborns. !d. at 631-39. The Court evinced no concern over the right of parents to make
such nontreatment decisions. !d. at 636 n.22. The notion of leaving the matter in the parents'
hands, without governmental intrusion, underlay the whole opinion.
Although such a "laissez-faire" approach is inappropriate in cases such as Bloomington's
Baby Doe, uecause human life is at risk, the Court finds it appropriate. But, when parents might
select a "nontreatment" of the pregnancy of their minor child, believing it to be in her best interest, the privacy right of parents to rear their own children is no longer compelling. Even notifying
the parents may be taboo, because parents who may be trusted to have their children's best interests at heart when deciding that they should not receive neonatal surgery, or when committing
them to a mental institution, suddenly lose their competency to determine best interest when the
subject is abortion.
4 56. Roe, 410 U S. at 159-62.
457. !d. at I 56-59.
458. !d. at 154, 159, 16S.
4S9. See infra section III-B-1, 2, & 3.
460. Akron, 462 US. at 459 (O'Connor,

J.,

dissenting).
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protecting life exists throughout pregnancy. 461
Back, then, to a discussion of fetal rights in other legal contexts.
Not only is abortion jurisprudence internally incoherent in regard to
the protection of fetal life, it is inconsistent with related areas of law as
well. In these related areas fetal rights are given greater protection.
Some jurisdictions even recognize pre-conception torts as well as the
more usual variety of prenatal harms and interests. Although criminal
and tort protection of the fetus is inadequate, 462 the protection of "potential" life in the abortion context seems uninformed by the protection
offered in these related areas. 463

1.

Fetal rights in tort law

The law of torts has seen a dramatic change in the past ninety
years. The rights of the unborn child have moved from a position of
little legal protection to a position where even preconception wrongs are
recompensible. As duties to the fetus increase, the foundation upon
which Roe sits erodes, turning it into the exception rather than the rule
in defining the personhood of the fetus.
The first American case which dealt with fetal injury was the celebrated opinion by then Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in Dietrich
v. Northampton. 464 Holmes interpreted the Massachusetts wrongful
death act to preclude recovery for the death of a four to five month old
fetus. 4611 He held that "the unborn child was a part of the mother at the
time of injury" and that "any damage to [the fetus] which was not too
remote to be recovered for at all was recoverable by her." 466 Dietrich
was widely followed by other courts until 1946.' 67 Holmes' approach
was buttressed by concern with problems of proving causation, and fear
that allowing recovery would lead to fictitious claims.' 68
461. !d. at 459, 460 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
462. Parness, Crimes Against the Unborn: Protecting and Respecting the Potentiality of
Human Life, 22 HARV. J. oN LEGIS. 97 (1985).
463. Roe is sometimes read by lower court judges (and legislatures, too, no doubt) to preclude
protettion of fetal life, not just prior to viability but in a variety of criminal law contexts as well.
For example, some courts have concluded that Roe makes feticide during the first three months of
pregnancy unpunishable. Another struck down a statute requiring disposal of fetal remains "in a
manner consistent with ... other human remains" because, it reasoned, Roe does not permit the
treatment of a fetus as a human being in any context. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181,
221 (E.D. La. 1980)(striking LA.Rt:v.STAT.ANN. § 40:1299.35.14 (1977)).
464. 138 Mass. 14 ( 1884 ).
465. The fetus lived for "ten or fifteen minutes" after premature birth. Dietrich, 138 Mass.
at 15. Nevertheless, the court referred to the newborn as an "unborn child." !d. at 17.
466. !d. at 17.
467. PROSSER AND Kt:t:TON ON TH~: LAW OF ToRTS 367 (W. Keeton ed. 5th ed. 1984).
468. !d. See, e.g., Magnolia Coca Cola Bouling Co. v. Jordan, 124 T('x. 347,78 S.W.2d 944
(1935).
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Dietrich did not go uncriticized, however. In 1900, the Supreme
Court of Illinois followed the reasoning of Dietrich in Allaire v. St.
Luke's Hospital." 69 Justice Boggs issued a strong dissent, attacking the
idea that the fetus was a part of the mother:
Medical science and skill and experience have demonstrated that at a
period of gestation in advance of the period of parturition the foetus is
capable of independent and separate life, and that though within the
body of the mother it is not merely a part of her body, for her body
may die in all of its parts and the child remain alive and capable of
maintaining life when separated from the dead body of the mother. 470

Though medical knowledge of the separateness of the fetus from the
mother was recognized at the turn of the century, the tort-related legal
rights of the unborn were slow in coming.
Recovery for prenatal injuries was finally allowed in 1946, in
what William Prosser called "the most spectacular abrupt reversal of a
well settled rule in the whole history. of the law of torts." 471 In Bonbrest v. Kotz, 472 a federal court allowed the plaintiff infant to recover
for injuries sustained when he was negligently taken, as a viable fetus,
from his mother's womb by the defendant doctor! 73 The reasoning in
Bonbrest (which closely followed that of Justice Boggs in his earlier
dissent) stated:
As to the viable child being 'part' of its mother-this argument seems
to me to be a contradiction in terms. True, it is in the womb, but it is
capable now of extrauterine life-and while dependent for its continued development on sustenance derived from its peculiar relationship
to its mother, it is not a 'part' of the mother in the sense of a constituent element-as that term is generally understood. Modern medicine
is replete with cases of living children being taken from dead mothers.
Indeed, apart from viability, a non-viable foetus is not part of its
mother. 474

As to the difficulty of proof of such claims, the court stated: 'The law
is presumed to keep pace with the sciences and medical science certainly has made progress since 1884. We are concerned here only with
the right and not its implementation." 4711
Since Bonbrest, every state has recognized prenatal harm as a le469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.

184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
/d. at 370, 56 N.E. at 641.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE
65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
/d. at 143.
Id. at 140.
/d. at 143.

LAW OF TORTS

336 (4th ed. 1971)
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gitimate cause of action for a child subsequently born! 76 Compensation
for prenatal injuries has also been allowed under the Federal Tort
Claims Act in an action against the United States. 477 Some states limit
recovery to post-viability injuries, but the clear trend is toward recovery
for all prenatal harm! 78
The justifications given for discarding the viability test vary. In
Smith v. Brennan, 479 the New Jersey Supreme Court found that age is
not the only determinant of viability, and, in borderline cases, there is
no principled way to determine viability! 80 The court said:
We see no reason for denying recovery for a prenatal injury because it
occurred before the infant was capable of separate existence. Whether
viable or not at the time of the injury, the child sustains the same
harm after birth and therefore, should be given the same opportunity
for redress. 481
A New York appellate court in Kelly v. Gregort 82 (the first court
to reject the viability standard) focused on the issue of biological separability: "[L]egal separability should begin where there is biological
separability." 483 Here, as in other related areas of the law, medical science empowered the engine for legal change. The court noted such
knowledge, especially that dealing with fetal development, as a factor in
helping to lead to this rule. 484
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has dropped the viability test
in favor of a causation test: "With us the test will not be viability but
causation, and our inquiry will be whether the damage sustained is
traceable to the wrongful act of another." 485 This causation test seems
more rational and logical than a viability test, which has been criticized
476. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 467, at 368.
477. Sox v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.S.C. 1960). A cause of action for prenatal
injuries under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) was recognized in Douglas v. Town of Hartford, 542 F.
Supp. 1267 (D. Conn. 1982). The Court held that, for purposes of§ 1983, a fetus was a "person"
within the meaning nf the statute. Contra Harman v. Daniels, 525 F. Supp. 798 (W.D. Va.
1981)(decided on virtually identical facts); Poole v. Endsley, 371 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Fla 1974),
ajj'd in part, 516 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1975); McGarvey v. Magee-Womens Hosp., 340 F. Supp.
751 (W.O. Pa. 1972), affd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973). See generally Note, Douglas v. Town
of Hartford: The Fetus as Plaintiff Under Section 1983, 35 ALA. L. REV. 397 (1984); Note, The
Fetus Under Section 1983: Still Struggling for Recognition, 34 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1029 (1983).
478. PRoSSER AND KEETON, supra note 467, at 368-69; Note, The Law and the Unborn
Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NoTRE DAME LAw. 349, 357 (1970).
479. 31 N J 353, 1'i7 A.2d 497 (1960).
480. 1d. at 367, 157 A.2d at 504.
481. :d.
482. 2H2 A.D. 542, 125 NY.S.2d 696 (1953)
483. 1d. at 543, 125 N Y.S.2d at 697.
484. 1d. at 543-44, 125 N.Y.S.2d at (,97-98.
485. Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 79, 220 A.2d 222, 224 (1966).
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as arbitrary and transient. 486 The disallowance of claims for injuries in
the first trimester may well be the denial of the most meritorious and
seriously harmful claims."' 87 Though causation may be difficult to determine, most courts seem to realize that such difficulty should not be a
bar to the action, but something to be handled in the courtroom. Recent
medical advances make proof of medical causation increasingly
reliable."' 88

2.

Fetal rights in wrongful death actions

Under the language of most wrongful death statutes, recovery is
only possible if the death was suffered by a "person." 489 Since wrongful
death is a statutory right, the nature of the right depends on the provisions in the individual statutes. Most of the statutes are death acts
which create a new cause of action for the death of a person "in favor
of a representative and for the benefit of certain designated persons." 490
Other statutes are survival acts which preserve a cause of action for
"damages resulting from the victim's death as well as damages accrued
at the moment he died." 491 These survival acts allow suits to be

486. See, e.g., Morrison, Torts Involving the Unborn-A Limited Cosmology, 31 BAYLOR
L. REV. 131, 141-44 (1979); Robertson, Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for Injury to the Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries and Wrongful Lzfe, 1978 DtrKF
L.J 1401, 1414-20.
487. Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MICH. L. RFv. 579, 589 (1965)
488. PRoSSER AND KEETON, supra note 467, at 369. In the parent-child relationship, there
has been substantial limitation on tort liability. Generally, an unemancipated minor child is immune from tort liability for injury to his parents. See generally 67 A C.JS Parent & Child
(1978). § 128. In addition, an unemancipated minor child has no right of action against a parent
for the tort of the parent /d. at § 129; Annot, Liability of Parent for Injury to Unemancipated
Child Caused by Parent's Negligence-Modern Cases, 6 A.L.R.4TH 1066 (1981)(hereinafter Liability of Parent). This intra-family immunity has been justified by the necessity for the protection
of family peace and tranquility and by the concern that any change in the rule would interfere
with the rights and obligations of parents with respect to the discipline, control, and care of their
children. /d. at 1072. Some courts, however, have abrogated the intra-family tort immunity doctrine to allow a child to maintain an action against his parents for ordinary negligence, except
where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child or where it
involves an exercise of reasonable parental discretion with regard to the provision of food. clothing.
housing, medical and dental care. /d. at 1113. See, e.g., Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199
N.W.2d 169 ( 1972). In 1980, a Michigan court of appeals, in Grodin v. Grodin, indicated a
woman would be liable to a child for taking medicine while pref(nant which caused the child's
teeth to be discolored. 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869. Whether the l\lichigan holding is
followed or not, it is apparent that the unborn have strong and increasing rights in tort law. In the
tort category of wrongful death actions the same trend may be seen. See infra.
489. Kader, The Law of Tortious Prenatal Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo. L. REV. 639,
656 (1980).
490. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 467, at 946.
491. /d.
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brought by the executor or administrator of the decedent's estate. 492
States have both wrongful death and survival provisions, usually encoded in the same statutes. 493
Courts generally allow recovery under the wrongful death statutes
where a viable unborn child is injured, born alive, and then dies. 494
This also seems to be the case for nonviable unborn children who are
born alive and then die.m; The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Torigian v. Watertown News Co.," 96 allowed recovery on behalf of an infant who died two and a half hours after birth as a result
of injuries sustained in the fourth month of gestation. The court reasoned that there was no sound distinction between the viable and nonviable situations, and that the "vast majority" of cases allowed tort recovery to children who were injured when nonviable. 497 The child was
held to be a "person" within the meaning of the Wrongful Death
Act." 98 The Supreme Court of Alabama, in Wolfe v. Isbell," 99 granted
an action to a nonviable child who was subsequently born alive and
lived for fifty minutes. On the viability question, the court cited approvingly a Wisconsin Supreme Court holding:
[A] child is no more a part of its mother before it becomes viable that
[sic] it is after viability, and ... it would be more accurate to say that
the fetus from conception lived within its mother rather than as a part
of her.~
00

The court then reasoned:
It follows that the right to maintain an action for the wrongful death
of an unborn child depends on the right of the particular child, if he
had survived, to maintain an action for injuries sustained. 501

A significant development in this area of tort law was the evolution of the right to maintain a wrongful death action where the injured
child was stillborn. The first case to allow such an action, Verkennes v.
492. /d. at 947.
493. /d. at 950.
494. Kader, supra note 489, at 642; Note, Tort Recoverv for the L'nborn, IS J FAM. L.
276, 285 (197(>-77); Note, supra note 478, al 3'l8.
495. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra nole 467, al 368-69 ("JWJhen actually fared with the
issue for decision, most rourts have allowed recovery, even ... when the child was neither viable
nor quick.").
4%. 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967).
497. /d. at 448, 225 N.E.2d at 927.
49tl /d.
499. 2')1 Ala. 327, 280 So. 2d 758 (1973).
500. /d. at 331, 280 So. 2d al 761 (riling Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto Ins., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99
N.W.2d I(,J (1959)).
')01. /d. al 330, 280 So. 2d al 761.
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Corniea, 502 held that because the unborn were persons a wrongful
death claim would be allowed. 503 Later courts have concurred, adding
other justifications to this fundamental legal conclusion such as the biological independence of the fetus, 504 as well as the need to effect the
remedial and policy purposes of the legislation. 505 An argument made
by the Ohio Supreme Court demonstrates a typical attack on the logic
of the born-alive rule:
Suppose ... viable unborn twins suffered simultaneously the same
prenatal injury of which one died before and the other after birth.
Shall there be a cause of action for the death of the one and not for
that of the other? Surely logic requires recognition of causes of action
for the deaths of both, or for neither. 508

In Summerfield v. Superior Court, 507 a 1985 case allowing recovery for a stillborn viable fetus, the Arizona Supreme Court noted a
number of reasons for overturning its previous holding which disallowed such actions. The court cited the medical evidence of the separate
existence of mother and fetus, as well as the strong legislative policy of
protecting the unborn child, as evidenced in the criminal code and
property law of the state. 508 The court also noted that the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions allowed a cause of action for the stillborn
viable fetus. 509 In 1985, Pennsylvania also joined the ranks of jurisdictions allowing recovery for a stillborn, viable fetus, 510 as did South Dakota,511 in 1986, and North Carolina, in 1987. 512
Montana, in 1984,513 and Texas, in 1987, 514 each disallowed a
cause of action for wrongful death of a stillborn child. The Montana

502. 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
503. !d. at 366, 371, 38 N.W.2d at 839, 841.
504. Kader, supra note 489, at 646 & n.29. E.g., O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 135, 188
N.W.2d 785, 787 (1971 ). Cf Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, 152 Ohio St. 114, 124, 87
N.E.2d 334. 340 (1949)(holding contra to Roe that biological independence compels the conclusion
that a fetus is a person).
505. See Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 99, 300 So. 2d 354, 356 (1974)
506. Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 434, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1959).
507. 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P2d 712 (1985)(en bane).
508. !d. at 476, 698 P.2d at 721.
509. !d. at 476 & n.5, 698 P.2d at 721-22 & n.5. Cf Tebbutt v. Virostek, 65 N.Y.2d 931,
937-38 n.3, 483 C\!.E.2d 1142, 1147 n.3 (1985)(Jasen, J., dissenting)("The commentators on the
subject of death actions for unborn children are virtually unanimous in favor . . .").
510. Amadw v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 501 A.2d 1085 (1985).
511. Farley v. Mount Marty Hasp .. 387 N.W.2d 42 (S.D. 1986).
512 DiDonato v. Wortman, 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489 (1987); see generally Comment.
Wrong Without a Remedy-North Carolina and the Wrongful Death of a Stillborn, 9 CAMPBELL L. REV. 93 (1986).
513 Kuhnke v. Fisher, 210 Mont. 114, 683 P.2d 916 (1984).
514 Witty v. ,\merican Gen. Capital Distribs., 727 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1987).
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court held the legislature had occupied the field by defining a minor
child as beginning at birth. Therefore, an unborn fetus could not be a
minor child and could not fall within the statute. 515 The Montana Supreme Court noted, "That there is a field here in which the legislature
should act [to allow such actions] is beyond question. " 516
The Texas decision declared the issue to be one of legislative intent and held that legislative silence on the matter indicated no intent to
include stillborn children within the state wrongful death statute. 517 It
also interpreted Texas precedent to require a born-alive rule. 518
In a powerful, cogent dissent, three members of the Texas Supreme Court rejected the majority's rationale. The dissent declared that
the precedent, on which the majority relied for a born-alive rule, was
incorrectly interpreted. 519 In prior cases the court had "consistently accepted" its "responsibility to interpret statutes" to prevent inequity,
even absent expressed legislative intent. 520 The dissent also noted there
was no expressed legislative intent excluding fetuses from the statute, 521
and that there were several precedents, both in Texas law and general
common law, for including the unborn within the wrongful death
statute. 522
The current number of jurisdictions allowing a cause of action for
the wrongful death of a fetus is thirty-six, while those not recognizing
such an action are eight. 523 Roe has influenced many of these decisions,
515. Kuhnke, 210 Mont. at 120, 683 P.2d at 919.
516. !d.
517. Witty, 727 S.W.2d at 505.
518. !d. at 505-06.
519. !d. at 507 (Kilgarin, J., dissenting). The debated precedent, Yandell v. Delgado, 471
S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1971 ), dealt with the sole issue of "whether a fetus had to be viable at the time
an injury was sustained in order for the injury to be actionable." Witty, 727 S.W.2d at 507 (Kilgarin, J., dissenting). "Furthermore, in Yandell, the fetus survived and the suit was brought for
personal injuries, not wrongful death. The live birth issue in a wrongful death context could not
have been before the Yandell court because there was no death involved." !d. at 507-08 (citation
omitted). The majority cited Yandell as authority for a born-alive rule. !d. at 505-06.
520. Witty, 727 S.W.2d at 507, 511-12 (Kilgarin, J., dissenting). The dissent cited several
such cases involving the Texas wrongful death statute. !d. at 507.
521. !d.
522. !d. at 508-11. A prior decision had reserved the very issue in this case. !d. at 510.
523. Thirty-six jurisdictions recognize a cause of action for the wrongful death of a stillborn
child. Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974); Summerfield v. Superior
Ct., 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985)(en bane); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358,
224 A.2d 406 (1966); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956);
Greater Southeast Community Hosp. v. Williams, 482 A.2d 394 (D.C. 1984); Porter v. Lassiter,
91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); Yolk v. Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570, 651 P.2d 11 (1982);
Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind.
App. 487,277 N.E.2d 20 (1971); Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1983); Hale v.
Manon, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Danos
v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633 (La. 1981 ); State ex rei. Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d
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often with confusing and contradictory results. First, courts have used

Roe to support the argument that there should be no recovery because
the fetus is not a person within the fourteenth amendment. Second, Roe
has been cited for the proposition that viability is the point where the
state interest becomes compelling and, therefore, the statute should apply only at viability. Finally, Roe has been cited as supporting the state
interest in prenatal life, thereby supporting extension of the wrongful
death action to cover the unborn. 624
Actually, only one sentence and a footnote in Roe apply directly.
Justice Blackmun wrote: "In a recent development, generally opposed
by the commentators, some States permit the parents of a stillborn child
to maintain an action for wrongful death because of prenatal injuries."626 The footnote referred to only two commentators: a note in No71 (1964); Mone v. Greyhound Lines, 368 Mass. 354,331 N.E.2d 916 (1975); O'Neill v. Morse,
385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838
(1949); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d
904 (Mo. 1983)(en bane); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 95 N.M. 150, 619
P.2d 826 (Ct. App. 1980); DiDonato v. Wortman 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489 (1987); Hopkins
v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1984); Werling v. Sandy, 17 Ohio St. 3d 45, 476 N.E.2d
1053 (1985); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976); Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 268 Or.
258, 518 P.2d 636 (!974)(en bane); Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 501 A.2d 1085 (1985); Presley
v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138
S.E.2d 42 (1964); Farley v. Mount Marty Hosp., 387 N.W.2d 42 (S.D. 1986)(applying S.D.
CoDIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-5-1 (1985 Supp.) which expressly includes a fetus); TENN. CoDE
ANN. § 20-5-106 (1980)(legislatively overruling Hanby v. McDaniel, 559 S.W.2d 774 (Tenn.
1977)); Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hosp., 139 Vt. 138, 425 A.2d 92 (1980); Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975)(en bane); Baldwin v. Butcher, ISS W.Va. 431, 184
S.E.2d 428 (1971); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107
(1967).
Eight jurisdictions deny recovery for the wrongful death of a stillborn child. Justus v. Atchison, 19 CaL 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 CaL Rptr. 97 (1977)(en bane); Hernandez v. Garwood,
390 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1980); Kuhnke v. Fisher, 210 Mont. 114, 683 P.2d 916 (1984); Smith v.
Columbus Community Hosp., 222 Neb. 776, 387 N.W.2d 490 (!986); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J.
303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Tebbutt v. Virostek, 65 N.Y.2d 931, 483 N.E.2d 1142 (1985)(citing
with approval Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969));
Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs., 727 S. W.2d 503 (Tex. 1987); Lawrence v. Craven Tire
Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969).
The Supreme Court of Utah stated, in dictum, that "the death of a viable fetus should be
considered as much a ground for damages as would a miscarriage." Nelson v. Peterson, 542 P.2d
1075, 1077 (Utah 1975). Though it cited a 1942 case stating there was no wrongful death cause of
action for a fetus, since the issue was moot, it declined to reconsider the issue, saying, "Whether or
not [death of a viable fetus] gives a different basis for recovery [from causing a miscarriage] can be
determined when liability has been found in a proper case." /d. at 1077-78. A federal district
court in the Virgin Islands has reportedly upheld a cause of action for wrongful death of a viable,
unborn child. Recent Cases, LEX VITM:, Spring, 1987, at 2 (citing Maynard v. Maynard, (D.V.L
May, 1987)). The authors have been unable to obtain a copy of the opinion or locate it on any
database.
524. Kader, supra note 489, at 652.
525. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
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TRE DAME LAWYER and Prosser's treatise on torts. 526 The former did
not oppose recovery for wrongful death but opposed abortion as inconsistent with the rights of the unborn, including the wrongful death action which it supported. 527 In fact, the NoTRE DAME LAWYER article
declared:
The law of torts provides even more striking examples. Will the pregnant woman who is hit by a negligent driver while she is on her way
to the hospital to have an abortion still have a cause of action for the
wrongful death of her unborn child? If so, how is it possible for the
law to say that a child can be wrongfully killed only hours before he
can be rightfully killed? Absurd as it may seem, this is the present
state of the law in some jurisdictions, and it does no good to say that
the inconsistencies can be abated simply by refusing all recovery for
prenatal injury or death because negligent death or injury to a child
whose mother does not want an abortion clearly is a recognizable
wrong for which there must be just compensation.
Is the unborn child any less a person when, instead of being
killed by an automobile, he is killed by a doctor in the performance of
an abortion? Seldom has the law been confronted by such an obvious
contradiction. 528

The other reference in the Roe footnote, to Prosser, was apparently in error as well. 1129 Prosser simply stated the development of the
law, and in no way opposed recovery. 113° Footnotes to Prosser's text did
indicate some disagreement, but here even Prosser was in error. He
implied that some articles opposed recovery for stillborns when they did
not, 1131 and he omitted several articles and the key material cited in
Verkennes v. Corniea which favored recovery. 532 The Supreme Court
also overlooked persuasive arguments and the clear trend of cases between 1971 (the date of Prosser's work) and 1973 (the date of Roe). 1133
Thus, Roe's discussion of wrongful death actions for unborn children was "largely inaccurate, and should not be relied upon as the correct view of the law at the time of Roe v. Wade. " 1134 Despite this fact
and Roe's silence as to whether such actions for wrongful death were
consistent with the abortion ruling, some cases have mentioned Roe in
526. /d. at 162 n.65.
527. Note, supra note 478.
528. Id. at 369.
529. Kader, supra note 489, at 653.
530. W. Prosser, supra note 471, at 338.
531. Kader, supra note 489, at 654-55.
532. 229 Minn. at 370, 38 N.W.2d at 841. Kader, supra note 4B9, at 654-55.
533. Kader, supra note 489, at 654-56. Four of the five cases decided in this period favored
recognizing the cause of action. Id.
534. /d. at 653.
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exammmg or re-examining the question of recovery for the wrongful
death of a stillborn fetus. Interestingly, some have done so with no
mention of Roe.
For those states denying recovery for the unborn in wrongful
death actions, Roe has been seen as supportive authority. In Justus v.
Atchison, 11311 the California Supreme Court said it was "not so naive" as
to believe the legislature could have entertained any idea of the fetus as
a person when the wrongful death acts were passed in 1862 and
1872. 1136 This was a clear reference to Roe's finding of no personhood
for the fetus in the fourteenth amendment, which arose in the same
time period. 1137 Of such circular logic, Kader made the following
observation:
There is a certain circularity in all of this, perhaps inevitable. Roe v.
Wade relie[ d] upon nineteenth century legislation for evidence that
the fetus was not considered nor intended to be a "person" in the law,
and modern prenatal death decisions in turn cite the conclusion of
Roe v. Wade for the same proposition. 538
535. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977)(en bane).
536. Id. at 571, 565 P.2d at 132, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
537. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
538. Kader, supra note 489, at 658. Ironically, it is precisely during this period that science
was recognizing that fetuses were fully human from conception. As Victor Rosenblum has
observed:
Only in the second quarter of the nineteenth century did biological research advance to the extent of understanding the actual mechanism of human reproduction and
of what truly comprised the onset of gestational development. The nineteenth century
saw a gradual but profoundly influential revolution in the scientific understanding of
the beginning of individual mammalian life. Although sperm had been discovered in
1677, the mammalian egg was not identified until 1827. The cell was first recognized
as the structural unit of organisms in 1839, and the egg and sperm were recognized as
cells in the next two decades. These developments were brought to the attention of the
American state legislatures and public by those professionals most familiar with their
unfolding import-physicians. It was the new research findings which persuaded doctors that the old "quickening" distinction embodied in the common and some statutory
law was unscientific and indefensible.

The Human Life Bill: Hearings on S. /58 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the
Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (statement of Victor Rosenblum, Professor of Law and Political Science, Northwestern Univ.); see also, Dellapenna, supra note 430,
at 402-04. About 1857, the American Medical Association led a "physicians' crusade" to enact
legislation to protect the unborn from conception. J. MoHR, supra note 425, at 147-70. The
resulting legislation was designed primarily to protect the unborn and not, as Justice Blackmun
claimed, solely to protect maternal health. Id., See Roe, 410 U.S. at 151 & n.48. Contrary to
Justice Blackmun's assertion, eleven state decisions explicitly affirmed protection of the unborn
child as a purpose of their abortion statute (nineteenth century), and nine others implied the same.
Gorby, The "Right" to an Abortion, the Scope of Fourteenth Amendment "Personhood," and the
Supreme Court's Birth Requirement, 1979 S. ILL. U.L.J. I, 16-17. Furthermore, twenty-six of
thirty-six had laws against abortion by the end of the Civil War, as did six of the ten territories by
1865. Dellapenna, supra note 430, at 429. This flatly contradicts Justice Blackmun's statement
that such legislation did not become widespread until after the Civil War. Roe, 410 U.S. at 139.
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The California Supreme Court also cited Roe as authority for the
nonpersonhood of the unborn. 539 The court noted that any change must
come from the legislature, which had occupied the field. 54 ° California
appellate courts had rejected the cause of action before Roe was decided, so Roe was used to support pre-established California law. 541
The justus opinion figured prominently in the recent rejection of a
wrongful death action for the unborn in Texas. 542
Roe also influenced the Florida Supreme Court in the 1980 case of
Hernandez v. Garwood. 543 The court cited Roe as authority that a fetus was not a person and that equal protection of the fetus was not
violated if it were excluded from the wrongful death act unless born
alive. 544 There was no Florida rejection of the cause of action for
stillborns before Roe. In 1977, the Florida Supreme Court first refused
the cause of action in Stern v. Miller. 545 It noted that a change must be
made by the legislature, since legislative intent was the issue. 546 However, the court noted that the weight of authority favored the cause of
action, the reasons were "compelling," and the commentators "sp[ oke J
in one accord ... and urge[d] recovery." 547 No reference to Roe was
made in the Stern opinion, nor in a brief opinion affirming it in
1978. 548 However, the attitude shifted, as noted, in Hernandez with an
explicit reliance on Roe.
Tennessee also denied a cause of action in wrongful death actions
for the unborn. It had denied the action before Roe in 1958, stating that
the fetus was not a person. 549 In 1977 in Hamby v. McDaniel, the
court employed an extended quotation from Roe to support its position
This material indicates that legislatures at the time of the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the nineteenth century abortion laws, and the nineteenth century wrongful death statutes
were not so naive as the California Supreme Court implied in its statement. that it was "not so
naive" as to believe the legislature could have entertained any idea of the fetus as a person when
the wrongful death acts were passed in 1862 and 1872. Such legislatures could have included the
unborn (from conception) in their understanding of the term "person'' In fact this seems likely,
since legislators were the specific targets of the national 'physicians' crusade." Interestingly, Justice Blackmun was aware of this crusade, for he cited material from it, Roe, 410 U.S. at 141, but
failed to apply its implications.
539. Justus, 19 Cal. 3d at 577, 565 P.2d at 130-31, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 105-06 (including the
erroneous assertion that commentators generally opposed the causr of action for stillborn children).
540. !d. at 575, 565 P.2d at 129, 139 Cal. Rptr. at !04.
541. !d. at 581, 565 P.2d at 133, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
542. Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs., 727 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1987).
543. 390 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1980).
544. !d. at 359.
545. 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977)
546. !d. at 308.
547. !d. at 306.
548. Duncan v. Flynn, 358 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1978).
549. Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1')58).

258

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 3

against the rising tide to the contrary. 11110 The legislature has smce
amended the Tennessee code to allow a wrongful death action for a
viable fetus. 11111
The Utah Supreme Court reserved the issue of a wrongful death
action for a stillborn in Nelson v. Peterson. 11112 Certain dicta indicate a
sympathy for such an action. 11113 However, in Nelson, the court said that
it was not prejudicial for a jury to hear of the illegitimacy of the deceased unborn child because it would help in calculating the mother's
damages for mental anguish, since "many women undergo abortions in
such a situation .... " 11114 Thus, Roe's influence was present although it
should be noted that the first case holding there was no cause of action
for an unborn child in Utah was decided before Roe. 111111
Nebraska, 11 ~'> 6 New Jersey, 11117 New York,~'> 58 and Virginia 11119 cases
deciding wrongful death actions for unborn children made no mention
of Roe. However, these cases were all decided before Roe or were based
on prior cases that were. Montana only mentioned Roe in its discussion
of California's rule, which it distinguished, and went on to say it was
"beyond question" that the legislature should act to allow the cause of
action. 560 Thus, in the cases denying recovery in wrongful death actions
for the unborn, it is clear that Roe has had a negative effect on the
growth of the law in certain states. Nevertheless, the trend continues to
the present to reject the Supreme Court's holding in Roe that a fetus is
not a person and allow a cause of action for the unborn. Ideally, "person" should mean the same in constitutional and statutory contexts.
However, Roe is the exception to the rule, which was clear even in
1973, and any change ought to be in its holding, not in the tort law.
Roe is increasingly out of step with this area of the law.
The Arizona Supreme Court stated the problem well in its 1985
rejection of the born-alive rule:
The theoretical underpinnings of the Dietrich rule have been eroded,

550. 559 S.W.2d 774, 777-78 (Tenn. 1977).
551. TENN. Com: ANN.§ 20-5-106(b)(1980).
552. 542 P2d 1075 (Utah 1975).
'l53. See supra note 523.
554. Nelson, 542 P 2d at 1077.
555. Webb v. Snow, 102 Utah 435, 132 P.2d 114 (1942)
556. Smith v. Columbus Community llosp., 222 Neb. 776, 387 N.W.2d 490 (1986); Egbert
v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573, 573-74, 260 N.W.2d 480, 482 (1977)("We express no opinion with
respect to the existence of the fetus as a person in either the philosophical or scientific sense.").
557. Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.j. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964).
558. Tebbutt v. Virostrk, 65 N.Y.2d 931, 483 N.E.2d 1142 (1985)(riting its rule in Endresz
v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 248 N.E.2d 901 (1%9))
559. Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 1(/J S.E.2d 440 (1969).
560. Kuhnke v. Fisher, 210 Mont. 114, 120, 683 P 2d 916, 919 (1984).
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and both it and Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 A. 704 (1901),
the other early case which gave support to the rule of non-recovery,
have been overruled by the very courts which decided them .... The
majority finds no logic in the premise that if the viable infant dies
immediately before birth it is not a 'person' but if it dies immediately
after birth it is a 'person.'
We take note, further, that the magic moment of 'birth' is no
longer determined by nature. The advances of science have given the
doctor, armed with drugs and scalpel, the power to determine just
when 'birth' shall occur. ~61

Roe has also been cited as authority for allowing recovery in
wrongful death actions for stillborn children because of the state's interest in potential life. 562 In Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 563 the Supreme
Court of Alabama employed such an approach, as did the Oregon Supreme Court in Libbee v. Permanente Clinic. 564 The Oregon court
noted that Roe held a fetus not to be a person under the fourteenth
amendment, but decided the term meant something different under the
Oregon Constitution. 565 Recently, the Ohio Supreme Court also cited
Roe as supporting the protection of potential life and, therefore, recognizing a wrongful death action for the unborn was "entirely consistent
with Roe. " 566 The Supreme Court of Arizona also recognized a right of
recovery for a stillborn child in 1985. 567 It argued that such an action
"may further the policy of Roe" by protecting the woman's right to
continue a pregnancy. 568 The Arizona court noted that, aside from protection of the right to continue one's pregnancy, Roe really was irrelevant in the wrongful death context, because voluntary termination of a
pregnancy was quite distinguishable from termination "against the
mother's will." 569
Roe has also been influential in arguments for limiting recovery in
wrongful death actions to the unborn who were viable. Georgia was the
only pre-Roe state to allow recovery for a previable, stillborn fetus, allowing recovery for an unborn, "quick" child. 570 In 1976, Rhode Island
561. Summerfield v. Superior Ct, 144 Ariz. 467, 477, 698 P.2d 712, 722 (1985)(en bane).
Also note the discussion of permissible judicial action in a developing area of the law created by
statute. /d. at 472-73, 479, 689 P.2d at 717-18, 724.
562. Roe, 410 US at 162.
563. 293 Ala. 95, 99, 300 So. 2d 3S4, 357 (1974).
564. 268 Or. 258, 26 7, 518 P.2d 636, 640 ( 1974).
565. /d.
566. Werling v. Sandy, 17 Ohio St. 3d 45, 49, 476 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (1985).
567. Summerfield v. Superior Ct, 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985)(en bant").
568. /d. at 478, 698 P.2d at 723 (citing Kader, supra note 489).
569 /d. (emphasis in original).
570. Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955).
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abandoned any viability test in allowing recovery for stillborn infants,
stating:
[V]iability is a concept bearing no relation to the attempts of the law
to provide remedies for civil wrongs. If we profess allegiance to reason, it would be seditious to adopt so arbitrary and uncertain a concept as viability as a dividing line between those persons who shall
enjoy the protection of our remedial laws and those who shall become,
for most intents and purposes, nonentities. It seems that if live birth is
to be characterized, as it so frequently has been, as an arbitrary line
of demarcation, then viability, when enlisted to serve that same purpose is a veritable non sequitur. 571

While the majority in the Rhode Island opinion never explicitly mentioned Roe, the harsh criticism of the viability test may betray a distaste
for the Supreme Court's viability criterion. A concurring opinion does
cite Roe as support for a viability dividing line. 572
There is no logical reason why viability should be a criterion for
recovery in a wrongful death action for a stillborn child. The viability
requirement is no longer applied where the child is born alive. David
Kader has stated: "[I]t is probably both desirable and inevitable that
the viability requirement will likewise be abandoned to allow recovery
by the beneficiary of a stillborn, notwithstanding any implications of
Roe v. Wade to the contrary." 573 However, the implications of Roe
show signs of stalling the progress predicted by Kader. In Toth v. Goree574 a Michigan appeals court denied recovery for a three month old,
nonviable fetus. The court said that any precedent "must be read in
light of more recent developments in the case law. Roe v. Wade has had
a considerable impact on the legal status of the fetus. " 575 The court
stated that there would be an inherent conflict if a person could be held
liable under a wrongful death statute for the death of a child whom the
mother could abort. 576 Of course, since the abortion right has developed
to allow virtual abortion on demand throughout the pregnancy, 577 the
Michigan court's reliance on the viability distinction may be misplaced.
In 1975, it was still generally believed that states could effectively prohibit abortion after viability. Now it is apparent that a wrongful death
571. Presley v. Newport Hosp, 117 R.I. 177, 188,365 i\.2d 748, 753-'14 (1976).
572. !d. at 192. 365 A.2d at 756 (Bevilacqua, C.J, concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
573. Kader. supra note 4H9, at 660.
574. 65 Mich. App. 2'!6, 237 N.W.2d 297 (1975).
575. /d. at 303, 237 N.W.2d at 301 (citation omitted).
576. /d.
577. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
( 1986)(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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action is inconsistent with the abortion right before and after viability.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has also noted the inherent
contradiction with Roe:
We remark in passing that it would be incongruous for a mother to
have a federal constitutional right to deliberately destroy a nonviable
fetus, Roe v. Wade, and at the same time for a third person to be
subject to liability to the fetus for his unintended but merely negligent
acts. &78
In the most recent cases, Roe's viability emphasis is evident. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Amadio v. Levin, said, "(t]he reasoning of the Court in Roe has been subject to widespread criticism and, at
least as to the protectability of 'viable' unborn children, suffers from
internal inconsistency." 1179 Thus, the Pennsylvania court makes no
mention of viability as a part of its rule. This probably indicates a
rejection of a viability test. 1180 The Ohio Supreme Court, in Werling v.
Sandy, 1181 specifically cited Roe as support for a viability standard,
which it adopted. 1182 The Arizona Supreme Court, in Summerfield v.
Superior Court, claimed Roe was irrelevant but followed the majority
in establishing a viability criterion. 1183 The Supreme Court of North
Dakota made no mention of Roe but followed the majority viability
rule. 1184
Thus, it seems that the present trend is to require viability in a
cause of action for wrongful death. Roe has certainly reinforced this
trend. Interestingly, the viability line is seen as arbitrary by some
courts who adopt it anyway because of the "weight of authority." 11811 It
makes little sense to abandon one arbitrary line for another, although
moving to a viability criterion is a step in the right direction. Roe's
illogical line drawing at viability will, unfortunately, have enduring effects in this area.

3.

Fetal rights in equity

Equity is increasingly invoked to protect the rights of the unborn.
It has taken on new dimensions with the recent development of fetal
578. Wallace v. Wallace, 120 N.H. 675, 679, 421 A.2d 134, 137 (1980) (citation omitted).
579. 509 Pa. 199, 225 n.5, 501 A.2d 1085, 1098 n.5 (1985) (Zappala, J., concurring).
580. Most likely this is the case. /d. at 207, 501 A.2d at 1089 ("[T]he recovery afforded the
estate of a stillborn is no different than the recovery afforded the estate of a child [born alive].").
581. 17 Ohio St. 3d 45, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (1985).
582. /d. at 49, 476 N.E.2d at 1056.
583. Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 478, 698 P.2d 712, 723 (1985).
584. Hopkins v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1984).
585. See, e.g., Summerfield, 144 Ariz. at 477, 698 P.2d at 722 ("We acknowledge ... that
this, too, is an artificial line .... ").

262

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 3

surgery 1186 and increased concern about preventing injury to the unborn
child through the negligence of the mother. 1187 While a fetus may not
have a right to be born, under Roe, the right to be born with a sound
mind and body has increasingly been recognized. 1188
A number of decisions have recently protected the unborn's right
to life or health, even against maternal desire or convenience. These
decisions are in marked contrast to the lack of protection for the fetus
in abortion cases. Nowhere is the anomalous nature of the abortion
right more visible.
Decisions which protect the unborn's right to life or health involve
the right and obligation incidental to being a parent: the right and obligation to be the natural guardian of one's child. 1189 This "private realm
of family life" is protected from unwarranted state interference. 1190
Family autonomy is not absolute, however, 1191 and may be limited
where "it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or
safety" of their children. 1192 As a result, courts have acted to permit
essential and necessary treatment of a child, 1193 such as a blood transfusion119' or vaccination, 11911 despite parental refusal to consent to the treatment. Courts have ordered medical treatment over parental objections
based on religious 1196 and non-religious grounds. 1197
In some instances, pregnant women have refused medical treatment for themselves, which poses a serious risk to the life and health of
their unborn children. While generally a person has a right to refuse
medical care, 1198 the state's interest in the welfare of children will justify
compelling medical care when necessary to preserve the life of an un586. Lenow, The Fetus as a Patient: Emerging Rights as a Personr, 9 AM. J.L. & Mm. 1
(1983).
587. Note, A Maternal Duty to Protect Fetal Healthr, 58 IND. L.J. 531 (1983).
588. Mathieu, Respecting Liberty and Preventing Harm: Limits of State Intervention on
Prenatal Choice, 8 HARV. J.L. & PuB. Pm.'v 19 (1985).
589. Richards v. Forrest, 278 Mass. 547, 553, 180 N .E. 508, 511 (1932).
590. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
591. Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978).
592. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
593. State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962).
594. Brooklyn Hosp. v. Torres, 45 Misc. 2d 914, 258 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
595. Mannis v. State, 240 Ark. 42, 398 S.W.2d 206, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 972 (1966).
596. Jehovah's Witnesses of Washington v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (D.D.C.
1967), ajj'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968). See generally Annotation, Power of Court or Other Public
Agency to Order Medical Treatment over Parental Religious Objections for Child Whose Life is
not Immediately f.'ndangered, 52 A.L.R.3D 1118.
597. Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978). See generally Annotation, Power of Court or Other Public Agency to Order Medical Treatment for Child Over Parental Objections Not Based on Religious Grounds, 97 A.L.R.3D 421.
598. See generally Annotation, Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment Allegedly Necessary to
Sustain Life, 93 A.L.R. 3D 67.
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born child. 1199
In two pre-Roe cases, Hoener v. Bertinato600 and Raleigh FitkinPaul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 601 a New Jersey juvenile court and the state's supreme court justified, under their parens
patriae power, authorizing a hospital to give lifesaving blood transfusions to save the life of a child, even though the parents objected on
religious grounds. In Hoener, the court authorized a blood transfusion
to the child immediately after birth to correct an Rh factor problem
that caused the death of the woman's previous child. It remained for
the Anderson case to extend this principle to the child yet unborn.
In Anderson, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided whether a
pregnant Jehovah's Witness could be compelled, against her religious
beliefs, to take a blood transfusion. The court unanimously held that
the thirty-two week old child was entitled to the law's protection and
ordered the transfusions, stating:
In State v. Perricone we held that the State's concern for the
welfare of an infant justified blood transfusions notwithstanding the
objection of its parents who were also Jehovah's Witnesses, and in
Smith v. Brennan we held that a child could sue for injuries negligently inflicted upon it prior to birth. We are satisfied that the unborn child is entitled to the law's protection and that an appropriate
order should be made to insure blood transfusions to the mother in
the event that they are necessary in the opinion of the physician in
charge at the time. 602

This was the first case in which a court ordered procedures which invaded a mother's bodily integrity to benefit the unborn fetus. 603 The
court determined that the child's right to live outweighed the woman's
constitutionally protected right to practice her religion, as well as her
right to refuse medical treatment and her right to bodily integrity. The
court noted that the fact that the child and woman "are so intertwined
and inseparable" 604 made the decision easier to make than if it were
just an adult involved, underscoring the paramount status of the interest in protecting the child in the decision. Here the child was viable.
Roe would have at least recognized the state's interest in the child's
potentiality of life.
599.
C.2d 619
600.
601.
602.
603.
604.

In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1976); In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. &
(1973); Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (juv. Ct. 1961).
67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (juv. Ct. 1961).
42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
/d. at 423, 201 A.2d at 539 (citations omitted).
Lenow, supra note 586, at 21.
Anderson, 42 N.J. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538.
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In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority,m the
Georgia Supreme Court approved more intrusive measures. A pregnant
women suffered from complete placenta previa (a condition where the
placenta covers the opening of the birth canal). A ninety-nine percent
chance of fetal fatality was predicted if a natural birth was attempted.
The physicians also predicted a fifty percent chance that the mother
would die with natural birth. Both had excellent chances of surviving a
Caesarian section. The court upheld an order requiring the woman to
submit to a sonogram, blood transfusions, and a Caesarian section
should they be found necessary to sustain the life of the thirty-nine
week old child, even though Mr. and Mrs. Jefferson opposed the operation on religious grounds. The order provided for custody of the unborn child to be granted to the state for the purpose of requiring surgery. The court stated that Roe indicated the state had a compelling
interest in the life of the fetus after viability. Justice Hill concurring in
the per curiam opinion, said:
[W]e weighed the right of the mother to practice her religion and to
refuse surgery on herself, against her unborn child's right to live. We
found in favor of her child's right to live. 606
As it turned out, a subsequent ultrasound revealed that the placenta
had shifted-a very rare occurrence-and the Caesarian was
unnecessary. 607
A recent survey indicated that courts in eleven states have ordered
Caesarian deliveries to protect fetuses. 608 Only one of these cases was
reported; most even elude the newspapers. 609 After surveying the cases,
one author wrote, "In the cases of which I am aware, every judge but
one who has ruled on an application for nonconsensual Cesarean delivery has granted the request. 610
In November, 1987, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia continued this trend. In the case of In re A.C., the court held
that the interests of an unborn child and the state outweighed the right
of a pregnant woman against bodily intrusion. 611 The mother was terminally ill, in extremis, lucid only at intervals, and with only hours to
live; the fetus was twenty-six weeks old and experiencing oxygen depri605. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981 ).
606. /d. at 90, 274 S.E.2d at 460.
607. Lenow, supra note 586, at 21 n.l23.
608. Kolder, Gallagher & Parsons, Court Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1192, 1194 (1987).
609. Rhoden, Cesareans and Samaritans, 15 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 118 (1987).
610. /d. at 118 (footnote omitted).
611. 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), vacated and reh'g en bane granted, 539 A.2d 203 (D.C.
1988).
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vation. 612 The court-ordered Caesarean delivery was
performed-mother and child died soon after. 613
In the 1983 case of Taft v. Taft, 614 the issue of court-ordered surgery to protect the fetus was raised before the tv1assachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court. The woman was four months pregnant. Her husband
sought a court order to force her to submit to a "purse string" operation, so her cervix would hold the pregnancy. 615 The woman wanted
the child, but she refused to undergo the surgery for religious reasons.
The lower court appointed a guardian ad litem for the unborn child
and granted the husband authority to consent to the operation. On appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed. It stated that
"[no] case has been cited to us, nor have we found one, in which a court
ordered a pregnant woman to submit to a surgical procedure in order
to assist in carrying a child not then viable to term. " 616 The court reserved judgment on whether the state's interest in the unborn was compelling enough to allow such overriding of the mother's privacy and
right to "free exercise" of religious beliefs. 617
The Taft court, however, did not close the door to ordering surgical procedures to protect the unborn. The court specifically noted the
sparse record regarding necessity "as a life saving procedure" or likelihood of success. 618 The court added that the state's interest "might be
sufficiently compelling" if the state's interest were "established. " 619
Significantly, the Taft decision involved a previable fetus. Interestingly, the court made no mention of Roe. However, the inference was
clear that the viability point, which was significant in the original abortion cases, played no role in the consideration of imposed treatment on
behalf of the unborn. Obviously, the viability criteria is arbitrary,
meaningless, and contrary to reason. It was rightly not considered.
The prevention of disabilities is a strong state interest, with which
many are sympathetic. Many of these disabilities are preventable by
proper prenatal care. 620 This is a growing area in the establishment of
fetal rights. In a 1980 case, In Re Baby X, 621 a newborn had demonstrated symptoms of narcotics withdrawal within a day of birth. The
612. !d.
613. !d.
614. 388 Mass. 331, 446 l'i.E.2d 395 (1983).
615. !d. at 332, 446 N.E.2d at 396.
616. !d. at 334 n.4, 446 N.E.2d at 397 n.4.
617. !d. at 334, 446 N.E.2d at 397.
618. !d. at 335, 446 N.E.2d at 397.
619. !d. al 334-35, 446 N.E.2d at 397.
620. Parness, The Duty to Prevent Handicaps: Laws Promoting the Prevention of Handicaps to Newborns, 5 W NEw ENG. L. REv. 431 (1983).
621. 97 Mich. App. 111,293 N.W.2d 736 (1980).
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court held that evidence of the mother's prenatal drug use constituted
abuse and neglect. The court took temporary custody of the child.
However, since the same court had previously held a fetus not to be a
person under the child custody statute, the state's equitable powers to
protect the unborn are limited. In an unreported case, 622 a court enjoined a pregnant woman from using drugs and ordered a weekly
urinalysis to protect the fetus.
It is unclear how far the states will go in ordering fetal surgery or
medical procedures to protect the life of the unborn child. The court in
Jefferson used a viability standard, as per Roe, but what happens when
medical advances push back the stage of viability? And what effect will
the trends and forces which have engineered the expansion of prenatal
tort law have upon this area of the law? Will previable unborn children become the subject of court ordered fetal surgery against the
wishes of a mother?
The growth of fetal treatment capabilities and litigation will force
further consideration of the rights of the unborn. Surely, some criteria
must be established. The early returns indicate that fetal rights are being recognized in the balance with the mother's rights. This is appropriate. Hopefully, the influence of Roe will not halt this growing trend.
While women's rights must be placed in the balance, it is certainly
equitable that unborn fetuses be allowed to develop without preventable
handicaps and injuries. 623
622. Boston Globe, April 27, 1983, at 8, col. 1.
623. See id.; Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 23 DuQ.
L. Rt:v. I (1984); Note, Informed Consent: An Unborn's Right, 48 ALB. L. REv. 1102 (1984).
Contra Johnson, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to
Liberty, Privacy, and /<.'qual Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986). As indicated in the text above,
a pregnant woman's duty to her unborn child includes the duty to provide life-saving medical care.
The failure to provide medical care for a child can also carry criminal penalties. See generally
Annotation, Failure to Provide Medical Attention for Child as Criminal Neglect, 12 A.L.R.2o
1047 Thus, a father could be guilty of a misdemeanor for failure to furnish medical attention to
an unborn child, People v. Sianes, 134 Cal. App. 355, 25 P.2d 487 ( 1933), as long as it is shown
that the child. as distinguished from the mother, is adversely and substantially affected by the lack
of medical attention. People v. Yates, 114 Cal. App. Supp. 782, 298 P 961 ( 1931 ).
In a number of different contexts, courts have ruled that the unborn is a member of the
family and a dependent. A California court has held that an unborn child had a right to support
from his or her father and ordered the father to fulfill his duty. Kyne v. Kyne, 38 Cal. App. 2d
122, 100 P.2d 806 (1940). Accord People v. Yates, 114 Cal. App. Supp. 782, 298 P. 961 (1931);
Metzger v. People. 98 Colo. 133, 53 P.2d 1189 (1936). The primary duty of a parent to a child is
to provide the child with support and protection. See generally, Annotation, Propriety of Decree in
Proceeding Between Divorced Parents to Determine Mother's Duty to Pay Support for Children
In Custody of Father, 98 A.L.R.3n 1146. In this regard, the duty to support may not be contracted away, even when the child is unborn. Wilson v. Wilson, 251 Ky. 522, 65 S.W.2d 694
(1933). The obligation of a parent to support his or her children may be enforced by an action at
any time during the child's minority, see, e.g., Strecker v. Wilkinson, 220 Kan. 292, 552 P 2d 979
(1976), and may be brought on behalf of a child not yet born. See, e.g., McCov v. People ex rei.
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the strong protection given the

[MinorJ Child, 165 Colo. 407, 439 P.2d 347 (1968) (en bane). In addition, an order of support
may be modified for the purpose of making allowance for the support of a child born since the
filing of the original proceeding, even when the decree provided for the support of the child while
unborn. See, e.g., Schneider v. Schneider, 188 Neb. 80, 195 N.W.2d 227 (1972).
Most states have made the nonsupport of a child a criminal offense. See generally 67 A C.J.S.
Parent & Child § 165. These statutes include an unborn child, who has been held to be a minor
child within the meaning of a statute declaring willful nonsupport of a minor child to be an
offense. People v. Yates, 114 Cal. App. Supp. 782, 298 P. 961 ( 1931 ). In this regard, the support
is to be furnished through the mother. Where nothing at all in the way of food, clothing or shelter
is furnished by the father to the expectant mother, a breach of duty to provide for the unborn child
is shown. !d.
The Louisiana Supreme Court allowed an unborn child to bring an action to prove paternity,
which would entitle the child to support and heirship. Malek v. Yekani-Fard, 422 So. 2d 1151
(La. 1982). Such derisions rest on the long recognized rights of the unborn in property and family
law. Other related rights and obligations arise from the parent-child relationship as applied to
unborn children. One substantial right is the presumption of legitimacy of birth. This presumption
is "one of the strongest and most persuasive known to the law," In re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1, 170
N.E. 471 (1930), and extends to a child conceived in wedlock but born after the termination of the
marriage. See generally Annotation, Presumption of Legitimacy of Child Born after Annulment,
Divorce, or Separation, 46 A.L.R.3n 158. As a result, a child conceived by artificial insemination
of the wife during a valid marriage has been held to be a legitimate child, entitled to all the rights
and privileges of a naturally conceived child of the same marriage. In re Adoption of Anonymous,
74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1973). Further, a surrogate mother, impregnated by artificial
insemination with semen of a man not her husband, has been held unable to terminate her parental rights in the child and have custody of the child transferred to the biological father. In re Baby
Girl, FAM. L. REP. 2348 (1983).
In Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance v. Pigott, 393 So. 2d 1379 (Ala.
1981 ), the Alabama Supreme Court held that the unborn grandson of the insured was a member
of the family of the insured for the purpose of being covered by the uninsured motorist clause in
the named insured's policy. See also Peterson v. Nationwide 1\lut. Ins., 175 Ohio St. 551, 197
N.E.2d 194 (1964). In Adams v. Weinberger, 521 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1975), the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals found that a posthumously born illegitimate child was entitled to his late father's
social security survivor benefits. The test to qualify for the benefits was whether the support by
the father for the unborn child was commensurate with the needs of the unborn child at the time
of the father's death. See also Wagner v. Finch, 413 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1969); Moreno v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1973). Also, in S.L.W. v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation
Board, 490 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1971 ), a posthumously born child had the right of recovery for workmen's compensation death benefits, even though the father was unaware of the pregnancy at the
time of his death. See also Fontenot v. Annelida Acres, Inc., 302 So. 2d 690 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
In addition, for purposes of inheritance and trust laws, the unborn has long been recognized
as a child with full rights as any born child. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *130 ("An
infant .
in the mother's womb .. is capable of having a legacy, or a surrender of a copyhold
estate, made to it. It may have a guardian assigned to it; and it is enabled to have an estate limited
to its use, and to take afterwards by such limitation, as if it were then actually born."). As a
result, an unborn child ran, among other things, inherit and own an estate, Hall v. Hancock, 32
Mass. (15 Pick.) 255 (1834); Aubuchon v. Bender, 44 Mo. 560 (1869), be a tenant-in-common
with his brothers and sisters, Deal v. Sexton, 144 N.C. 157, 56 S.E. 691 (1907), or with his own
mother, Biggs v. McCarty, 86 Ind. 352 (1882), be an actual income recipient prior to birth,
Industrial Trust Co. v. Wilson, 61 R.I. 169, 200 A. 467 (1938), and take property by deed from
an inheritance. Mackie v. Mackie, 230 N.C. 152, 52 S.E.2d 352 (1949). By 1941, a New York
court, In re Holthausen, 175 Mise 1022,26 N.Y.S.2d 140 (1941), summed up the law concerning
property rights of the unborn child as follows:
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unborn. This is out of step with the inadequate protection of fetal
rights in abortion law.

4. Fetal rights in criminal law
"The criminal law historically has afforded the unborn child a
substantial amount of protection," noted David Louisell in 1969. 624
The effect of Roe has been to strip away much of this protection. While
the criminal law gave some of the unborn legal rights as "persons,"
Roe's declaration that they were not persons, for purposes of the fourteenth amendment, has spilled over into areas beyond abortion. Theoretically, the Court's holding for fourteenth amendment purposes has
no bearing on personhood for homicide laws, but some state courts
seem unable to grasp the distinction. Perhaps what is at work is the
intuitive notion underlying stare decisis, that the law should be consistent. In other words, persons who have been "persons" under the criminal law should remain so or have no rights at all. Apparently, it is felt
that the Court has taken such a radical step in stripping the unborn of
their personhood in Roe that it cannot have meant to leave personhood
in place for other purposes. Also, it is felt by some abortion advocates
that the growth and maintenance of fetal rights in such an analogous
area as homicide undercuts Roe and so must be inhibited. 6211
Such reasoning has brought about the astonishing result in the
California cases regarding homicide of an unborn child. A murder indictment had been brought against a man for killing an unborn child.
He had shoved his knee into his pregnant ex-wife's abdomen, saying,
"I'm going to stomp it out of you." In 1970, the California Supreme
Court reversed the murder indictment in Keeler v. Superior Court, 626
applying the born-alive rule. 627 Within the same year, the legislature
It has been the uniform and unvarying decision of all common-law courts in respect of
estate matters for at least the past two hundred years that a child en ventre sa mere is
'born' and 'alive' for all purposes for his benefit.
!d. at 1024. 26 NY S 2d at 143.
With regard to the disposition of an inheritance, a guardian ad litem may be appointed where
the alleged father of the unborn had died and his estate was pending. In re Thomas, 118 Misc. 2d
456, 460 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1983). Similarly, with regard to the law of trusts, an unborn beneficiary
cannot he bound by the consent of living beneficiaries, In re Estate of Allen, 35 Haw. 501 ( 1940),
and a guardian ad litem can he appointed by the court to consent to a modification or revocation of
the trust. Hatch v. Riggs Nat'! Bank, 361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Thus, with few limitations,
the unborn child is considered the child of his parents with the full rights of a born child and to
which the parents owe substantial duties.
624. Louisell, Abortion, the Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16 UCLA L.
RFv. 233, 238 (1969).
625. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 623.
626. 2 CaL 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 CaL Rptr. 481 (1970) (en bane).
627. The born-alive rule is an ancient relic from the fourteenth century, when proof
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promptly redefined homicide to include the killing of a fetus. 628 In the
197 6 case of People v. Smith, 629 the state appealed the dismissal of a
homicide charge for a man who allegedly murdered a nonviable fetus.
The appellate court held that Roe had removed the protection of a nonviable fetus:
The underlying rationale of [Roe], therefore, is that until viability is
reached, human life in the legal sense has not come into existence.
Implicit in [Roe] is the conclusion that as a matter of constitutional
law the destruction of a non-viable fetus is not a taking of human life.
It follows that such destruction cannot constitute murder or other
form of homicide, whether committed by a mother, a father (as here),
or a third person. 630

The Smith court failed to distinguish between the fourteenth
amendment context and the homicide context. Amazing as the result in
Smith seems, the underlying notion that the legal treatment of the unborn ought to be consistent is sound. However, the only satisfactory
way to make the law logically consistent is to give the unborn protection in all contexts. If the courts refuse such complete protection, then
they ought to distinguish recognition of personhood for different contexts and at least provide protection to the unborn when abortion is not
at issue. Under the clear influence of Roe, California chose the worst
possible result-no protection at all.
A similar result was reached in Louisiana. In State v. Gyles, 631 the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that the unborn were not included as
"human beings" for the purposes of the homicide statute. The court
noted that the legislature could amend the criminal code, in keeping
with Roe's restrictions. 632 An amendment was adopted the next year,
making the term "person" denote "a human being from the moment of
fertilization and implantation. " 633 Yet, the same court in State v.
Brown, 634 where the defendant had beaten a woman and her unborn
child to death, held the amendment did not expand homicide to include
feticide. The court cited a need for greater clarity and less confusion
than the word "person" reflects and a need to remain "within the limproblems resulted from medical limitations in determining causation. Commonwealth v. Cass, 392
Mass. 799, 805, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1328 (1984).
628. CAL PENAL CooE § 187 (West 1988).
629. 59 Cal. App. 3d 751, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1976).
630. /d. at 755, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
631. 313 So. 2d 799 (La. 1975).
632. /d. at 802.
633. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:2(7) (West 1986).
634. 378 So. 2d 916 (La. 1979).
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its fixed in Roe v. Wade. " 636
These decisions were clearly misguided under a correct analysis of
Roe. No privacy interests were involved on the part of the woman. The
legislative intent was clear, and the state had strong interests in
preventing assaults on unborn children, preventing their physical impairment and death, and protecting a woman's fundamental right of
choosing to carry her child to term. 636
The result of such decisions, in both California and Louisiana, has
been noted by one commentator:
The irony of the Keeler decision is that, had the defendant's assault on the unborn child been somewhat less severe or even less accurate so that the child was born alive before she died from the injuries,
the crime would clearly have been murder. [A footnote indicated that
under the born-alive rule the child need only have lived a short time
after birth to have established homicide.] It is therefore to the defendant's advantage to be sure that he has killed, rather than merely injured, the child in utero. One would have to search long and hard to
find a better example of inverse justice at work. 637
The Keeler case has had widespread influence. It is regularly
quoted in cases following its result. For example, Minnesota, in 1985,
denied a cause of action on behalf of a viable eight and a half month
fetus under its vehicular homicide statute. 638 It cited Keeler twice. 639
Also in 1985, a New York court followed Keeler's lead, prominently
citing "Keller [sic]." 640 In 1984, West Virginia held that the killing of
a thirty-seven week fetus did not constitute homicide. 6 n Keeler was
given special mention. 642 Also in 1984, an appellate court in Florida
cited Keeler and Roe in holding that the killing of a fetus did not constitute DWI manslaughter nor vehicular homicide. 643 This case was remarkable because, at the time of the automobile accident, the mother
was in labor with a full-term viable fetus. 644 Further, the legislature
had expressed its will in the criminal area by including willful feticide
within the crime of manslaughter. 6411 Arguing strict construction, the
court refused to abandon the born-alive rule for the nonwillful crimes
635.
636.
637.
638.
639.
640.
641.
642.
643.
644.
645.

!d. at 918.
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472 n.7 (1977).
Note, supra note 478, at 367-68.
State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1985).
!d. at 628 n.7, 630.
People v. Joseph, 130 Misc. 2d 377, 496 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Orange City Ct. 1985).
State v. Wilson, 332 S.E.2d 807 (W.Va. 1984).
!d. at 808 n.3.
State v. McCall, 458 So. 2d 875 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
!d. at 876.
!d. at 877.
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charged. 646 In 1983, the Supreme Court of Kentucky decided that a
fetus was not protected by the murder statute in the case of Hollis v.
Commonwealth. 647 Hollis reportedly took his estranged wife from her
parents' home to their barn. 648 She was twenty-eight to thirty weeks
pregnant. 649 He "told her he did not want a baby, and then forced his
hand up her vagina intending to destroy the child and deliver the fetus."6110 The court discussed Roe extensively, concluding, "It is fundamental that this Court has no authority to disagree with a decision of
the United States Supreme Court interpreting the Federal
Constitution. " 6111
Another widely cited case which followed Keeler was the 1980
Michigan case of People v. Guthrie. 6112 In 1983, Justice Ryan of the
Michigan Supreme Court, dissenting in the vacating of leave to appeal
the case, noted that the full-term infant in that case was "ready for
birth," and was killed when the mother's vehicle was struck head-on by
a pickup truck which had "crossed four lanes, including the centerline."6113 It was the "day before she was scheduled to enter the hospital
for a Caesarean Section delivery." 6114 The Michigan courts applied the
born-alive rule despite earlier state court recognition of the unborn as
within the state homicide statute. Instead of resorting to such precedent,
the Michigan court relied on the outmoded common law born-alive
rule. 61111 Had the infant been scheduled for delivery a day earlier, and
been riding home in an infant seat, it would have qualified for protection under the negligent homicide act. Such results, dependent on the
vicissitudes of scheduling, are illogical. As dissenting Justice Ryan
noted:
The 'rule' is generally understood to derive from the impossibility, 300 years ago, of determining whether and when a fetus was living and when and how it died, and the consequent necessity to preclude the fundamental inquiry whether a fetal death was a human
death.
To hold as a matter of law in the waning years of the twentieth
century that the question of the personhood or humanity of a viable
646. /d.
647. 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983).
648. /d.
649. /d.
650. /d.
651. !d. at 63.
652. 97 Mich. App. 226, 293 N.W.2d 775 (1980), appeal dismissed, 417 Mich. 1006, 334
N.W.2d 616 (1983)
653. People v. Guthrie, 417 Mich. 1006, 334 N.W.2d 616 (1983) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
654. /d.
655. /d. at 1008-9, 334 N.W.2d at 618-19.
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unborn child in the ninth month of gestation is governed by a common law rule of proof invented by the venerable but fallible Sir Edward Coke in the seventeenth century, to accommodate the medical
and scientific impossibility of then proving the viability of a fetus, is
disingenuous reasoning in the extreme. 656

Medical testimony at the preliminary examination indicated that proof
of life, viability, and cause of death were no longer the problems envisioned in the antiquated born-alive doctrine. 657
In 1982, a New Mexico appellate court also followed Keeler in
State v. Willis 658 by rejecting a vehicular homicide indictment for the
killing of a fetus. In 1981, New Jersey reached the same conclusion in
State ex rel. A. W.S., 659 citing Keeler and Guthrie.
Another widely quoted case is People v. Greer, decided by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1980. 660 The court followed Keeler by holding
it was not murder to kill an eight and a half month fetus by beating. 661
In 1986, Connecticut decided that an unborn, viable fetus was not
a "human being" within the meaning of the state murder statute, in
State v. Anonymous. 662 Keeler was heavily relied upon in that
decision. 663
Thus, it is evident that Roe and Keeler have been very influential.664 As discussed above, the reliance on Roe in this context is totally
unfounded. Keeler presents a more persuasive precedent. It was decided, as were many of the subsequent cases, on the basis of stare decisis, strict construction, and the due process concern of giving adequate
notice to defendants.
As this article argues, stare decisis serves important functions.
However, when the rationale for a precedent is outmoded, such as it is
for the born alive rule, common sense dictates that the precedent no
longer be followed. This principle has been widely applied in the analogous areas of wrongful death statutes and tort law. It is widely ac656. /d. at 1007, 334 N.W.2d at 617 (citation omitted).
657. /d.
658. 98 N.M. 771, 652 P.2d 1222 (1982).
659. 182 N.J. Super. 278,440 A.2d 1144 (App. Div. 1981).
660. 79 Ill 2d 103, 402 N.E.2d 203 (1980).
661. /d.
662. 40 Conn. Supp. 498, 516 A.2d 156 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986).
663. /d. at 500, 516 A.2d at 158-159. In 1987, in the case of Meadows v. State, 291 Ark.
105, 722 S.W.2d 584 (1987), the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that reckless killing of a viable
fetus was not within the state manslaughter statute. Arkansas was unique in having an early
feticide statute which had been expressly repealed. /d. at 587. From this, the court decided that
legislative intent did not include the unborn within the manslaughter statute. /d.
664. Another case preceding Roe excluded fetuses from vehicular homicide statutes. State v.
Dickinson, 28 Ohio St. 2d 65, 275 N.E.2d 599 (1971).
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knowledged by the courts that medical science has progressed and the
law should be "presumed to keep pace with the sciences." 665 There
really is no serious issue here, since even courts which exclude the unborn from homicide statutes acknowledge the outdated rationale of the
rule. For example, in Guthrie, 666 the court wrote:
This panel agrees that the "born alive" rule is outmoded, archaic and
no longer serves a useful purpose. Modern medical practice has advanced to the point that, unlike the situation when the rule was first
developed, the vast majority of viable fetuses will, in the absence of
some unexpected event, be born alive and healthy. Further, medical
technology can now accurately determine the stages of fetal development and viability. This being so, birth itself in terms of emergence
from the mother's body should no longer be determinative. We further acknowledge that for purposes of actions in tort for wrongful
death, recovery may be had even if a viable fetus was yet unborn. 667
Thus, an application of stare decisis here is a brittle, mechanical
application of the doctrine. Even worse, it works injustice. It is instructive to compare the rigid way that this precedent has been applied with
the inflexible/flexible approach used in abortion jurisprudence. In the
latter, the only inflexible point is that women may have abortions. Everything else is limply pliable. Here, while denying the validity of the
rationale, the courts continue to apply the rule. Clearly, the unborn are
deserving of more protection. 668 Even Roe indicated the compelling
state interest in fetal life where women's privacy interests were not opposed.669 Apparently, the explanation for this negative trend of feticide
law lies somewhere beyond the realm of mere stare decisis. It lies
largely in the negative influence of Roe.
The courts denying homicide actions for the unborn also cite the
due process right of defendants to have notice of what constitutes unlawful conduct. 670 It is difficult to believe that a defendant who intentionally sought to "stomp" a baby out of the womb, 671 or tear it out
vaginally, 672 or stab its mother in the abdomen when she was full-

665. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 143 (1946).
666. 97 Mich. App. 226, 293 N.W.2d 775 (1980), appeal dismissed, 417 Mich. 1006, 334
N.W.2d 616 (1983).
667. !d. at 232, 293 N.W.2d at 778. This passage was quoted approvingly in New Jersey's
rejection of homicide protection for the fetus as well, in 191>1. State ex ref. A.W.S., 182 N.J.
Super 278, 281,440 A.2d 1144, 1146 (App. Div. 1981).
668. Parness, supra note 462.
669. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
670. See, e.g., State v. Horne, 282 S.C. 444, 445, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (1984).
671. Keeler, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481.
672. Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983).
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term 673 would not believe he was acting criminally. The cases would
give him notice that, if the child were born and lived only briefly, he
would be liable for homicide. It seems incredible then to say that he
had no notice. How was he to be certain the child would not survive to
draw a breath? Or are we seeking to reward the lethally efficient, who
make no mistakes? It may be somewhat of a legal fiction to imagine
that a man in the act of stabbing his wife in her pregnant womb is
counting on the rule that he is absolved of criminal liability if he succeeds in killing the child. At least, he should be on notice of the doctrine of transferred intent; 674 if he attacks the mother with malice and
kills the unborn child unintentionally, he should be liable for having
intended the act. 675
Furthermore, with the rapid growth of fetal rights in tort law,
especially wrongful death, it should come as no great surprise to an
intentional killer of an unborn child if some state decides he has murdered a person. This is especially true in a state like Minnesota which
has been active and well-known for advancing fetal rights in its muchpublicized case, Verkennes v. Corniea, 676 where it recognized the unborn as persons. 677
Finally, there is a simple solution to the concern with notice.
While it works tragic injustice in an initial case, the employment of a
holding with prospective effect only solves the dilemma easily. This solution was found satisfactory in Commonwealth v. Cass678 and in State
v. Horne. 679
The remaining argument of the majority 680 is the doctrine of construing criminal statutes strictly. The purposes behind the rule are fairness681 and avoidance of judicial usurpation of the legislative function.682 In Cass, Massachusetts decided that fairness to the defendant
(notice) was really the central issue of narrow construction and resolved
it, as discussed above, by prospective application of its rule. 683 Of
course, the principle of fairness is one that should be considered both as
(,n

State 1 Horne. 282 S.C 444, :l19 S.E.2d 703 (1984)
1>74. !d. at 446-47, .119 S.E.2d at 704.
(,7S. !d.
(,7(,

229 !\linn. y,s_ :l8 N.W.2d 8:l8 (1949).

1>77. Unfortunately, Minnesota rejected this argument in State v. Soto, .17H N.W.2d 625
(1-.linn 1'!85)
(,78 392 \Ltss. 7')'), 467 N.E.2d 1324 (1984).
67'!. 282 S.C. 444, :ll9 S.E.2d 703 (1984).
(>80. The born-alive rule, in criminal cases, has been followed by 24 of the 26 jurisdictions
which have considered it. Solo, :l78 N.W.2d at 628 (including Solo in the sum).
681. Cass, 192 Ma.". at 804, 467 N.E.2d at 1327.
682. Solo, :l78 N.W. at 627-28.
68:l. Ca.1.1, :l92 Mass. at 807-08, 467 N.E.2d at 1329.
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it relates to the alleged criminal and to the victim. Clearly, the victim's
rights have received short shrift in most courts.
The other foundation of the narrow construction rule involves the
nature of the judicial function. The Soto court argued: "The rule of
strict construction of criminal statutes is essential to guard against the
creation of criminal offenses outside the contemplation of the legislature, under the guise of 'judicial construction.' " 684
Two courts have stood against the trend denying fetal protection
under homicide statutes and have discussed the rules of strict construction of criminal statutes. These will be examined to determine if their
logic is compelling. Do they properly address the issue of common law
development of criminal statutes? Of course, the nature of the statutes
will affect the outcome in individual cases. However, general themes
are transferable among the codes and cases.
In the 1984 case of State v. Horne, 68 ~ South Carolina announced
that a viable fetus would henceforth be a person for purposes of the
homicide law. In its rationale, it first set forth a stare decisis argument
based on consistency: "It would be grossly inconsistent for us to construe a viable fetus as a 'person' for the purpose.s of imposing civil liability while refusing to give it a similar classification in the criminal
context." 686 Then the court noted prior changes made in the criminal
law by the South Carolina Supreme Court itself:
This Court has the right and the duty to develop the common
law of South Carolina to better serve an ever-changing society as a
whole. In this regard, the criminal law has been the subject of change.
The fact this particular issue has not been raised or ruled on before
does not mean we are prevented from declaring the common law as it
should be. Therefore, we hold an action for homicide may be maintained in the future when the state can prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the fetus involved was viable .... 687
The more famous case of Commonwealth v. Cass 688 was also decided in 1984, by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Massachusetts had the advantage of a prominent case, extending wrongful
death rights to the unborn, 689 published a year before the vehicular
homicide statute was passed. Thus, the court could reasonably argue
that the legislature was presumed to be aware of state court develop684.
685.
686.
687.
688.
689.

State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Minn. 1985).
282 S.C 444, 319 S.E.2d 703 (1984).
/d. at 445, 319 S.E.2d at 704.
/d. (citations omitted).
392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (1984).
Mone v. Greyhound Lines, 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975).
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ments, and so must have intended the definition of a "person" in Mone
to apply to the new statute. 690
Despite a similar sequence of case and statute, Minnesota recently
rejected the Cass approach. 691 The court noted that the two courts
which had rejected the born-alive rule were "common law" jurisdictions, while Minnesota was a "code state," i.e., the l'vfinnesota legislature specifically abolished common law crimes. 692 The Minnesota court
noted its authority to construe the law, but said a change of such magnitude in the criminal law was "within the province of the legislature."693 This is the common argument of the majority, which follows
Keeler. 694
In analyzing this argument, it should be acknowledged at the outset that the general rule is correct. More judicial restraint is to be encouraged. It is troubling, however, when courts, including the United
States Supreme Court, can "legislate" freely to strip the unborn of personhood, but suddenly cannot do so to grant it. In addition, the legislatures need to act clearly and unambiguously to protect the state interest
in the unborn. However, where they have attempted to do so, as in
California and Louisiana, the courts have offered a hostile reception. 6911
Legislators must wonder if the effort will be effective. The kind of precision the courts apparently desire is time consuming, as the whole code
must be overhauled. Minor adjustments have been rejected. 696 Of
course, legislatures are busy with many other matters, as well, which
may seem more pressmg.
With this in mind, is there any way the courts can provide justice
in this area? Surely, one who would intentionally beat a fetus to death
must be deterred from such conduct. The answer lies in the nature of
the born-alive rule itself. The born-alive rule is based on medical limitations and is rooted in the common law. The medical proof problems
are largely gone. The question remains whether the legislatures intended to incorporate in their statutes the common law meaning of
terms as a static concept or as a dynamic concept. Did the term "person" or "human being" in the statute mean whatever the common law
would incorporate therein when applied, or what it meant at the time
690. Cass, 392 Mass. at 801, 467 N.E.2d at 1326. The principle is the same as the presumption that the legislature adopted common law definitions extant at the time a statute was
promulgated.
691. State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 629-30 (Minn. 1985).
692. /d. at 630.
693. /d.
694. Minnesota, likewise, cites Keeler for this argument. /d.
695. See supra text accompanying notes 626-35.
696. /d.
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passed, even if based on changed scientific facts?
The principle was established in Bonbrest that "[t]he law is presumed to keep pace with the sciences .... " 697 Every state has adopted
that principle by allowing a tort action for prenatal harm. 698 If such a
presumption is at work, then the legislative intent must be to adopt a
dynamic concept of the common law. In other words, the definition
under the presumption would be one based on current legal and scientific understanding, not that of hundreds of years past, which is no
longer appropriate. Even "code states" use common law definitions of
terms not defined in the code. These definitions should be allowed to
develop with the common law, and not be frozen in time because a
legislature chose to use them. Of course, the courts should not violate
the clear intent of the legislature, 699 but where the legislature has not
precluded reasonable development of the law, it should be allowed.
There is a clear distinction between the judicial actions in Roe and
in Cass. In Roe, the Supreme Court was interpreting the Constitution,
which historically has entailed an analysis of the intent of the framers
of the original document or the drafters of its amendments. The Supreme Court had no other legitimate authority than to perform such
analysis. It was not authorized to create law as a common law court. In
Cass, the court was acting properly within the common law tradition.
Thus, for a common law court, it is wholly appropriate to apply the
principle of keeping pace with science. When courts in code states employ common law interpretations of terms left undefined by the legislature, that, too, is a proper function of the courts.
However, when the Supreme Court in Roe700 and in Akron 701 declared that science is the controlling factor, over the intent of the framers or judicial precedent, it has usurped the role of the framers in the
same way that a common law court would if going contrary to the
express intent of a legislature in enacting a statute.
For example, if a legislature has defined death as the cessation of
respiration or heart function, even if science has moved to a brain activity definition of death, the court may not legitimately adopt a brain
death test against the will of the legislature. The legislature alone is
authorized to make such policy decisions. However, if statutory law
does not define death, but employs common law definitions, the judici697. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 143.
698. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 467, at 368.
699. This was done in California and Louisiana under the guise of strict construction. See
supra text accompanying notes 626-35.
700. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149, 163.
701. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416,434 (1983) (legislatures
may not "depart from accepted medical practice").
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ary may keep pace with science. Judge-made law-as the common law
is-may legitimately be altered by judges. The Constitution, of course,
is not judge-made law. It may not be altered by the Supreme Court-at
least not under constitutional authority.
However, within legitimate authority to construe statutes and develop common law, courts retain a duty to so construe statutes to avoid
inequity. Our judicial system is based on the common law tradition,
which influences even "code states." This tradition is a dynamic one,
particularly suited to changing circumstances. Judicial "activism"
within limits is a part of its genius. One hears cries of "judicial activism" by the dissent in Cass 102 and by the dissent in Doe v. Bolton. 703
The abortion cases, Roe and Bolton, were a dangerous sort of activism,
clearly usurping the role of the legislatures, invalidating the legislative
determinations of "a majority of the States reflecting, after all, the majority sentiment in those States," 704 on the basis of a right nowhere
mentioned in the Constitution, nor easily found among the shadows
("penumbras") thereof. 706
By contrast, decisions such as Mone and Cass were a positive sort
of "activism." 706 They represent the common law at work. In such situations, where the legislature has failed to act, injustice is being done,
and precedents from collateral areas indicate a change is due, it is essential that the courts act. Keeton favorably argued for an expansion of
such judicial involvement as legislatures are increasingly involved with
other matters. 707
[T]he continuing accumulation of precedents tends to narrow somewhat the area of interstitial creativity and to increase the need for
candid breaks with precedent .... [I]t is never a satisfactory answer
to an argument for judicial creativity that the need for change is one

702. Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 810,467 N.E.2d 1324, 1330 (1984) (Wilkins,
]., dissenting) (calling the majority opinion an "exercise of raw judicial power").
703. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., joined by Rehnquist,]. dissenting)(calling the majority opinion "an exercise of raw judicial power").
704. Roe, 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
705. /d. at 152.
706. This assertion of good and bad forms of judicial "activism" is not inconsistent. An excellent concise discussion of the uses of the historical context of the due process clause in its interpretation is contained in the United States' brief in Thornburgh. Brief for the United States, supra
note 35, at 25-29. One of the uses of history set forth is "to take account of developments in society
and the law." /d. at 27. However, "the Court has always taken pains to trace its point of origin
back to specific constitutional provisions by a route either influential or historical." /d. In Roe, the
"connections by either route were wholly missing." /d. The brief continued, "The story traced by
the Court does not show a steady and growing acceptance of a point of view until the practice in a
few jurisdictions can be characterized as anomalous." /d. The decisions in Mone and Cass are of
this latter type, well supported by the "historical trajectory." !d. at 28.
707. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REv. 463, 484 (1962).
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that could be accomplished by statute. Where a need for reform is
clear but no reforming statute has been enacted, courts must choose
among the unsatisfactory precedent and other rules open to judicial
adoption . . . .708

This flexibility has made the common law system immensely practical. Since legislators cannot foresee every possible situation when enacting a law, there remains need for judicial interpretation.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court comprehended the
need and correctly asserted its right and duty, in such a situation, to
interpret the statutory term dynamically, in light of changed circumstances. It is no coincidence that the court quoted Oliver Wendell
Holmes, an earlier member of the same court, who dictated the rule of
no rights for the unborn:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past. 709

Thus, Massachusetts has come full circle. Whether others will follow is
unclear. What is clear is that the unborn have been stripped of protection and the courts and legislatures need to act to restore it.
The protection which was afforded the unborn before Roe was
primarily provided by the state abortion statutes rather than homicide
laws. When the United States Supreme Court in the 1973 Roe and
Bolton decisions declared the abortion laws of Texas and Georgia unconstitutional, it removed the shield around the unborn.
The protection had been in place for some time. As early as the
thirteenth century in England, the killing of a quickened 710 fetus was a
homicide, according to a contemporary commentator, Henry de
Bracton. 711 William Blackstone noted this view, along with the subsequent view of Edward Coke, that such an act was only a "heinous
misdeme[a)nor." 712 In 1803, the Miscarriage of Women Act was
promulgated in England, increasing the crime for willful killing of a
fetus to a felony and pushing protection back to quickening. 713
708. !d.
709. Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 805-06, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1328 (1984) (quoting Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897)).
710. The law has historically protected the unborn from the beginning of life, as understood
by the science of the day. This protection was pushed back to conception with the discovery of cell
development in the early nineteenth century. See supra note 538.
711. 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 341 (S. Thorne ed. 1968)
(cited in Roe, 410 U.S. at 134 n.23).
712. I W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES 129-30.
713. LORD Eu.t:NBOROUGH's AcT, 1803, 43 Geo. 3, ch. 58, §§ 1-2.
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The United States followed the English pattern. 714 In 1821, Connecticut prohibited causing the miscarriage of a quick child. 716 New
York in 1828 extended the protection to those not yet quickened. 716
Most states followed suit with felony statutes protecting even the unquickened.717 Even though penalties were increased over time, legislators were apparently affected by the born-alive rule, resulting in "a
gross disparity in the protection of potential life and of continued
life." 718 Still, criminal prosecution and penalties were generally available, especially for willful feticide, until the abortion statutes were declared unconstitutional by Roe and Bolton. 719 While Roe applied only
to consensual abortions, it removed the abortion statutes leaving the unborn without protection. Although the states had already expressed
their intent to protect the unborn from attack by the criminal abortion
statutes, the courts have been generally unwilling to further this intent
by applying the legislative intent when interpreting homicide statutes.
Since the legislatures have been slow to act, the unborn may be killed
willfully, without fear of criminal sanctions, in most jurisdictions.
Perhaps the best hope for fetal protection in the criminal area lies
in comprehensive legislation to protect the unborn in non-abortion contexts. Three states are leading the way in this area. In 1987, North
Dakota enacted such a comprehensive statute, 720 joining Minnesota 721
and Illinois. 722 In 1987, the Eleventh Circuit declared a Georgia feticide statute as constitutional and not conflicting with Roe. The criminal
defendant, Smith, shot a pregnant woman and killed her unborn
child. 723 He contended the feticide statute was unconstitutional "because there [was] no unlawful taking of human life, and because the
statute contradicts ... Roe. " 724 The court declared the first contention
"frivolous" and the second "without merit. " 726 The fact that Roe declared a fetus not to be a "person" was "immaterial" where the state's
interests did not conflict with a woman's right to abort. 726 In 1987, in

714.
715.
(1821)).
716.
717.
718.
719.
720.
721.
722.
723.
724.
725.
726.

Parness, supra note 462, at I 08.
J. MoHR, supra note 425, at 21 (citing CoNN. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 14, 16, at 152, IS3

See

/d. at 26-27 (citing N.Y. REv. STAT. pt. IV, ch. I, tit. II, §§ 8, 9 at 550).

Parness, supra note 462, at I 09.
/d.
/d. at 110.
N.D. CENT. ConE§ 12.1-17.1 (Supp. 1987).

See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.
See, e.g., ILL REv. STAT., ch.36, § 9-1.1.
Smith v. Newsome, 815 F.2d 1386, 1388 (lith Cir. 1987).
/d.
/d.
I d. at 1388 & n.2.
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the case of State v. Wickstrom, 727 the conviction of a man who beat and
kicked a pregnant woman's abdomen, causing fetal death, was upheld
under the state's criminal abortion law. 728 Such prosecutions may be
possible elsewhere, but the need for comprehensive legislative action is
clear.
We see then, that in the criminal setting, Roe's denial of personhood to the unborn violated the principles of stare decisis by creating instability, promoting logical inconsistency, and inhibiting predictability and fairness. It destroyed legal protection for unborn children
from homicide and inhibited the growth of alternative protection. Such
inhibition was not mandated by Roe-which recognized the state interest in potential life where the mother's privacy rights do not conflict-but it was inevitable, from the shoddy reasoning and inadequate
protection of the unborn in Roe, that other courts would follow its lead.

5.

Laws relating to respect

Recognition of the dignity of human life is important to create a
climate where life is respected and, thus, not readily taken. Some states
have passed laws promoting this dignity for the unborn. These laws are
in keeping with Roe's recognition of the state interest in protecting "potential" life. 729 The laws take two forms. First, some statutes relate to
the humane disposal of fetal remains. Second, other statutes proscribe
fetal experimentation, except to preserve fetal life.
The first type of statute, requiring humane disposal of fetal remains, has been adopted by a number of states. 730 Such a statute was
overturned for vagueness in Akron. 731 The Akron Court found that a
"decent burial" might be intended, rather than prevention of "mindless
dumping" as the City of Akron argued. 732 However, in Akron, the
Court left open the possibility of clear legislation which did not burden
the mother's right of privacy. 733
In Leigh v. Olson, 734 a district court overturned a statute requiring
the woman seeking abortion to select a method of disposal, even though
727. 405 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. App. 1987).
728. /d. at 10.
729. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
730. Parness, supra note 462, at I 02 & n.12.
731. Akron, 462 U.S. at 451.
732. /d.
733. /d.
734. 497 F. Supp. 1340 (D.N.D. 1980). Cf Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Cincinnati, 822
F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1987); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 827 F.2d 1191 (8th Cir. 1987), reh 'g granted
and opinion vacated, 835 F.2d 1545 (8th Cir. 1987), reinstated and (en bane) reh 'g granted,
835 F.2d 1546 (8th Cir. 1987), reversed, 853 F.2d 1452, petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W.
2105 (U.S. Feb 3, 1989)
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one choice was to let someone else decide. 735 The court found this to be
too great a burden on the privacy right. No financial cost need have
been involved and the state had a legitimate interest in promoting respect for life, including an aborted fetus. 736 However, in the court's
mind, the psychological burden proved too great. There is, however,
substantial room here for the states to promote the dignity of the
fetus. 737
Fetal experimentation has been barred by some states, unless it
would save fetal life. 738 According to one commentator, such statutes
"suggest that in contemporary American society, the fetus is sometimes
accorded the same dignity as a human being born alive." 739 Such protection reflects "significant sentiment" on the part of legislators that the
unborn are entitled to respect. 740
The fetal disposal and experimentation statutes reflect a respect
for the unborn which is out of step with the approach taken in Roe.
Thus, despite the dictates of Roe, the people through their elected representatives continue to express their belief in the essential humanity of
the unborn.

6.

Summary

The holding of Roe has been shown to be out of step with the rest
of the law as it relates to the unborn. The long legal history of fetal
rights has been one of significant and expanding scope. The development of medical technology has solved problems of providing proof
which existed in former centuries. This has led to a dramatic turnaround in tort law. However, Roe has inhibited this growth in the area
of criminal protection by stripping the fetus of personhood and the protection of the abortion laws. The inhibiting effect of Roe flies in the
face of logic, medical technology and the consistency principles of stare
decisis.
While Roe and its progeny offer little protection to the postviable
fetus, 741 other areas of the law offer protection back to conception and
even before. These protections in other areas are much stronger than
the weak protection offered in Roe. Clearly Roe is out of step with the
735. Leigh, 497 F. Supp at 1351-52.
736. Parness, supra note 462, at 146.
737. /d.
738. /d. at 102 (giving examples in Louisiana, Illinois, and the report National Comm'n for
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Researrh, U.S. Dep't of Health,
Educ. & Welfare, Report and Recommendations: Research on the Fetus 61-62, 67, 74 (1975)).
739. Parness, supra note 462, at 102.
740. /d.
741. The "mother's health" exception has been interpreted very broadly.
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long-established and developing fetal rights in the rest of the law.
While Roe was wrong in its analysis of fetal rights in 1973, abortion
jurisprudence deviates even further from the rest of the law since Roe.
C.

Medical Regulations

In his majority opinion in Roe, Justice Blackmun acknowledged
that the abortion controversy raised philosophical, moral, religious, and
medical questions. 742 The Court's ruling focused primarily on the medical aspect. The trimester scheme was based on medical concepts, definitions, determinations, and technological capabilities. A key player in
the scheme was the attending physician. The woman was to make her
decision in consultation with her doctor. 743 The doctor was given great
leeway in exercising his virtually unassailable discretion. 744
However, the medical criteria employed in the Roe trimester
scheme were faulty and inadequate as a basis for a constitutional right.
The unfettered discretion and deference afforded physicians in the
abortion context is anomalous in light of the extensive regulation of
medical practice. Also, the treatment of the informed consent doctrine
in the abortion context is out of step with the current trend of the law
and regresses to a widely-rejected model of the physician-patient relationship. Even reasonable recording and reporting requirements cannot
withstand the Court's attack. These are the topics of this section.

I.

Trimester medical criteria

The Court in Roe decided that the state could not regulate abortion in the first trimester, as abortion was considered safer than continuing the pregnancy during that period. 7411 In reaching this conclusion,
Justice Blackmun referred to medical data from the appellant and
amici briefs. 746 The studies cited supported the proposition that abortion was safer during this period. 747 However, a review of opposing
amici briefs reveals contradictory data ignored by the Court. 748 The
742. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116-17.
743. ld. at 163
744. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191 (1973).
745. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149, 163.
746. /d. at 149. The Court's trimester scheme should not be confused with the mcdic;d division of pregnancy into three three-month periods. See Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 1>31. 635
(W.D. Ky. 1974), affd, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976); Speciall'ro;ect, Sun•q of Abortion Law,
1980 ARIZ. St. L.J. 67, 139-42.
747. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149.
748. See Brief for Certain Physicians, Professors and Fellows of tht· American Collee;e of
Obstetrics and Gynecology at 33-50, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Brief for Robert L.
Sassone at 25-36, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Court gave undue deference to certain segments of the medical community over others. Moreover, the asserted facts were in reality opinions of
certain medical groups.
Even the Court's language in Roe indicated the uncertainty of the
data. The Court stated initially, "Mortality rates for women undergoing early abortions, where the procedure is legal, appear to be as low
as or lower than the rates for normal childbirth." 749 Later the Court
referred back to this statement, concluding, "This is so because of the
now established medical fact, referred to above at [prior quotation],
that until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less
than mortality in normal childbirth." 7110 Subsequent articles and studies
have supported the argument that the Roe Court's medical fact was
really ill-founded medical opinion. 7111 The Roe Court's extreme deference to such opinions, and to what were basically legislative facts, was
unwarranted. 7112 With this foundation removed, the first trimester rule
is without a basis. Moreover, as medical technology changes, the relative safety of abortion and childbirth will remain a mobile guideline.
The Roe Court also relied on medical factors in drawing the line
between the second and third trimesters, which was placed at viability.
At viability, the state's interest in fetal life was to become compelling.7113 However, determining viability is a difficult task, leaving legis7 49. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149 (emphasis added).
750. !d. at 163 (emphasis added).
751. These analyses have further demonstrated that the opinions on v1hich the Court relied
were based on very questionable data. See Hilgers & O'Hare, Abortion Related Maternal Mortality: An In-Depth Analysis, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN ABORTION 69-91 (T. Hilgers,
D. Horan & D. Mall eds. 1981) (application of more accurate formulas produced a finding that
natural pregnancy is safer than legal abortion in both the first and second twenty weeks of pregnancy). See also Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The Need for a Life-Protective Amendment, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1250, 1295-03 (1975).
752. See generally Destro, supra note 751, at 1295-03. Such reliance on legislative facts is
especially problematic in cases involving fundamental constitutional questions. Opinions on medical restrictions of abortion are particularly prone to predisposition. While adjudicative facts may
be challenged at the trial level and are subject to the rules of evidence, legislative facts are usually
presented at the level of flat assertions with little or no chance for rebuttal. Thus, the basic precept
of the adversary system was neglected. See generally Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the
Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L.
Rtv. 1187 (1975).
The Court's heavy reliance on Cyril Means' article in Roe was particularly inappropriate in
this respect. Roe, 410 U.S. at 135 n.26, 136, 140-41; Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom:
Is a Penumbral or Ninth-Amendment Right About to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Lfgislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y. L. F. 335 (1971). Subsequent
studies have soundly criticized the accuracy of much of the information contained in his article.
See, e.g., Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 FoRDHAM L. REV.
807 (197"\); Destro, supra note 751, at 1267-92; Witherspoon, Reexamining Roe: NineteenthCentury Abortion Statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 ST. MARY's L.J. 29 (1985).
753. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160.

181 J

RIGHT TO ABORTION

285

latures with an almost insurmountable task in asserting their declared
compelling interest in fetal life and doctors in the precarious position of
having possible criminal penalties flow from an erroneous judgment of
nonviability. The result has been more litigation, resulting in a wide
berth being required of legislatures when legislating around the point
of viability, and virtually unchallenged discretion being allowed physicians in making the determination of viability. 7114 As with the line between the first and second trimesters, the viability line is a function of
advances in medical technology.
In sum, while much of the medical data used in Roe was suspect
at the time, medical technology has continued to alter the landscape,
making the trimester scheme almost unrecognizable in its present form
and on a certain "collision course with itself' in the future. 71111 The
resounding criticisms of the creation of a constitutional right, which
will vary year-by-year, have already been given and need not be
repeated. 7116

2.

Physician discretion

The unchecked discretion granted to physicians in the abortion
context is also inappropriate. Consistent with its view of abortion as
primarily a medical matter, the Court has placed great emphasis on the
physician-patient relationship. In Roe, for example, the woman in her
first trimester was declared free, in consultation with her physician, to
choose an abortion. 7117 Later in the opinion, the Court reiterated the
point that ''the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and
primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest
with the physician." 7116
Subsequent opinions have shielded the physician from scrutiny. In
Bolton, a scheme was invalidated which required review of the physician's decision by other physicians and a hospital committee. 7119 The
754. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 63-65. Danforth stressed the flexibility of the Roe viability
concept in upholding abortion legislation. /d. at 65. In Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979)
the Court struck down a state statute very similar to Danforth's. The fatal flaw was vagueness.
/d. at 393. It is ironic that attempts to make the viability concept more definite have been struck
down as too restrictive, while the formula, or very similar ones, used by the Court are inherently
vague. The result is that little protection of the compelling state interest in fetal life is extant. The
testimony in Danforth produced a wide range of definitions of viability. /d. at 396 n.15. See
generally Note, Current Technology Affecting Supreme Court Abortion jurisprudence, 27 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 1221 (1982).
755. Akron, 462 U.S. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
756. See supra section 11-A-3 of this article.
757. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149, 163.
758. /d. at 166.
759. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 197-200.
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physician-patient decision has also been shielded from familial veto, 760
regulation of the viability determination, 761 regulation of the informed
consent dialogue, 762 regulation of the abortion method, 763 all but very
limited recordkeeping, 764 and various standards of care imposed to protect fetal life. 765
This extreme deference to the medical profession is also evident in
the language of the Court's opinions, which evince a high degree of
trust and faith in the medical profession. Of course, this view is not
shared by many legislatures, which repeatedly attempt to regulate physicians' discretion in performing abortions. The Court, by contrast, refers "to the conscientious physician, particularly the obstetrician, whose
professional activity is concerned with the physical and mental welfare,
the woes, the emotions of his female patients." 766 The Court has expressed its belief that most physicians are "good" and that they will
have sympathy and understanding for the pregnant patient. 767 Former
Chief Justice Burger exhibited this sort of respect in his concurrence to
Bolton. He said "that the vast majority of physicians observe the standards of their profession, and act only on the basis of carefully deliberated medical judgments. " 768
This is hopefully true. However, criminal statutes are not generally rejected by the Court on the basis that most people are law abiding. Furthermore, the picture painted by the Court is anachronistic.
The Court portrays the physician as carefully consulting with the woman about possible medical and psychological harms, as well as longrange effects on her family and future. 769 Unfortunately, this is often
unrealistic, as depicted in the award-winning series in the Chicago
Sun-Times, The Abortion Profiteers. 770 More than fifty-five percent of
the approximately one and a half million abortions performed annually
are done in abortion clinics. 771 Many of these clinics operate at a high
volume and doctors working there have an interest in the profits of the
760. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 52, 67-75.
761. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388-90 (1979).
762. Akron, 462 U.S. at 444-47; Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 764.
763. Danforth, 428 US. at 75-79.
764. !d. at 79-81.
765. See, e.g., id. at 81-83.
766. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 196.
767. !d. at 197.
768. !d. at 208 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
769. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
770. See infra notes 1035-56 and accompanying text. See also Goldsmith, J<;arly Abortion in
a Family Planning Clinic, 6 FAM. PLAN. P~:RSP. 119 (1974).
771. Henshaw, Forrest & Blaine, supra note 238, at 120 table 1.
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clinic. 772 Often the doctor does not even see the patient until she is on
the operating table. 773 Justice Stewart took note of such practice in his
concurrence in Danforth:
The counseling ... occurs entirely on the day the abortion is to be
performed .... It lasts for two hours and takes place in groups that
include both minors and adults who are strangers to one another ....
The physician takes no part in this counseling process .... Counseling is typically limited to a description of abortion procedures, possible complications, and birth control techniques .... 774

Justice O'Connor, dissenting in Akron, called attention to the
"fact that the record [in Akron] show[ ed] that the [physician-patient]
relationship [was] nonexistent." 7711 She cited Judge Cornelia G. Kennedy, who declared "that the decision to terminate a pregnancy was
made not by the woman in conjunction with her physician, but by the
woman and the lay employees of the abortion clinic, the income of
which is dependent upon the woman's choosing to have an abortion." 776
With good reason, therefore, the states have endeavored to regulate
perceived abuses and to assert their allegedly compelling interests.
Under traditional rules, this ought to have been permitted.
a. Substantive due process. Indicative of the imprecision in abortion jurisprudence is the confusion over whose right is fundamental.
While the abortion right seems to be the woman's, certain issues, such
as informed consent requirements, have been decided on the basis of
their effect on the physician. 777 This emphasis on the physician's freedom to practice medicine unfettered by the state is not consistent with
traditional rules governing regulation of the medical profession.
Historically, the states have had the recognized authority under
their police power to regulate the practice of medicine. 778 For a brief
time, during the heyday of substantive due process, the Court recognized a right to practice medicine as guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. 779
772. See infra notes 1035-56 and accompanying text.
773. Wardle, supra note 19, at 245.
774. 428 U.S. at 91 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for the Appellants at 43-44,
Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976)(omissions by Stewart,].)).
775. Akron, 462 U.S. at 773 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
776. 651 F.2d at 1217 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
777. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763; Akron, 462 U.S. at 445; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67 n.8;
Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1984), appeal dismissed sub nom. Diamond v. Charles,
106 S. Ct. 1697 (1986).
'
778. An excellent article, tracing the rights of physicians in relation to the doctrine of informed consent, is Jipping, Informed Consent to Abortion: A Refinement, 38 CASE W. REs. L.
Rt:v. 329, 351-56 (1988).
779. /d.; Lochner, 198 U.S. at 60. Cf Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, Ill, 115
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As substantive due process was rejected, so too were such claims
for the medical profession. In the same year that Roe was decided, the
Court overruled Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 780 a 1928 case which had
upheld the property rights of pharmacists in their pharmacy business
against state regulation. 781 The overruling Court declared that substantive due process rights in medical matters were ended, and that "states
have power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices
in their internal commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws
do not run afoul of some specific constitutional prohibition, or of some
valid federal law . . . . " 782 Subsequent cases have likewise rejected a
substantive due process claim by the medical profession. 783 In response
to claims of "unduly oppressive and unwarranted restrictions" 784 on the
dental profession, one circuit court remarked that "[ t ]he courts have so
often sustained identical legislative provisions" 78 ~ that it was "surprised"786 at the contention.
Thus, no longer is a right to practice medicine free from regulation recognized. 787 That the Supreme Court has revived such a notion
in abortion jurisprudence is further evidence of the inconsistency between abortion and ordinary case law.
Since the Court has never explicitly held that physicians have a
right to practice abortions free from state interference, 788 it should cease
relying on such a concept. The current sub silentio recognition of the
right in the abortion context is anomalous. 789 Thus, there is no constitutional basis for the extreme deference of the Court to the medical
profession, and the unassailable discretion accorded abortion doctors is
inappropriate.
b. Police Power. Outside of the detour into substantive due
processa in abortion case law, he right of the states to regulate the practice of medicine has been largely unquestioned. Of course, constitutional requirements must be observed, but the state's police power has
(1928)
780. 278 U.S. 105 (1928).
781. North Dakota State Bd. v. Snyder's Drug Stores, 414 U.S. 156 (1973).
782. /d. at 165 (quoting Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536-37 (1949)).
783. Jipping, supra note 778, at 349-51 (citing Semler v. Oregon Bd. of Dental Examiners,
294 U.S. 608 (1935) and Johnston v. Board of Dental Examiners, 134 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1943)
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 758).
784. Johnston v. Board of Dental Examiners, 134 F.2d 9, 10 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
785. /d. at 11.
786. /d.
787. Jipping, supra note 778, at 351.
788. /d. at 349.
789. Further confusion is caused by the failure of the Court to precisely define the right. Is it
a right to an empty womb, a dead fetus, control of one's own body, control over certain derisions,
an abortion, or merely a choice between abortion and birth? /d. at 339.
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traditionally governed medical regulation. 790 Thus, the medical profession is subject to regulation to secure the people "against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and
fraud," 791 especially in matters "which closely concern the public
health. " 792 In fact, declared the Court, "[ t ]here is perhaps no profession
more properly open to [state] regulation than that which embraces the
practitioners of medicine." 793
Exercise of state police power has led to licensing requirements, 794
ongoing supervision, 7911 revocation of licenses, 796 regulation of the commercial aspects of medical practice, 797 and defining the content of practice itself.7 98 In areas analogous to abortion, such as sterilization and
warning labeling of contraceptives, regulation has been commonplace.
For example, many states have sterilization statutes incorporating requirements of age, written consent, and what information will constitute informed consent. 799 Parental consent may be required for minors
to be sterilized, 800 a second physician may be required for consultation,801 and spousal consent has been required. 802 Some states require a
waiting period after written, informed consent is required. 803 This is in
recognition of the permanent and generally irreversible nature of the
procedure and the potential psychological sequelae. Similarly, an abortion is a permanent and irreversible termination of one's offspring, potentially fraught with similar ills. Surely a waiting period would be
within the state power. However, even a twenty-four hour waiting period was struck down by the Akron Court. 804
Ironically, the reasoning in Akron was that "[ t ]he decision
790.
791.
792.
793.
794.
795.

/d. at 351-52.
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889)
Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910).
/d.
Jipping, supra note 778, at 353.
/d. at 353-54.

796. /d.

797. /d. at 354-55.
798. /d. at 3S'i-56.
799. Cow. REv. STAT. § 25-6-102(6) (1982); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-78q (West
1981); DEL Com. ANN. tit. 16, § 5702 (Supp. 1988); GA. Com: ANN. § 31-20-2 (1985); Kv
REv. STAT. ANN. § 212.345 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983); ML RFv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, §
7004 (1988); N.C. GEN. STAT § 90-271 (1986); OR. REv. STAT.§ 435.305 (1985); TENN. Com
ANN.§ 68-34-108 (1986); Ur. CooE ANN.§ 64-10-3 (1987); VA. Com ANN.§ 54-325.9 (1982);
W VA. Com. ANN. § 16-11-1 (1985).
800. See, e.g., Cow. REv. STAT. § 25-6-1 02(6) (1982)
801. GA. CoDE ANN. § 31-20-2 (1985).
802. /d.
803. Kv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 212.347 (Michie/Bobbs-Mcrrill 1983) (24 hrs.); VA. CoDE
ANN. § 54-325.9 (1982) (30 days for persons who are neither natural nor adoptive parents).
804. Akron, 462 U.S. at 450.
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whether to proceed with an abortion is one as to which it is important
to 'affor[d] the physician adequate discretion in the exercise of his medical judgment.' " 8011 The Court added, "In accordance with the ethical
standards of the profession, a physician will advise the patient to defer
the abortion when he thinks this will be beneficial to her." 806
c. Nature of abortion. One commentator has noted that, while
abortion is a medical procedure in that a physician must perform it, it
is not medically indicated in ninety-eight percent of abortion cases. 807
Thus, despite the fact that abortion is one of the most common surgical
procedures today, in only a small fraction of cases is it indicated for
physical or psychological health reasons. 808 It most correctly compares
to elective surgery. 809 As noted by one writer, the result of this is that
"the physician's special training and judgment are obviously less important in the abortion context than with most other medical
procedures. " 810
The Court has recognized the generally non-medical reasons for
abortion in its opinions. In Bolton, the Supreme Court gave the concept
of health a very broad definition to include such items as family and
work concerns-whatever related to "well-being." 811 Thus, in finding
reasons for women to have abortions, the Court has given health the
broadest possible interpretation. By contrast, when considering health
in the context of the state's compelling interest in protecting the health
of women considering or procuring abortions, the Court has adopted a
very narrow view of health. This "dichotomous definition of 'health'
lies at the heart of [the Supreme Court's] inappropriate review of informed consent statutes." 812
Before proceeding to the topic of informed consent, it should be
observed that the nature of abortion as predominantly an elective procedure, in the usual sense of the term, makes the extreme deference to the
special diagnostic and treatment skills of physicians inappropriate. In
the context of assembly line clinics, the physician is often a mere technician, not the noble healer depicted in the portrayals by the Supreme
Court, in need of wide discretion to ply his profession. In any event, the
great deference and discretion provided is inconsistent with the usual
805. /d. (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 ( 1979)).
806. !d. Surely the Court's viewpoint ignores the prevalence of abortion dinirs run with a
profit motive.
807. Jipping, supra note 778, at 372.
808. !d. at 373.
R09. /d.
810. /d. at 373-74.
811 Bolton, 410 U.S. at 192.
812. Jipping, supra note 778, at 374.
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state police power in contexts other than abortion.

3.

Informed consent

As noted in Section 11-C of this article, Pennsylvania passed provisions requiring neutral information to be provided to women seeking
abortions concerning such things as potential risks and the availability,
if desired, of materials explaining alternatives to abortion and fetal
characteristics at various stages. The appellate court in the case of
Thornburgh invalidated all of these provisions on the basis of Akron. 813
The Supreme Court likewise struck down the statutes, claiming
they were designed to persuade women to withhold consent, 814 that
they "intrude[d] upon the discretion of the pregnant woman's physician,"815 that the material depicting fetal development at two-week
stages was overinclusive, 816 and that it was contrary to "accepted medical practice." 817 The Court declared the provisions could not "be saved
by any facts that might be forthcoming at a subsequent hearing." 818
In Danforth, the Supreme Court said a state may require informed, written consent to an abortion. 819 The opinion said the allowable information requirement consisted of "what would be done and its
consequences." 820 In Akron, the Court limited the state by saying it
may not require the physician to deliver information designed to influence the woman's choice. 821 The Akron Court went on to say that "the
state legitimately may seek to ensure that [the decision] has been made
'in light of all the attendant circumstances-psychological and emotional as well as physical-that might be relevant to the well-being of
the patient.' " 822 The Akron Court also indicated that statutes describing the information to be disclosed in general terms would be
permissible. 823
The Pennsylvania statutes, at issue in Thornburgh, clearly fit
within the permissible range allowed by the Supreme Court's prior decisions. There was no speculation on when life begins, nor over the
813. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283,
295-96 (3d Cir. 1984) rev'd 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 462 US. 416, 444-45 (1983).
814. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 764.
815. /d. at 762.
816. /d.
817. /d.
818. /d. at 764. Thornburgh was on appeal from a granting of a preliminary injunction.
819. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976).
820. /d.

821 Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 443-44 (1983).
822. /d. at 443 (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S 379, 387, 394 (1979)).
823. /d. at 445, 447.
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probable characteristics of a specific fetus, nor was abortion presented
as a particularly dangerous surgery. These were the problems found
objectionable in Akron. 824 The Pennsylvania regulations required the
presentation of objective, verifiable, and relevant information. Specifically, Pennsylvania required that a woman be informed of who will
perform the abortion. 8211 This was a reasonable requirement. Another
section required that a woman be advised "that there [might] be detrimental physical and psychological effects which were not accurately
foreseeable." 826 This provision was carried forward from a prior statute, which was upheld against this same attack, by the Supreme Court,
in Franklin v. Fitzpatrick. 827 The order in Fitzpatrick specifically
cited Danforth as controlling. Pennsylvania also required that a woman
be given "medically accurate" information about the risks of abortion
and childbirth. 828 This seems a mere codification of what the Court
specifically allowed in Danforth and Akron. A woman was also to be
advised of the probable gestational age of her fetus. 829 This is nonjudgmental, relevant information which is certainly not objectionable
under the Akron test. Finally, information of assistance available for
the childbirth option was to be offered to the woman. 830 Her receipt
and reading of this material was purely optional and obviously relevant
to her choice. 831
As Justice White stated in his dissent, "One searches the majority's opinion in vain for a convincing reason why the apparently laudable policy of promoting informed consent becomes unconstitutional
when the subject is abortion." 832 He rejected the majority reliance on
Akron as controlling in striking down the provisions, because the provisions were fundamentally different. 833 The other three reasons the majority cited were equally uncompelling to Justice White.
First, the fact that the information might be irrelevant to some
decisions was not controlling. 834 Legislators are allowed rational generalizations where there is no impingement on a fundamental right. 8311 In
this case, there was no infringement, because the woman's right to
824.
825.
826.
827.
828.
829.
830.
831.
832.
833.
834.
835.

!d. at 443-44.
18 PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN.§ 3205(a)(1)(i) (Purdon 1983).
!d. § 320S(a)(1)(ii).
Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976).
18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(1)(iii) (1983)
!d. § 3205(a)(l)(iv).
Id. § 3205(a)(2)(i) & (ii).
/d. § 3205 (a)(2)(iii).
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 799 (White, J., dissenting).
/d. at 799-800 (White, J., dissenting).
/d. at 800 (White, J., dissenting).
!d. (White, J., dissenting)
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choose was in no way affected. 836
Second, the majority was concerned with anxiety and the possibility that the regulations might influence the woman. 837 As Justice White
put it, "This is in fact their reason for existence, and . . . it is an
entirely salutary reason." 838 The doctrine of informed consent requires
that, if a woman would be influenced by information in making her
decision, then she must have that information. 839 The purpose of Roe
was "not maximizing the number of abortions, but maximizing
choice." 84 ° Furthermore, Justice White adds, "[O]ur decisions in
Maher, Beal, and Harris v. McRae all indicate that the State may
encourage ... childbirth ... and the provision of accurate information
regarding abortion and its alternatives is a reasonable and fair means of
achieving that objective. " 841
Third, the majority said that the informed consent provisions intruded on the physician's discretion. 842 However, as Justice White
pointed out that "the government is entitled not to trust members of a
profession to police themselves .... " 843 Further, the "regulation of the
practice of medicine, like regulation of other professions and of economic affairs generally, was a matter peculiarly within the competence
of legislatures, and ... such regulation was subject to review only for
rationality," argued Justice White. 844 Interestingly, the Court recently
held that attorneys could be required to disclose more information than
they were accustomed to or desirous of doing in advertising. 845 The
normal rules were laid aside when it came to abortion and the medical
profession.
The majority argued that the "anti-abortion character" of the regulations was evident, because the Commonwealth did not similarly require "disclosure of every possible peril" of other surgery. 846 However,
were a legislature to do so, it would doubtless be upheld, especially
where there were findings of abuse by the medical profession. 847 Evi836. /d. at 800-801 (White, J., dissenting).
837. !d. at 763.
838. /d. at 801 (White, J., dissenting).
839. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064;
Appleton, Doctors, Patients and the Constitution: A Theoretical Analysis of the Physician's Role
in Reproductive Decisions, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 183, 211 (1985).
840. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 801 (White, J., dissenting).
841. /d. at 801-802 (White, J., dissenting).
842. /d. at 764.
843. /d. at 803 (White, J., dissenting).
844. /d. at 802 (White, J., dissenting).
845. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
846. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 764.
847. The Commonwealth was prepared to give such testimony at the trial of Thornburgh.
Brief for Appellants at 45-48, Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747. See also Brief for Gans, Carlson &
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dence of abuse existed and should have been considered by the Court.
Only a super-protected right would cause the Court to say that no evidence could change its mind. 848
Further evidence of the super-protected nature of the abortion
right is the fact that the Court was willing to reject the whole modern
trend of informed consent law to strike down the Pennsylvania regulations.849 The Supreme Court followed the "physician paternalism"
model of informed consent, which allows physicians great discretion to
disclose or not to disclose, based on the physician's perceptions of the
patient's needs. s&o This model is particularly suspect in situations
where the physician has a strong monetary interest in a particular outcome, such as in an "abortion mill." 8&1 In 1972, the widely respected
and followed case of Canterbury v. Spence 8 &2 brought a newly emerging model into prominence. This new model featured patient autonomy,
which is, ironically, an interest allegedly at stake in Roe. The "patient
autonomy" model was summarized in the Canterbury opinion as
follows:
[T]he patient's right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty
to reveal. That right can be effectively exercised only if the patient
possesses enough information to enable an intelligent choice. The
scope of the physician's communications to the patient, then, must be
measured by the patient's need, and that need is the information material to the decision. Thus the test for determining whether a particular peril must be divulged is its materiality to the patient's
decision. 853

The deep respect and deference to the medical profession, which
the Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed, 8&4 is not reflected in the
informed consent decisions of the states. Twenty-eight of the jurisdicDewing, Amici Curiae, at 2-5, Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747 (testimony of women who had abortions and experienced medical misconduct in communication of information).
848. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 764 ("These statutory defects cannot be saved by any facts
that might be forthcoming at a subsequent hearing.").
849. Brief for Gans, Carlson & Dewing, Amici Curiae, supra note 847, at 18-21.
850. !d.
85 I. There is also evidence that the decision to withhold information may not always be
grounded in practical experience:
Available evidence indicates that the physicians' decisions to withhold information are
based on hearsay rather than on actual experience with the effects of full disclosure and
that the physician's own emotional reluctance to confront the patient with stark diagnoses and risks often prevents disclosure.
Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy For the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 79
YALE L.j. I 533, I 566 (1970).
852. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
853. /d. at 786-87.
854. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. 113, Akron, 462 U.S. 416.
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tions that have confronted the issue have rejected the pure "physician
paternalism" model adopted by the Court. 855 The clear trend is to require the physician to inform patients of the facts, so that the patients
may make the choice of whether to have treatment rather than have the
doctor decide for them. 856
Pennsylvania had firmly adopted the "patient autonomy"
mode\. 857 As many states have done, Pennsylvania even rejected a
"therapeutic" exception, which would otherwise permit the physician
to withhold certain information, if the physician thought the patient
should not hear it. 868 This sound rejection of paternalism would seem
especially appropriate in the "women's rights" area of abortion. The
Court's imposition of its own paternalism and that of doctors' strikes a
dissonant chord in this setting. 869
Since the state has a legitimate interest in the "potential life" of
the fetus, 860 since several decisions have allowed the state to encourage
childbirth, 861 and since the abortion right is "a negative one," not to be
encouraged for its own sake, 862 the Court's talk of informed consent
discouraging women from abortions seems strange. If there is something in the nature of the truth about the matter that discourages
women from having abortions, perhaps the right itself ought to be
questioned. It is certainly not something about which one should decide
without all the facts. A woman who is told that the life within her is
simply a mass of cells has not been afforded the opportunity to make an
informed decision about abortion. 863 The right to bear a child is at least
as fundamental as the right to an abortion, according to Maher v.
Roe. 86" Informed consent provisions, such as Pennsylvania promul855. Brief for Gans, Carlson & Dewing, Amici Curiae, supra note 846, at 20.
856. /d.
857. /d.
858. /d. at 26.
859. Because abortion involves the taking of a life, it is an emotionally troubling issue. However, this does not justify deception regarding the true nature of the decision. Such deception
deprives a woman of the right to make a truly informed choice. Yet, the evidence indicates that
women are often not told the basic facts. Bellotti, 499 F. Supp. at 219. In Planned Parenthood
Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 489 n.12 (1983), Justice Powell cited The Abortion Profiteers, a
Pulitzer Prize-winning newspaper series on the abuses and manipulation found in the medical
profession practicing abortions. See supra notes 1035-56 and accompanying text.
860. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
861. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 801 (White, J., dissenting) ("Moreover, our decisions in
Maher, Beal, and Harris v. McRae all indicate that the State may encourage women to make
their choice in favor of childbirth .... ").
862. /d. at 797 (White, J., dissenting).
863. See, e.g., Brief for Gans, Carlson & Dewing, supra note 847, at 2-5 (where the unborn
child was called "a mass of cells," the "product of conception," and other euphemisms avoiding its
true nature).
864. 432 U.S. 464, 472 n.7 (1977).
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gated, preserve the choice. Amazingly, the Court has rejected this core
right established by Roe.
Chief Justice Burger, who was moved to leave the majority and to
call for the reexamination of Roe by the extremity to which the Court
has gone, put the matter well:
[T]oday the Court astonishingly goes so far as to say that the State
may not even require that a woman contemplating an abortion be
provided with accurate medical information concerning the risks inherent in the medical procedure which she is about to undergo ....

Can anyone doubt that the State could impose a similar requirement
with respect to other medical procedures? ...
. . . Can it possibly be that the Court is saying that the Constitution forbids the communication of such critical information to a woman? We have apparently already passed the point at which abortion
is available merely on demand. If the statute at issue here is to be
invalidated, the "demand" will not even have to be the result of an
informed choice. 86 ~

Finally, because of the generally elective nature of abortion described earlier, the patient autonomy model is especially appropriate in
the abortion context. The Court's heavy emphasis on the role of the
physician "is misplaced since so much of what goes into and results
from the abortion decision is non-medical in nature," observed Thomas
Jipping in an article entitled Informed Consent to Abortion: A Refinement. 866 He continued, "[T]he Court's hostility to state measures
designed to ensure informed consent to abortion is inappropriate" for
several reasons, including the fact that "it looks at the physician's discretion rather than the woman's decision." 867
Justice Stevens declared in Danforth, that "even doctors are not
omniscient; specialists in performing abortions may incorrectly conclude
that the immediate advantages of the procedure outweigh the disadvantages . . . . " He added, "In each individual case factors much more
profound than a mere medical judgment may weigh heavily in the
scales." 868
The reasons why the patient autonomy model is especially appropriate in the abortion context may be briefly summarized. The nature
of abortion supports the reasonable patient model of informed consent
for at least two reasons. The factors that prompt women to consider the
865.
866.
867.
868.

Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 783-84 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Jipping, supra note 778, at 378.

/d.
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 104 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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abortion option are almost exclusively non-medical in nature 869 and,
therefore, the physician's particular skill and exclusive knowledge are
not implicated. Second, the abortion right itself, though not based on an
absolute right of control over one's own body, nonetheless is a right of
personal choice. Autonomy of decisionmaking is the most important
facet of that right. This is the very basis of the reasonable patient
model. 870
The Supreme Court's rejection of the states' police power to regulate the practice of medicine, and the rejection of the patient autonomy
model of informed consent, in an area where it is particularly appropriate, is truly out of step with the rest of the law. Even within abortion
law, a glaring disparity may be seen between the concept of health employed to allow abortions and the same concept when considered in the
context of giving informed consent. Such inconsistent treatment may
also be seen in the Court's treatment of recordkeeping.

4.

Records

The Thornburgh case provided another example of the Supreme
Court's invasion of the states' traditional police power to regulate the
medical profession. As with the informed consent usurpation, the one
involving recordkeeping was without warrant.
The Pennsylvania Act, at issue in Thornburgh, required physicians to provide reports with a variety of data for statistical purposes. 871
Required information included: physician's name, location of facility,
woman's age, race and marital status, type of abortion procedure, and
any complications. 872 Also included was a report of the basis for the
physician's determination that the fetus was not viable "or that the
abortion was necessary to preserve maternal health." 873 The court of
appeals invalidated these requirements, because they were too extensive
and complicated, and, hence, were likely to increase the cost of an abortion and possibly have a chilling effect on physicians' willingness to
perform abortions. 874 The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court,
but on a different rationale. It found that "[i]dentification [was] the
86'.1. Torres & Forrest, Why Do Women Have Abortions?, 20 FAM. PLAN. Pt:RSPECT. 169
(1988)
870. See Jipping, supra note 778, at 377-78.
871. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.§ 3214 (Purdon 1983).
872. /d.
873. /d. § 3211.
87 4. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283,
301-02 (3d Cir. 1984) rev'd 476 U.S. 747 (1986). But see Brief for the United States, supra note
35, at 9-10.
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obvious purpose of these extreme reporting requirements." 876
There was nothing in the record to support such a finding. 876 In
fact, the statute required the avoidance of identification by requiring
that, although the reports were to be made available to researchers for
public inspection, they were to be "made available ... in a form which
[would] not lead to the disclosure of the identity of any person filing a
report." 877 The district court had specifically "found that 'the requirements of confidentiality ... regarding the identity of both patient and
physician prevent[ed] any invasion of privacy which could present a
legally significant burden on the abortion decision.' " 878
Rather than finding flaws in the district court's conclusion, the
Court merely substituted its own finding. 879 This was a clear violation
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). Unless the trial court's finding of fact is clearly erroneous, the reviewing court ought to defer to the
trial court's finding. 880 Even the Supreme Court ought to be bound by
these rules. 881 To do otherwise is to introduce more inconsistency and
unpredictability into the law.
The Court not only erred procedurally, by going to the merits and
refusing to defer, but it erred substantively as well. As Justice White
stated, it is "implausible that a particular patient could be identified ..
882
. ."
The true purpose of the reporting was to ensure that physicians
were not doing post-viability abortions except where medically indicated (as specifically allowed in Roe), 883 and to further its interests in
maternal and fetal health by accurate record keeping. 884 Under the
Court's prior opinions, record keeping provisions were plainly constitutional. This was evident in Danforth 886 and Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City v. Ashcroft. 886 The required information, at issue in Thornburgh, was of the type that doctors performing abortions
would have readily available. 887 The material all fit on a single page

875. Thornburgh. 476 U.S. at 767.
876. /d. at 805 (White, J , dissenting).
877. 18 PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. § 3214(e)(2) (Purdon 1983).
878. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 805 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Thornburgh, 552 F. Supp.
at 804).
879. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 805 (White, J., dissenting).
880. FED. R. Ctv. P. 52(a).
881. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 805-06 (White, J., dissenting).
882. !d. at 806 (White, J., dissenting).
883. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165.
884. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 807-10 (White, J., dissenting); Brief for Bowes, M.D., and
Schmidt, M.D., Amici Curiae, at 4, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
885. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80-81 (197!>).
886. 462 U.S. 476, 486-90 (1983) (plurality opinion) (pathology reports).
887. Brief for Bowes and Schmidt, supra note 884, at 14.
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form, 888 and was a virtual adaptation of material used for reporting by
the Centers for Disease Control. 889
That the state may not further its compelling interests in fetal and
maternal health by the use of standard demographic and medical categories in reports, where confidentiality is mandated 890 and cost would
be minimal, 891 indicates again the extremes to which the Court is willing to go in "protecting" the abortion right.
In sum, as in every other area, the Court's treatment of the regulation of the medical profession by the states is anomalous. This special
treatment confirms again the super-protected status of abortion.

D.

Procedural and Adjudicatory Issues

The anomalies of abortion jurisprudence are also evident in the
area of procedural and adjudicatory issues. The Supreme Court seems
more eager to intervene in abortion cases than in other contexts. 892
Therefore, standard procedural rules and canons of adjudication are
often treated differently in abortion cases. Epstein discussed this in his
critique of Roe, focusing on the Roe Court's unorthodox handling of
standing and mootness issues. 893 More recently, Justice O'Connor, in
her Akron dissent, noted that the Court violated traditional principles
of adjudication by reaching out to invalidate provisions of the Akron
ordinance before they were construed by a state court. 894 In Thornburgh, Justice O'Connor devoted nearly her entire dissent to the majority's willingness to go to the merits before a trial was ever held or the
facts developed. 89 ~
888. Brief for Appellants at 55a (addendum shows sample form).
889. Brief for Bowes and Schmidt, supra note 884, at 11.
890. 18 PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. § 3214(e)(2) (Purdon 1983).
891. Brief for Bowes and Schmidt, supra note 884, at 11. In Ashcroft, regulations producing
an estimated increase in cost of $19.40 per abortion were constitutionally permissible. Ashcroft,
462 U.S. 476, 490 (1983)
892. The Court seems especially eager to intervene in order to strike down restrictions on
abortion. However, it ran apply the procedural rules quite strictly and mechanically when not
involved in eliminating restrictions. See, e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986). In Diamond, the Court held that an intervenor (physician) had no standing to appeal a case overturning
abortion laws, where the state had not continued the appeal. While the derision seems reasonable,
it stands in stark contrast to the Oexible application of the rules when the Court needs to reach
beyond the usual limits to consider a rase to overturn abortion laws. This Oexible approach is
traceable throughout abortion jurisprudence and leaves one with the impression of result-orientation. See infra section III-D-3-(a).
893. Epstein, supra note 30, at 160-67.
894. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 468-70 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
895. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 814
(1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Such looseness by the Supreme Court sets bad precedent for lower
courts. As amicus curiae in Thornburgh, the United States noted that
the lower courts have violated principles of sound adjudication in much
the same manner as the Supreme Court. 896 For example, the courts
commonly strain for unconstitutional interpretations of disputed statutes rather than seeking constitutional ones as required by the normal
rule. 897
This creates an impression that abortion jurisprudence is both result-oriented and policy-oriented. Moreover, it undermines procedural
rules that serve a useful and important function.

1.

Standing in Roe

The pattern for the approach of the abortion cases to procedural
matters and principles of adjudication was set by Roe. 898 The Roe opinion discussed at length the standing of the parties and the question of
mootness. 899 In the process, it deviated significantly from the norm.
The Court began by setting forth the standards and applying them
to Jane Roe. As to standing, the Court asked whether Roe had "established that 'personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' that insure[d] that 'the dispute sought to be adjudicated [would] be presented
in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of
judicial resolution.' " 900
Ir. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion, the Court decided that
there was "little dispute" that Roe's case, at the time of filing,
"presented a case or controversy" and that as a "pregnant single woman thwarted by the Texas criminal abortion laws [she] had standing
to challenge those statutes." 901 Justice Blackmun further noted that
"[t]he 'logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to
be adjudicated' and the necessary degree of contentiousness [were] both
present. " 902
896. Brief for the United States, supra note 35, at 3.
897. ld. at 13-14.
898. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
899. ld. at 123-29.
900. Roe, 410 U.S. at 123 (citation omitted) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
732 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 C.S. 83, 101 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 l! S 186, 204 (1962)).
901. Roe, 410 U.S. at 124.
902. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968); Golden v.
Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969)). A widely recounted story that Jane Roe was pregnant as a result
of a gang rape has been recanted by Norma McCorvey, the woman using the Roe pseudonym,
who now declares she was pregnant "through what [she} thought was love." USA Today, Sept. 9,
1987, at 4A. Similarly, a U.S. District Judge in Georgia recently ordered the records unsealed in
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), revealing that a woman named Sandra Rae Bensing Cano
was the Jane Doe in that case. Ms. Cano declares that she was used by Atlanta attorney Margie
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The real question, according to the Court, was whether Roe's case
was moot. 903 The normal rule for federal cases requires that "an actual
controversy must exist at all stages of appellate or certiorari review,
and not simply at the date the action is initiated," wrote Justice
Blackmun. 904
The Court easily bypassed the usual rule, however, by placing
Roe's case within the exception for matters " 'capable of repetition, yet
evading review.' " 906 The Roe majority then concluded that Jane Roe
had standing, a justiciable controversy, and no problem with
mootness. 906
Pitts Hames, who argued the case before the United States Supreme Court, for Ms. Hames' own
purposes. Cano declared that she never wanted to abort her pregnancy at the time. In fact, she
gave birth to a daughter and placed her for adoption. Ms. Cano's goal in getting the records
unsealed was to aid her credibility as the true Jane Doe in order to further her efforts to halt
legalized abortion. Identity of Woman in Abortion Ruling Revealed, San Francisco Banner, Jan.
6, 1989, at 4, col. 1-3.
903. Roe, 410 U.S. at 124-25.
904. Jd. at 125.
905. Jd. (quoting Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).
906. /d. Epstein has challenged the Court's finding that Roe's case was not moot. "[T]o all
appearances her case [was] one of classic mootness," he observed. Epstein, supra note 30, at 162.
He argued that if, despite the ambiguity of the pleadings, Roe once had standing, it had been
mooted by the termination of her pregnancy. She was no longer pregnant by the time the Court
heard her appeal. According to the Court, "The usual rule in federal cases is that an actual
controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date the
action is initiated" Roe, 410 U.S. at 125 (citations omitted).
An exception to the mootness doctrine has been carved out by the Court. In Southern Pacific
Terminal Co., 219 U.S. at 515, the Court established an exception for events "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Roe applied this, without further analysis, to pregnancy. Roe, 410 U.S.
at 125. Epstein argued that the earlier cases, on which the Court relied, had construed this exception to require a necessity element. Epstein, supra note 30, at 163. He claimed that only if "there
was a danger that the Court could not deal with issues raised
if the present plaintiff were
unable to proceed" would the Court utilize the exception. /d. at 163 & n.15.
There was no such danger in Roe as the issues could have been raised by a physician defending against criminal abortion charges, such as Dr. Hallford. Jd. at 164. By the Court's prior
decision, the physician might also raise jus tertii:
These doctors would not have interests in all respects identical with those of pregnant
women, but since they too would seek to upset the statute on its face, it is hard to see
what arguments would not be available to them that would be available to the women,
particularly since the doctors could assert the rights of their patients in support of their
own case.
ld. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965)).
Another available alternative was the Does. Roe, 410 U.S. at 127. The Court said they were
unnecessary in view of the decision on Roe's standing and the identity of their interests. ld. However, the Court proceeded to analyze their standing anyway. The Court painted the Does' claim as
speculative and resting on possible future events. ld. at 128.
It has been argued by Epstein that, under United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S 669 ( 1973), the
Does might have been granted standing. Epstein pointed out a new test of standing that the Court
had just developed in 1970. Epstein, supra note 30, at 166. This new test, developed in a decision
about the Administrative Procedure Act, had two aspects: (1) The plaintiff must show an "injury
in fact, economic or otherwise," and (2) "[T]he interest sought to be protected by the complaint
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The Roe Court next turned to the standing of Dr. Hallford, a
plaintiff-intervenor. The Court decided that, since he had already been
indicted under the Texas abortion law, he must make his constitutional
arguments in the state court. 907 The doctor sought to avoid the application of the abstention doctrine by distinguishing his present status from
his status as a "potential future defendant" and assert only the latter. 908
The Court rejected the distinction and dismissed the doctor's appeal. 909
The Court finally considered the Does, a childless married
couple. 910 They asserted that their physician had warned the wife to
avoid pregnancy for health reasons. 911 They argued that the Texas law
inhibited normal marital relations for them because, were she to become pregnant, there would be no abortion readily available. 912 The
Court rejected standing for the Does, because Mrs. Doe was not pregnant (and was childless), and any future possibility of harm or present
marital unhappiness was either too speculative or too indirect. 913
By the prior standards of the Court, Jane Roe ought not to have
been granted standing. As Justice Rehnq uist noted, there was nothing
in the record to indicate that Roe was in her first trimester at any time
"during the pendency of her lawsuit." 914 She conceivably could have
[was] arguably withi:1 the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Data Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970).
As to the first question, regarding damages and the remoteness problem, Epstein cited the
case of SCRAP. Epstein, supra note 30, at 166; SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 669. As SCRAP was decided
in the same year as Roe, it should provide an accurate contemporary indication of the Court's
thinking as to remoteness. In SCRAP, the Court decided a group of students had standing, because
an ICC rate increase for railroads hauling goods, which could include recyclable materials, might
lead to increased preference for nonrecyclable containers, which could lead to an increase of litter,
which could lead to clutter in the Washington parks, which would offend the sensibilities of these
students. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 669-70. In that case, the Court also noted that a "trifle" would be
adequate for an "interest." !d. at 689 n.14. The Does arguably had a trifle of an interest. As to
the second part of the test, the Does fell within "the class of persons whose interests [were] arguably regulated by the statute." Epstein, supra note 30, at 167. But, as· now Justice Antonin Scalia
argued in 1983, SCRAP itself was wrongly decided. Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SuFFOLK U.L. Rt:v. 881, 890-898 ( 1983).
It is generally accepted, however, that an exception to the mootness doctrine, for events "capable of repetition yet evading review," is necessary. Pregnancy is certainly such an event. The
present problem is that the Court no longer examines the issue. It should at least explain the
application of the doctrine to cases involving statutes which do not actually ban abortion, such as
fetal disposal and parental notification (for minors) statutes. The doctrine may have no applicability in such contexts.
907. Roe, 410 U.S. at 125-26.
908. /d. at 126.
909. /d. at 127.
910. /d.
911. /d.
912. /d. at 128.
913. /d.
914. /d. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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been in her last trimester when the complaint was filed. 9111 Under Roe,
the state could proscribe abortion after viability, except for a pregnancy
threatening the health or life of the mother, which was not alleged.
Thus, Jane Roe may never have come within the constitutionally protected realm where she had a fundamental right to choose an abortion.
The Court used this "hypothetical lawsuit" 916 as "a fulcrum" 917 to
strip any significant abortion restrictions from the first trimester. 918 By
so doing, the Court played fast and loose with the standing rules. It
also violated another important principle. As Justice Rehnquist noted,
"the Court depart[ ed] from the longstanding admonition that it should
never 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required
by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.' " 919
Richard Epstein has argued that "the 'concreteness' which compliance with the standing requirement is said to bring to a lawsuit" was
contrary to the Court's sweeping intent for its pronouncement. 920 He
noted the Court's view of "constitutional litigation as a means of settling the great conflicts of the social order." 921 With this "level of aspiration," he reasoned, "the 'concreteness' of a factual situation may well
prove to be an embarrassment that can only work to limit the comprehensive sweep of the Court's pronouncements, for the details of a case
could well reveal narrow grounds for a decision on the merits." 922 He
concluded that the only way to tell that the standing requirement was
met, was "because it [was] there." 923 That is hardly the sort of reasoning one is entitled to expect from the Supreme Court of the United
States.
The impression left by the treatment of standing in Roe was that
ends were more important than means. Careful craftsmanship was
lacking in this area, as it was elsewhere in the opinion.
Unfortunately, this established a precedent of procedural laxity
often followed by the lower courts and by the Supreme Court itself.
The Fifth Circuit observed that "the Supreme Court has visibly relaxed its traditional standing principles in deciding abortion cases," and
proceeded to employ the lowered standards itself.9 24 Likewise, the Sixth
915.
916.
917.
918.
919.
920.
921.
922.
923.
924.

/d. (Rehnquist,

J.,

dissenting).
J., dissenting).
/d. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
/d. at 171-72 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
/d. at 172 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Epstein, supra note 30, at 161.

!d. at 172 (Rehnquist,

/d.

/d.
/d. at 162.
Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1986).
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Circuit cited the Supreme Court's laxity in procedural matters as authority for its own laxness in applying standing principles to abortion
cases. 92 ~ This use of precedent to justify procedural laxity and the violation of other procedural precedents IS umque to abortion
jurisprudence.

2.

A subsequent pattern

The Roe approach to procedural matters was followed in many
subsequent Supreme Court and lower court cases. A brief overview of
some recent irregularities will indicate the pattern. 926
In Thornburgh, the pervasive eagerness to strike down abortion
regulations was clearly visible. Justice O'Connor criticized the Court's
willingness to go to the merits on an appeal from a preliminary injunction.927 She concluded: "If this case did not involve state regulation of
abortion, it may be doubted that the Court would entertain, let alone
adopt, such a departure from its precedents." 928 Of course, this irregularity originated with the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, indicating that the trend extends to the lower courts. 929
In addition, Thornburgh violated the usual rule of construing statutes in a constitutional manner where possible. It seemed rather to
place the worst possible construction on the statute. For example, the
Pennsylvania statute required the attendance of a second physician at
abortions after viability. 930 It contained no explicit exception for medical emergencies. A like provision in Ashcroft had no such explicit section either. 931 In Ashcroft, the Court inferred such an exception and
upheld the statute. 932 The Third Circuit refused to do so in Thornburgh, despite an initial provision in the same section providing a
"complete defense to any charge" under "this section," if "the abortion
was necessary to preserve maternal life or health. " 933 The Supreme
Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. 934
92S. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Cincinnati, 822 F.2d 1190, 1396 & n.4 (6th Cir. 1987).
926. Of course, individual courts and cases may be exemplary in handling these matters.
What is argued here is a pattern of greater laxity' regarding abortion cases in the interest of
striking down regulatory statutes.
'!27. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, SIS
( 1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
'!28. !d. at 826.
929. American College of Obstetricians and Gynemlogists v. Thornburgh, 717 F.2d 283, 290
(3d Cir. 1984), affd, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
930. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.§ 3210(c) (Purdon 1983)
931. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 l,).S. 476, 485 & n.8 H983).
932. !d.
933. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3210(a) (Purdon 1983) (emphasis added)
934. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretirs & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 771
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The 1983 case of Akron contained a variety of irregularities. The
Court noted the abstention doctrine but refused to follow it. 935 Rather,
it chose to assume that the Ohio state judiciary would impose an unconstitutional construction on the parental notification ordinance for
minors. As the dissent noted, this was inappropriate because it violated
the independence of state courts. 936 In violating the abstention doctrine,
the Court abandoned its more principled approach in Bellotti v. Baird
(Bellotti (1)). 937 In Bellotti (/), the Court held that the district court
should have abstained from deciding the constitutionality of a parental
notification statute until the state supreme court had construed it. 938
The Akron Court also declined to follow the rule requiring constitutional construction of statutes where fairly possible. The Akron ordinance required physicians to "insure that the remains of the unborn
child are disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner." 939 The Court
of Appeals found the word "humane" impermissibly vague and declined to sever it. 940 The Supreme Court affirmed. 941 The city of Akron
argued that its intent was merely to prevent dumping of fetuses on garbage piles. Such a construction clearly was possible from the terms of
the statute and from Planned Parenthood Association v. Fitzpatrick, 942 where a humane disposal provision was upheld. 943
The development of other examples below will further demonstrate the pattern. For example, the employment of such doctrines as
vagueness to strike down abortion regulations is quite remarkable in its
pervasiveness.

3.

General rules and special abortion rules

As John Hart Ely proclaimed in 1973, the Supreme Court has
granted the abortion right a "super-protected" status. 944 The following
discussion demonstrates that "super-protected" status as it is evidenced
in three areas: (1) standing, (2) constitutional adjudication, and (3) the
judicial rush to judgment. In each section, the general rules will be
compared with their usage in abortion jurisprudence.
(1986). Further examples of this pattern in Thornburgh will be found below.
935. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 440-41 (1983).
936. /d. at 470 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
937. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
938. /d. at 151.
939. Akron, 462 U.S. at 451.
940. /d.
941. /d.
942. 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975), summarily affd sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick,
428 US. 901 (1976).
943. /d. at 573. Further discussion of this matter may be found in text below.
944. Ely, supra note 24, at 935.
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a. Standing. As set forth in detail above, the Roe Court found
standing for Jane Roe. She had not alleged that, at any time during the
pendency of her lawsuit, she was within a period of her pregnancy
which the state could not regulate by proscribing abortion (except for
health reasons, which were not alleged). Nevertheless, the Court
granted her standing. This violated the general rule that one must at
some time during the legal proceeding come within the constitutionally
protected realm in order to have standing. 9411
The standing of physicians to challenge laws restricting abortion
has been automatic since Doe v. Bolton. 946 In Bolton, the district court
had denied the physicians standing, relying primarily on Poe v. Ullman. 947 In Poe, only one prosecution had taken place since the passage
of the challenged contraceptive regulation statute in 1897. 948 Enforcement of the more recent Georgia abortion statute at issue in Bolton had
been more active. 949 Therefore, the Bolton Court held that the case was
more like Epperson v. Arkansas, 9110 where a school teacher was allowed to challenge an anti-evolution statute, though she was not yet
criminally charged. 9111
More troubling was the Supreme Court's decision to allow physicians to assert the rights of their patients in abortion suits. The
problems with this include a potential conflict of interest between the
physician and his patient, and a violation of the usual rules for asserting jus tertii (the right of a third party). Singleton v. Wulff 112 decision
demonstrated the problem clearly.
In Singleton, the Court allowed physicians to raise the rights of
their patients in an action challenging Missouri's refusal to fund abortions not "medically indicated" under its Medicaid program. 9113 A weak
plurality was mustered with four justices favoring jus tertii standing
945. The Court in Roe allowed or disallowed standing for women based upon whether they
were pregnant. Thus, Jane Roe had standing because of her pregnancy. Roe, 410 U.S. at 124.
However, since the Does were not expectant parents, their claim was rejected as too speculative or
too indirect. !d. at 127-28. This minimal requirement of pregnancy has been followed by the
lower courts when considering the standing of women to challenge abortion regulations. See, e.g.,
Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Rosen, 633 F. Supp. 1123, 1128 (N.D. Ohio 1986)
(denying standing to a minor female who did not allege her pregnancy in challenging a parental
notification statute). For a good exposition of the standing rules, see Haskell v. Washington
Township, (,35 F. Supp. 550, 551-55 (S.D. Ohio 1986).
946. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
947. !d. at 188; Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
948. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 188.
949. /d. at 188-89.
950. 393 U.S. 97 (1968)
951 Bolton, 410 U.S. at 189.
952. 428 U.S 106 (1976).
953. /d. at 108.

181]

RIGHT TO ABORTION

307

and one concurring only because the physicians already had standing of
their own (while questioning the logic of the other four). 9114
Justice Blackmon, writing the plurality opinion, noted the rule
that "[f]ederal courts must hesitate before resolving a controversy ...
on the basis of the rights of third persons .... " 91111 His first reason was
that unnecessary adjudication of such rights should be avoided and the
holders of the rights might not wish to assert them or might be able to
enjoy them regardless of the litigation outcome. 9116 His second reason
was that the best defenders of jus tertii were usually the third parties
themselves. 9117 Third parties might have a preference for defending their
own rights, as they would be bound by stare decisis. 9118
Justice Blackmon noted that from these two considerations came
the general rule: "Ordinarily one may not claim standing in this Court
to vindicate the constitutional rights of some third party." 9119 However,
noted Justice Blackmon, a general rule should not be applied when its
underlying rationale is missing. 960 There are two elements the Court
examines to determine if an exception should be made. First, the Court
examines the relationship of the litigant and the third party to see if the
latter's "right is inextricably bound up with the activity the litigant
wishes to pursue." 961 Second, the Court determines whether "some
genuine obstacle" exists to prevent the third party from asserting its
own right. 962
The first test, regarding the relationship of the parties, eliminates
the possibility that jus tertii will not be affected by the result of the
lawsuit. 963 It may also show that the litigant will be fully (or nearly) as
effective a proponent of the third party's right as the third party would
be. 964 As authority, the Court cited Griswold v. Connecticut, 9611 where
physicians were allowed to assert the privacy rights of married persons
to receive advice on contraceptives. Griswold emphasizes the "confidential" relationship and the likelihood that the married couple's rights
954. /d. at 121-22 (Stevens, J., concurring).
955. !d. at 113.
956. /d. at 113-14 (citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)).
957. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114.
958. /d.
959. /d. (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953), quoting Barrows v. Jackson, 366 US. 420, 429 (1961); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 n.20 (1968)).
960. /d. at 114.
961. /d.
962. /d. at 116.
963. /d. at 115.
964. /d.
965. 381 us. 479 (1965).
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would "be diluted or adversely affected" if not asserted in the suit. 966
The Singleton Court also cited Eisenstadt v. Baird, 967 which focused
on the "advocate" relationship and the effect on the third party, 968 and
Barrows v. Jackson, 969 which allowed a property owner to raise jus
tertii in challenging a racially restrictive covenant. Justice Blackmun
also observed that Doe v. Bolton, 970 which allowed physicians to assert
the rights of their patients, would be controlling were Bolton not based
on a criminal statute. 971 Applying this principle, Justice Blackmun argued that a physician was essential to a safe abortion and a poor woman could not obtain a physician unless the state paid for one. 972
Moreover, the abortion decision was to intimately involve the physician,
under Roe. 973 Therefore, Justice Blackmun concluded, the physician
was uniquely qualified to litigate the right of the patient to make the
abortion decision. 974
The second test is whether a genuine obstacle exists to the third
party's own assertion of the right. 975 Such an obstacle suggests that the
third party's absence from court is not an indication that his right is not
truly at stake. 976 Justice Blackmun cited NAACP v. Alabama 977 as an
example. 978 There the Court held that to require NAACP members to
litigate their own rights would violate the right to anonymity for association members which was at issue in the case. 979 Justice Blackmun also
cited Eisenstadt960 and Barrows961 as supporting this point. 982
Applying this principle in Singleton, Justice Blackmun found two
obstacles. First, a woman might be chilled from asserting her right by a
desire to protect her privacy. 983 Second, a woman's claim suffered from
"imminent mootness, at least in the technical sense. " 984 Justice Blackmun acknowledged that these "obstacles" were not insurmountable, as
966.
967.
968.
969.
970.
971.
972.

973.
974.
975.
976.
977.
978.
979.
980.
981.
982.
983.
984.

/d. at 481; Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 115 (1976).
405 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1972).
/d.; Singleton, 428 U.S. at 115.
346 U.S. 249, 259 (1953), Singleton, 428 U.S. at 116.
410 U.S. 179, 188-89 (1973).
Singleton, 428 U.S. at 115.
/d. at 117.
/d.; Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-56.
Singleton, 428 U.S. at 117.
/d. at 115-16.
/d. at 116.
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
Singleton, 428 U.S. at 116.
/d.; NAACP, 357 U.S. at 459.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 438, 446 (1972).
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259 (1953).
Singleton, 428 U.S. at 116.
/d. at 117.
/d.
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evidenced by the frequent use of pseudonyms, the Roe doctrine regarding events "capable of repetition yet evading review ," 985 and the employment of class actions. 986 Nevertheless, he decided that the physician
could assert the rights of his patients. 987
Justice Stevens was unconvinced by this logic but concurred, constituting a plurality to allow jus tertii assertion. 988 He did so because
the doctors already had standing on their own. 989
Four members of the Singleton Court forcefully rejected Justice
Blackmun's argument. Justice Powell, author of the leading case on the
matter, Warth v. Seldin, 990 wrote for the dissent. He argued that beyond the Article III question of power (present here) lay the prudential
question of whose rights might be asserted. 991 The plurality, he noted,
acknowledged the general jus tertii rule but purported to find an exception.992 Justice Powell analyzed the plurality's precedents and rejected
its result. 993
In Barrows, 994 NAACP, 995 and Eisenstadt, 996 he observed, there
was more than a "genuine obstacle," as the plurality had argued. 997
Rather, the facts of the cases indicated that assertion of jus tertii was
appropriate when third party litigation was "in all practicable terms
impossible." 998
Moreover, Justice Powell argued, using the plurality's own "genuine obstacle" test did not result in proper assertion of the rights of a
third party. 999 He pointed out the plurality's own confession that the
obstacles were not insurmountable and, thus, were not significant
enough to allow an exception to the general rule. 1000
The Singleton plurality's primary reliance on the "confidential relationship" was also attacked by Justice Powell. He interpreted the
985. Roe, 410 U.S. at 124-25 (quoting Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498,
575 (1911)).
986. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 117.
987. /d. at 118.
988. !d. at 121-22.
989. /d.
990. 422 U.S 490 (1975).
991. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 124 & n.3.
992. /d. at 125.
993. /d.
994. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
995. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
996. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
997. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 125-26.
998. /d. at 126. See Comment, Singleton v. Wulff r,'xtension of the Right of Privacy
Through Standing, 55 DENVER L.J. 331, 339-42 ( 1978).
999. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 126.
1000 Id. at 126-27.
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precedents cited by the plurality as only authorizing assertion of jus
tertii where the state "directly interdicted the normal functioning of the
physician-patient relationship by criminalizing certain procedures." 1001
Here, he argued, there was no direct interference, as neither patient
nor doctor was forbidden to engage in abortions. 1002 Furthermore, the
primary emphasis on the relationship in Singleton was in "marked
contrast" to the subordinate position given the relationship in Eisenstadt. 1003 Justice Powell suggested this shift resulted "from the weakness of the argument that this litigation [was J necessary to protect
third-party interests." 1004
Rather than being logically related to Barrows, 10011 Eisenstadt, 1008
and NAACP, 1007 Justice Powell argued, the Singleton case was much
closer to Warth v. Seldin. 1008 In Warth, taxpayers were not allowed to
assert the rights of low-income persons partially because no obstacle
prevented these persons from asserting their own rights. 1009
The arguments of Justice Powell are the more persuasive. Under
the plurality's "obstacle" test, one can find no "genuine obstacle." In
fact, the Missouri medicaid statute provided a right to an administrative hearing for persons denied payment of claims. 1010 An adverse decision could be appealed. 1011 Thus, a ready mechanism existed for assertion of welfare recipients' claims.
Further, Justice Powell's approach of allowing the physician to
assert his own rights, but not those of third parties, squares with Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. /rvis. 1012 In Irvis, a guest of a lodge member was
denied service. The guest was allowed to assert an equal protection
claim regarding the lodge's treatment of guests. However, he was denied standing to attack the lodge's membership policies, because he had
never applied for membership and could not assert jus tertii. 1013
The Bolton decision, cited by the Singleton plurality as supporting
a physician's right to assert jus tertii, did not use the causation test

1001. /d. at 128.
1002. /d. at 128-29.
1003. /d. at 127-28 n.S.
1004. /d.
1005. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
1006. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
1007. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
1008. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
1009. /d. at 509-10; Singleton, 428 U.S. at 127 (citing for comparison McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430 (1961)).
1010. Mo. REV. STAT.§ 208.156 (Supp. 1975).
1011 /d. § 205.10(a)(S) (1973).
1012. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
1013. /d. State action was found in the issuance of a liquor license.
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established in the 1975 case of Warth v. Seldin. 1014 Had it been applied, as one commentator noted, the physicians would have had to establish "that a substantial probability existed that they would be prosecuted under the statute and that such harm would be alleviated if the
doctors were successful in the suit." 10111 The causation test was ignored
in the 1976 abortion cases of Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth 1016 and Singleton v. Wuljf. 1017 The same commentator observed, "if the plaintiff's claims were subjected to the causation test, the
plaintiffs should have been denied standing [in Bolton, Danforth, and
Singleton]. " 1018
Another writer stated:
To obtain standing under this test the doctor would have to show that
he had a pregnant patient who had asked for an abortion, that he had
decided to perform the abortion, the patient was withholding consent
or the doctor has tried to get the consent of a parent or spouse but has
been unable to do so, and the only reason the patient has decided to
forego the abortion is because of the statute. Additionally, the doctor
must forego the abortion or risk the penalty. To meet the causation
test the doctor will be required to show-as were the builders in
Warth-that there is a 'specific project' involved which is 'currently
precluded' by the statute. 1019

Conversely, had the jus tertii rules used in the abortion context been
applied, the builders in Warth would have been granted standing. 1020
The arguments of dissenting Justice Powell in Singleton, with regard to the confidential nature of the physician-patient relationship, are
also persuasive. Not only did the plurality incorrectly make the relationship the primary emphasis, but the precedents had not merged the
physician and patient for constitutional purposes. 1021 The precedents
clearly were distinguishable as they applied only in the criminal context and related to direct interference. 1022 The plurality argued that a
less direct interference had been allowed as the basis for jus tertii
1014. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). Bolton set further bad precedent by allowing a plaintiff claiming
no life or health threat to assert the rights of women with such threats. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179, 222-23 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
I 015. Comment, The Burger Court's Approach to jus Tertii Standing, 13 GoNz. L. REv.
961, 984 (1978).
1016. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
1017. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
1018. Comment, supra note 1015, at 985.
1019. 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.00-3 (Supp. 1977) (quoting from
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 516 (1975)).
1020. Comment, supra note 1015, at 985; 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 1019, at § 22.00-4.
1021. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 128 (Powell,]., dissenting).
1022. ld. at 128-29.
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standing in Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 1023 As Justice Powell noted,
however, the issue of third-party standing was not addressed (or even
mentioned) in that case. 1024 Moreover, the interference with private
schooling "was as complete as if it had been proscribed," 10211 as the
statute at issue required the children to be in public school during
school hours. 1026 The Pierce Court itself noted that "[ t ]he inevitable
practical result" was the destruction of private schools. 1027
Finally, the concept of "confidential relationship" is "analytically
empty," as Justice Powell asserted in Singleton. 1028 This would make
the decision "difficult to cabin," as there was little to distinguish the
doctor from providers of other services. 1029 Justice Powell noted that
this was especially so, "when one recognizes that, realistically, the 'confidential' relationship in a case of this kind often is set in an assemblyline type abortion clinic. " 1030 He saw little basis for jus tertii standing
"based on nothing more substantial than a professional (or perhaps
only an abortion-clinic) relationship and dimly perceived 'obstacles' to
the rightholder's own litigation. " 1031
Thus, as Justice Powell observed, the Court violated a rule of selfgovernance by reaching unnecessarily to decide a difficult constitutional
issue when "nothing more [was] at stake than remuneration for professional services." 1032 In the process, the Singleton Court extended the
right of privacy through an expanded view of standing. 1033
The assembly-line abortion clinic raises another issue. Normally,
one may only assert the rights of another where the interests of both
coincide. Doctors have often been allowed to assert the rights of their
patients because it was assumed the patients' interest in getting well
coincided with the doctors' interest in promoting wellness. However,
with the commercialization of abortion, questions have been raised as to
whether a physician's interest in financial gain coincides with his patient's best interests. While the issue has been given short shrift by
1023. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
1024. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 129 n.6.
1025. !d.
I 026. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530.
1027. !d. at 534.
1028. Singleton, 428 U.S at 130 n.7.
1029. !d. Any provider of services would now be able to claim standing for his customer's
rights, noted Justice Powell, "in an attack on a welfare statute that excludes from coverage his
particular transaction." !d. at 129-30.
1030. !d. at 130 n.7.
1031. !d.
I 032. !d. at 129.
1033. Comment, supra note 998.
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some courts, 1034 it is worth serious consideration.
In November, 1978, the Chicago Sun-Times began publication of
a Pulitzer prize-winning series entitled "The Abortion Profiteers." 1035
It was a culmination of five months of investigation by the newspaper
and the Better Government Association. 1036 Members of the investigation team had infiltrated six prominent abortion clinics. 1037 They had
also investigated referral agencies and a laboratory that did work for
the clinics. 1038 These six clinics accounted for more than half of the
abortions in Illinois. 1039
The reporters summarized their findings as follows:
• Dozens of abortion procedures performed on women who were not
pregnant and others illegally performed on women more than 12
weeks pregnant.
• An alarming number of women who, because of unsterile conditions
and haphazard clinic care, suffered debilitating cramps, massive infections and such severe internal damage that all their reproductive organs had to be removed.
• Incompetent and unqualified doctors, including moonlighting residents, medical apprentices and at least one physician who has lost his
license in one state and faces revocation here.
• Doctors who callously perform abortions in an excruciating 2 minutes, when they should properly take 10 to 15 minutes, and doctors
who don't even wait for pain-killing anesthetics to take effect.
• Referral services that, for a fee, send women to a disreputable Detroit abortionist, whose dog, to one couple's horror, accompanied the
nurse into the operating room and lapped blood from the floor.
• Clinics that either fail to order critical postoperative pathology reports, ignore the results or mix up the specimens.
• Dangerously shoddy record keeping by aides who falsify records of
patients' vital signs and who scramble or lose results of crucial lab
tests.
• Counselors who are paid not to counsel but to sell abortions with
sophisticated pitches and deceptive promises. 1040

The reason for many of the problems was traced to greed. Since
1034. See Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 n.l (N.D. Ill. 1978), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Carey v. Wynn, 439 U.S. 8 (1978).
1035. The articles, by Zekman, Warrick, Koshner, McCahill, Warren, Sweet, Williams,
Wheeler, and Hillman, extended from November 12 to December 6, 1978. Citations herein will
be to a special reprint edition numbering forty-six pages. Hereinafter, it will be cited as The
Abortion Profiteers.
I 036. The Abortion Profiteers, supra note I 035, at I.
1037. /d. at 2.
1038. /d.
1039. !d.
I 040. /d. at 1-2.
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they are paid by the number of abortions that they perform, doctors
raced each other to see who could complete the most abortions. 1041
While safer clinics limited doctors to fifteen abortions per day/ 042 at
the dangerous ones, individual doctors were chalking up forty per
day. 1043 This speed was achieved at the expense of patient comfort,
careful procedures, sterile environments, adequate counseling, and accurate record keeping. 1044
Referral agencies received large fees for patients brought in while
dispensing misleading information and providing pregnancy tests so
haphazard that three samples of male urine were declared to show positive signs of pregnancy. 10411 A former worker on one of these hot lines
declared, "Counseling? There was none. What we were doing there
[was] selling abortions. We got no training except in what not to say.
How not to use words like 'fetus' or 'kill' that might scare the customers away. Don't mention complications." 1046
As noted in the series, "not all women who go to abortion clinics
are sure they want abortions." 1047 Some have been "dragged" there by
relatives or pressured by husbands or boyfriends. 1048 Recognizing this
problem, the Illinois legislature required clinics to provide counseling.1049 However, the investigation revealed that many of these counselors were taught to sell, not counsel. 10110 One administrator declared to
an investigator who had infiltrated the staff, "We really have to sit on
the phones back there and make appointments. Our fiscal year ends in
September and we have to boost the figures. So go the extra mile." 10111
One counselor said she was trained not to tell the oatient the abortion would hurt, not to discuss the procedure or instruments in any
detail, not to answer too many questions, and not to talk about birth
control. 10112 The reason? All unnecessary corners had to be cut to maximize profits. 10113
The investigation, therefore, revealed a conflict of interest between
some doctors' greed and their patients' need. The deaths of twelve
1041.
1042.
1043.
1044.
1045.
1046.
1047.
1048.
1049.
1050.
1051.
1052.
1053.

!d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
!d.
!d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
!d.
!d.
/d.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

15
35.
16.
18, 24-26.
21.
22 (emphasis in original).
33.
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women 1054 and the maiming of others,l 055 unreported but discovered in
the investigation, underscore this conflict. Doctors whose goal is to
maximize personal profit by performing as many abortions as possible,
and who encourage their staff "counselors" to sell abortions, are not
appropriate parties to represent the rights of their patients. 1056
Thus, the Court has distorted and expanded the usual standing
rules to accommodate the abortion privacy right. 1057 This abortion distortion factor is also apparent in the Court's application of the rules of
constitutional adjudication to abortion cases.
b. Constitutional adjudication. This subsection deals with three
principles of constitutional adjudication. First is the principle that constitutional problems should be avoided in judicial decisions where possible. Special emphasis is placed upon the rule requiring construction of
statutes which avoids their unconstitutionality where fairly possible.
The second principle is the closely related one of construing statutes to
uphold their constitutionality where a vagueness challenge is made.
The third principle is the deference required of federal courts to lower
courts, states, and legislatures, including the doctrine of abstention.
(1 ). Avoiding constitutional issues. The principle of avoiding constitutional issues was probably best summed up by Justice Brandeis in
his famous concurrence to Ashwander v. TVA. 1058 Justice Brandeis
listed seven rules which the Court had developed to avoid "passing
upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for
decision." 1059 Four of his rules were based on article IIP 060 standing
considerations. First, "[ t]he Court [would] not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly non-adversary, proceeding .... " 1061
Second, "[t]he Court [would] not 'anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' " 1062 Third, "[t]he Court
1054. /d. at 24. The deaths were the result of the abortions, but were unreported as such. /d.
1055. /d. at 16.
1056. The picture painted, in Roe, of a woman carefully weighing all the options, in consultation with her good-hearted family doctor, was unrealistic in the light of the way a majority of
abortions were being performed in Illinois. The shift to clinics seems to be a national trend and
not limited to Illinois. Interestingly, in Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452. 462-63 (7th Cir. 1984),
the Seventh Circuit decided the Abortion Profiteers series was irrelevant as evidence of the need to
protect the state's interests in seeing that true informed consent was obtained.
1057. In 1987, a federal appellate court cited the Singleton rationale in giving a Planned
Parenthood Clinic and its medical director standing to assert their patients' rights. Planned
Parenthood Ass'n of Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 822 F.2d at 1396 & n.4. It noted that this
was a relaxation of the usual rules. /d.
1058. 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (joined by Stone, Roberts, and Cardozo. J).
1059. /d. at 346.
1060. U.S. CoNST. art. III.
1061. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346.
1062. /d. (citations omitted).
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[would] not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one
who fail[ed] to show that he [was] injured by its operation." 1063 Fourth,
"[ t ]he Court [would] not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at
the instance of one who [had] availed himself of its benefits." 1064
Three of Justice Brandeis' rules were based on policy considerations developed by the Court itself. First, "[t]he Court [would] not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than [was] required by the
precise facts to which it [was] to be applied.' " 10611 Second, "[t]he Court
[would] not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there [was] also present some other ground
upon which the case [might] be disposed of. " 1066 If the Court could
choose to decide a case on a constitutional ground or on a ground of
statutory construction or general law, it should select the latter
grounds. 1067 Third, " '[ w ]hen the validity of an act of the Congress
[was] drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality
[was] raised, it [was] a cardinal principle that this Court [would] first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute [was] fairly possible by
which the question [might] be avoided.' " 1068
These rules were quoted by the Court in Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 1069 where the Court added that the rules
were employed to "avoid[] passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision ... , notwithstanding conceded jurisdiction, until necessity compel[led] it in the performance of
constitutional duty." 1070 "Like the case and controversy limitation itself
and the policy against entertaining political questions," the Court declared, the avoidance principle "is one of the rules basic to the federal
system and this Court's appropriate place within that structure. " 1071
This avoidance principle has been reflected in "numerous cases
and over a long period." 1072 It has been repeated by the Supreme Court
1063. /d. at 347.
I 064. /d. at 348.
1065. /d. at 347 (citations omitted).
1066. /d. at 347.
1067. /d.
1068. !d. at 348 (citations omitted). This principle applies to acts of state legislatures as well.
See, e.g., Thornburgh, 737 F.Zd at 294.
1069. 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
I 070. /d. at 569.
1071. Id. at 570.
1072. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 503 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion). There
has been controversy over particular applications of the principle, but not the principle itself. See
Mattiello v. Connecticut, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 55, 225 A.2d 507, appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 209
(1966); Nairn v. Nairn, 197 Va. 80,87 S.E.Zd 749, vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam); A.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGERous BRANCH: TH~: SuPREME CouRT AT THF. BAR OF Pouncs
(1962); Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues" -A Comment on Principle and Expe-
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in cases involving state abortion laws. 1073 However, the avoidance principle has not been consistently employed in abortion jurisprudence.
Most notable, of course, was the "hypothetical" case employed by the
majority in Roe. 1074
One of the avoidance rules often applicable in abortion jurisprudence has been the well-settled rule that federal courts should apply
sympathetic constructions to state statutes in order to uphold their
constitutionality .10711
dienry in judicial Heview, 64 Coi.UM. L. Rt:v. 1 (1964).
1073. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976). The Ashwander avoidance
principle was also recently cited with approval in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Balderman, 465 U.S. 89, 117 (1984).
I07 4. See supra text accompanying notes 916-22.
1075. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191-92 (1973); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretirs & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 294 (1986). Despite these common statements of
the rule, one district murt in Henrie v. Derryberry, 358 F. Supp. 719, 726 (N.D. Okla. 1973),
and Jus tire Brennan, dissenting in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 60 I, 627 ( 1973), have used
language seeming to indicate that a federal rourt may not "construe or narrow" a state enactment.
Of murse, in the same year, 1973, the Court in Bolton (with Justice Brennan joining the majority) "construed" (and used the term, "construed," itself) the word "necessary" to allow an abortion where a woman's "well-being" was at risk. In "well-being," the Court included "all fartors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the wellbeing of the patient." Hoe, 410 U.S. at 191-92. The Court noted its earlier broad construction of
"health" in United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1971), involving a District of Columbia
statute, and approved the district court's adoption of such a construction of the Georgia statute.
Hoe, 410 U.S. at 191-92. Moreover, construction of state statutes is permissible even outside the
smpe of abortion jurisprudence. The misunderstanding seems to arise from a semantic conflict in
(;rayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), G<x•ding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), and
United States v. Thirty-seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971). In Thirty-seven (37) Photographs, the Court affirmed the rule requiring constructions favoring constitutionality of statutes.
Thirty-seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. at 368-69. It noted two prior rases where it had not done
so, "the obstacle" being that the statutes at issue were state or city enactments. !d. The Court
observed, for example, that one statute could be saved by a judicial construction which read time
limits into the statute, but said "such construction had to be 'authoritative,' and we lark jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legislation." !d. (citation omilled).
This statement of the rule was true as to authoritative construction, as a stale court is not
bound by a federal court's construction of a statute of that stale. The real issue in this bit of
dictum was not ''authoritative" ronstrurtion, however. A federal rourt may construe a statute so as
to uphold its constitutionality and a stale may later impose an unconstitutional construction in
place of the federal one. The lark of authoritative constructive power does not void the rule requiring courts to find statutes constitutional where fairly possible. The real problem was slated by the
Court when it said, in Thirty-seven (37) Photographs, that it had refused to "rewrite" the stale
and city enactments (e.g., by adding time limitations). !d. al 369. Thus, the use of the ronrepl of
ronstruction, which the Court rejected here, included a rewriting of the statute which required
state authority to do.
Justice Brennan, writing the Court's opinion a year later in Gooding, 405 U.S. 518, cited the
Thirty-seven ( 37) Photographs rule in his comment that "ioJnly the Georgia courts can supply the
requisite construnion, since of course 'we lark jurisdiction authoritatively to mnslrue slate legislation.'" Gooding, 405 U.S. at 520. In the context
Gooding, the "requisite ronstrurtion" referred
to an authoritative one, as the stale rourls had already construed the elements of the statute without limiting them as required [or constitutionality of the statute. /d. al 524-27. Thus, the federal

or
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As with the rest of the avoidance principle, this rule has not been
consistently applied in abortion cases.
In Thornburgh, this rule was violated by seeking to find an unconstitutional construction of a state statute rather than seeking to avoid
one. As noted briefly above, the statute at issue required a second physician to care for the fetus in the case of abortions performed after viability.1076 In Ashcroft, the Court had allowed a second-physician requirement, provided there was an emergency exception. 1077 Although
the provision considered in Ashcroft contained no explicit emergency
exception, one was construed from the phrase "provided that it does not
pose an increased risk to the life or health of the woman." 1078
The Pennsylvania statute at issue in Thornburgh provided "a
complete defense to any charge brought against a physician for violating the requirements of this section that he had concluded in good faith,
in his best medical judgment, . . . that the abortion was necessary to
preserve maternal life or health." 1079 Clearly the failure to obtain a
second physician was excusable where a mother's life or health was at
risk. In fact, the statute's language in Thornburgh provided the Court
with greater reason for such construction than did the statute in Ashcroft. Yet, the Thornburgh Court was unwilling to find a construction
which avoided unconstitutionality. The Court struck down the
statute. 1080
In Thornburgh, the Pennsylvania statute also required the use of
court could not impose any construction on the statute.
The Grayned case clarified the scope of federal authority to construe state statutes. Grayned,
408 U.S. at I 04. An anti-noise ordinance at issue had not been construed by the state courts which
tried the case, but reference was made to similar statutes which had been recently construed and
sustained. /d. at 109-10. The Grayned Court declared the rule:
In this situation, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it, we must "extrapolate its allowable
meaning." Here, we are "relegated, ... to the words of the ordinance itself," to the
interpretations the court below has given to analogous statutes, and, perhaps to some
degree, to the interpretation of the statute given by those charged with enforcing it.
"Extrapolation," of course, is a delicate task, for it is not within our power to construe
and narrow state laws.
!d. at 110 (footnotes omitted) (citing Thirty-seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. at 369).
It may be seen, then, that some effort has been made to distinguish permissible interpretive
functions of a federal court from impermissible ones and to assign the term "extrapolation" to the
former. That this effort has been unsuccessful is evident from the use of the term "construction"
for the interpretive function of a federal court in the abortion cases cited in this footnote and
numerous other cases. As noted, however, there are more limits on a federal court than on a state
court in construing state statutes.
1076. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.§ 3210(c) (Purdon 1983).
1077. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 482-86 (1983).
1078. !d. at 485 n.8.
1079. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 32!0(a) (Purdon 1983).
1080. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 771
(1986).
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the abortion method most likely to preserve the life of a postviable fetus
unless that method posed "a significantly greater medical risk" to maternal life or health. 1081 "[P]otential psychological or emotional impact
of the child's survival upon the mother" was not to be considered in
determining the medical risk. 1082
Arguably, a state could require some higher degree of maternal
risk after viability than before, because the broad health definition of
Bolton 1083 applies only to early pregnancy. 1084 But, even rejecting this
notion, the Thornburgh Court was offered two other plausible
constructions.
First, the state argued for a construction of the phrase "significantly greater" risk to mean "meaningfully increased" risk. 10811 Thus,
in keeping with Colautti v. Franklin, 1088 no trade-off would be required between a mother's health and fetal survivaU 087 The district
court had employed the "meaningfully increased" construction and upheld the statute, recognizing its "oblig[ation] to give the statute [a] reasonable interpretation which avoids the danger of constitutional invalidity."1088 That Court supported its construction by a dictionary
definition of the relevant terms. 1089 The Court of Appeals rejected this
interpretation, holding that the statute was "not susceptible to a construction that does not require the mother to bear an increased medical
risk in order to save her viable fetus. " 1090 The Supreme Court
agreed. 1091
A second construction would also have avoided a claim that increased medical risks were imposed on the mother:
Section 321 O(b) could reasonably be construed to mandate that the
physician may not base his decision to use an abortion procedure
other than the procedure most likely to result in a live birth solely on
the possibility of psychological or emotional harm to the woman if her
1081. 18 PA CoNS. STAT. ANN. § 3210(b) (Purdon 1983).
1082. /d.
I 083. Roe, 410 U.S. at 192. See supra note I 07 5 for the definition.
1084. Brief for the National Right to Life Committee, Amicus Curiae, at 12-22; Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (No. 84-495). See also
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 807-08 (White, J., dissenting).
1085. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 769.
1086. 439 U.S. 379, 400 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
1087. But see Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 807 (White, J., dissenting) ("Colautti held no such
thing.").
1088. Thornburgh, 552 F. Supp. 791, 807 (E. D. Pa. 1982).
1089. /d.
1090. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d
283, 300 (3d Cir. 1984) rev'd 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
1091. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 769.
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child is delivered alive rather than dead. 1092

However, neither the appellate court nor the Supreme Court considered abstaining to determine if the state courts might adopt a constitutional construction. Nor did the two courts adopt a constitutional construction. Instead they resorted to "linguistic nit-picking" to strike
down the provision. 1093
One further item in Thornburgh is relevant here. Pennsylvania
had promulgated its abortion regulations based in part on its finding
that many women were undergoing abortions "without full knowledge
of the development of the unborn child or of alternatives to abortion. " 1094 To remedy this defect in the informed consent process, a provision was enacted to give some structure to the physician-patient dialogue. The Supreme Court followed the appellate court in finding that
provision, Section 3205, unconstitutional. 10911
A cross-reference tied Section 3205 to Section 3208, which provided for printed information to be prepared by the state. This material
was to list agencies providing resources to women desiring to carry
their unborn children to term (and to assist thereafter with adoption or
child support). The material also provided "anatomical and physiological characteristics" of an unborn child at two week intervals. The appellate court had found no flaw with Section 3208, but held it was
"inextricably intertwined" with Section 3205, and so was not severable.
This was erroneous, as a mere cross-reference does not make for inextricable intertwining.
Moreover, the Supreme Court had held that a state may "make a
value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and ... [may] implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds." 1096 In implementing its value judgment, the state should be able to print any material it desires. Striking down Section 3208 seems little more than an

1092. Brief for the National Right to Life Committee, Amicus Curiae, at') n.1, Thornbuq~;h
v. American College of Obstretics & Gynecologists, 47(, U.S. 747 (19!l6)(No. 84-495).
1093. Thornburgh, 476 US. at 807 (White, J, dissenting).
The term 'significant' in this context, however, is most naturally read as synonymous
with the terms 'meaningful,' 'cognizable,' 'appreciable,' or 'non-negligible.' That is, the
statute requires only that the risk be a real and identifiable one. Surely, if the State's
interest in preserving the life of a viable fetus is, as Hoe purported to recognize, a
compelling one, the State is at the very least entitled to demand that that interest not be
subordinated to a purported maternal health risk that is in fan wholly insubstantial.
The statute, on its fare, demands no more than this of a doctor performing an abortion
of a viable fetus.

!d.
1094. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3202(b)(t)(Purdon 1983).
1095. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 764.
1096. Maher v. Roe, 432 US. 464, 474 (1977).
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attempt to censor material of which the courts disapproved. For purposes of this discussion, however, it is clear that the appellate court in
Thornburgh construed these statutes to create constitutional problems
and not to remove them.
The Supreme Court also held Section 3208 to be unconstitutional,
treating it as a unit with Section 3205, though not alluding to the "inextricably intertwined" language. 1097 It did not even consider the possibility of severing one of the two sections, and, when it refused to sever
provisions within Section 3205, it rested its refusal partially on the absence of a broad severability clause in the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act. 1098 That the Court failed to find a severability clause is astonishing, because the Brief for Appellants mentioned the relevant
severance clause twice/ 099 and it was also argued in connection with
these sections in the United States' brief. 1100
Such eagerness to strike down abortion legislation does not square
with the Ashwander principles. Justice White, dissenting in Thornburgh, summed up the matter well in his comment on the majority's
refusal to find an emergency exception in the two-physician requirement for postviability abortions:
The Court's rejection of a perfectly plausible reading of the statute
flies in the face of the principle-which until today I had thought
applicable to abortion statutes as well as to other legislative enactments-that '[ w ]here fairly possible, courts should construe a statute
to avoid a danger of unconstitutionality.' Planned Parenthood Ass'n
v. Ashcroft [citation omitted]. The Court's reading is obviously based
on an entirely different principle: that in cases involving abortion, a
permissible reading of a statute is to be avoided at all costs. 1101

In Danforth, 1102 the Court was presented with a construction
problem involving a statute designed to protect the lives of aborted fetuses. The statute provided:
Section 6. (1) No person who performs or induces an abortion shall
fail to exercise that degree of professional skill, care and diligence to
preserve the life and health of the fetus which such person would be
required to exercise in order to preserve the life and health of any
fetus intended to be born and not aborted. Any physician or person
1097. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762.
1098. Jd. at 765.
1099. Brief for Appellants at 74, 45a, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstretics &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (No. 84-495). The clause is found in Act No. 1982-138, § 5,
1982 Pa. Legis. Serv. 750, 794 (Purdon).
1100. Brief for the United States, supra note 35, at 7.
1101. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 812 (White, J., dissenting).
1102. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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assisting in the abortion who shall fail to take such measures to encourage or to sustain the life of the child, and the death of the child
results, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter . . . . Further, such
physician or other person shall be liable in an action for damages ...
1103

The challenge to this provision was based on overbreadth. Appellants argued that "the statute on its face effectively preclude[d] abortion
and was meant to do just that. " 1104 The district court held it to be
"unconstitutionally overbroad because it failed to exclude from its reach
the stage of pregnancy prior to viability." 11011
Under the usual rules, the Court had an obligation to find a constitutional construction for the statute whenever possible. It began its
task but aborted it too early. The Court considered the construction
offered by the state of Missouri's Attorney General: "the first sentence
of § 6(1) establishes only the general standard of care that applies to
the person who performs the abortion, and . . . the second sentence
describes the circumstances when that standard of care applies, namely,
when a live child results from the procedure." 1106
The Danforth Court was "unable to accept the appellee's sophisticated interpretation of the statute." 1107 The Court declared that section
6(1) required the special standard of care on behalf of a fetus; and it
did so without specifying that it applied only after viability. 1108 Thus,
the Court held, "it impermissibly require[d] the physician to preserve
the life and health of the fetus, whatever the state of pregnancy." 1109
The Court decided that the second sentence referring to child simply
did not modify the first sentence, but held them unseverable for being
"inextricably bound together." 1110
1103. /d. at 85-86.
1104. /d. at 82.
1105. /d. (citing Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1371 (E.D. Mo.
1975)). This ready application of the overbreadth doctrine to abortion is remarkable in itself,
because the common perception is that a facial overbreadth challenge will be applied only in free
expression cases. In a recent case, the Court declared, "[W)e have not recognized an 'overbreadth'
doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct.
2095, 2100 (1987) (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 n.18 (1984)). Yet, the Court applied the doctrine in Roe, 410 U.S. at 164, and in Danforth as noted in the text accompanying this
article, and this practice has been followed in numerous lower court cases. Thus, either the abortion right has been raised to the level of the right of free expression, which has traditionally been
the most protected of rights, or the Court's analysis is inconsistent. The Court has never directly
confronted the issue of whether abortion truly should be exalted to the level of free expression.
1106. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 82.
1107. /d. at 83.
1108. /d.
1109. /d.
1110. !d.
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That a reasonable constitutional construction was available and
had been set before the Court is evidenced by Justice White's dissenting
opinion. He noted that the standard of care required was only " 'that
degree of professional skill ... to preserve the ... fetus,' which would
be required if the mother wanted a live child." 1111 "Plainly, if the pregnancy is to be terminated at a time when there is no chance of life
outside the womb, a physician would not be required to exercise any
care or skill to preserve the life of the fetus .... " 1112 Thus, the statute
could easily have been construed to apply only to the time when the
fetus was viable.
"Incredibly," Justice White remarked, "the Court reads the statute ... to require 'the physician to preserve the life and health of the
fetus, whatever the stage of pregnancy,' ... thereby attributing to the
Missouri Legislature the strange intention of passing a statute with absolutely no chance of surviving constitutional challenge under Roe ...
"1113

Finally, as severability is "entirely a question of the intent of the
state legislature," 1114 and Missouri clearly intended to protect live babies resulting from abortions, 1116 the Court had an obligation to honor
that intent and sever the passage if the Court could find no constitutional construction of it. Due to the violation of the usual rules, one is
left with the feeling that the majority did not like the protection provided by the statute and found an unconstitutional construction of it as
a means to an end. 1116
It is perhaps indicative of the Court's predisposition in Danforth
that it failed to mention its obligation to employ a constitutional construction of the statute, if possible.
(2). Avoiding Vagueness. The rule requiring construction of a
statute to avoid its unconstitutionality covers construction of statutes to
avoid a finding of unconstitutional vagueness, as well. The courts have
been especially active in construing abortion laws in light of the vagueness doctrine. The principle underlying the doctrine was explained by
the Supreme Court in 1972 in Grayned v. City of Rockford:
1111. /d. at 99.
1112. /d. at 99-100.
1113. /d. at 100.
1114. /d.
1115. /d. at 101 (citing the Missouri Attorney General's argument that the only intent of§
6(1) was to require medical support for live babies resulting from abortions).
1116. Compare the debate in Thornburgh over whether a mother is entitled only to an
empty womb or to a dead fetus as well. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 784 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
("[18 PA CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3210(c) (Purdon 1983)[ simply states that a viable fetus is to be
cared for, not destroyed").
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It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for
vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is
free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws
give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws
may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must
provide explicit standards for those who apply them. 1117

The Supreme Court, in Colautti v. Franklin, llls set forth a
vagueness test in an abortion case:
It is settled that, as a matter of due process, a criminal statute that
'fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by statute,' or is so indefinite that 'it
encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions,' is void for
vagueness. This appears to be especially true where the uncertainty
induced by the statute threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. 1119

In light of the pervasive use of the vagueness doctrine to strike
down abortion regulations, a more detailed exposition of the rule is
appropriate. The Court observed, in Village of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. that the level of vagueness tolerated
varied with the nature of the statute at issue. 1120 Economic regulation
receives less scrutiny due to its narrow subject matter, the economic
motivation for business to consult legislation before acting, and the
availability of clarification by personal inquiry or administrative ruling.1121 Where criminal penalties are imposed, the scrutiny is
stricterY 22 However, a scienter requirement may mitigate a certain
amount of vagueness, especially where the principle of adequate notice
regarding proscribed conduct is involved. 1123 Finally, where a law
"threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights,"
more clarity is req uired. 1124 Prior to the abortion cases, however, this
higher level of scrutiny was only applied to cases involving restrictions
of free speech or association. Indeed, these are the examples cited by
1117.
1118.
1119.
1120.
1121.
1122.
1123.
1124.

Granyned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)

439

u.s.

379.

/d. at 390-91 (citations omitted).
455 U.S. 489, 498 ( 1982).
/d.
/d. at 498-99.
/d. at 499.
/d.
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Hoffman Estates 1126 and Colautti. 1126
The vagueness doctrine, which underscores the desire for notice of
proscribed conduct and adequate guidelines for law enforcement, has its
limits. First, as noted previously, courts have a duty to give a statute a
construction which favors the constitutionality of the statute, where
fairly possible. 1127 Second, that there may be difficulty with marginal
cases does not cause unconstitutional vagueness. 1128 Third, where one's
"conduct falls squarely within the 'hard core' of the statute's proscriptions," a facial vagueness challenge will not be allowed. 1129 Fourth,
where technical terms or terms with special meaning are employed
(e.g., common law terms), or where the terminology is commonly
grasped in the context, a fatal ambiguity will not be found. 113° Fifth,
scienter, as noted before, will ameliorate ambiguity. Sixth, the vagueness doctrine does not reqmre "unattainable feats of statutory
clarity." 1131

1125. /d.
1126. 439 U.S. at 391. Free expression has traditionally received greater protection both
from the vagueness doctrine and from the related overbreadth doctrine. See, e.g., Grayned, 408
U.S. at 109 (giving heightened scrutiny in context of first amendment constitutional rights only),
114-15 (overbreadth); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-13 (l'J73)(overbreadth).
1127. Any limiting construction given by a stale court or enforcement agency must be considered. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355 (1983).
1128. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618 (1954). While many of the discussions of
the vagueness rule, such as that in Harriss, focus on the due process clause of the fifth amendment, the Court has applied the principles equally to the fourteenth amendment. This may be
seen in the common citation of vagueness analysis precedents dealing with federal statutes in rases
involving state laws. See, e.g., Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108 n.3.
1129. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973).
1130. United States v. Maude, 481 F.2d 1062, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
1131. I d. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 ( 1947), set forth the
requirements of due process in its discussion of a statute which made it unlawful to coerce a
broadcaster to employ more employees than needed to perform actual services. The Court stated:
Clearer and more precise language might have been framed by Congress to express what it meant by 'number of employees needed' But none occurs to us, nor has
any better language been suggested, effectively to carry out what appears to have been
the Congressional purpose. The argument really seems to be that it is impossible for a
jury or court ever to determine how many employees a business needs, and that, therefore, no statutory language could meet the problem Congress had in mind. If this argument should be accepted, the result would be that no legislature could make it an offense for a person to compel another to hire employees, no matter how unnecessary
they were, and however desirable a legislature might consider suppression of the practice to be.
The Constitution presents no such insuperable obstacle to legislation. We think
that the language Congress used provides an adequate warning as to what conduct falls
under its ban, and marks boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries fairly to
administer the law in accordance with the will of Congress. Tbat there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the line on which a partieular
fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a
criminal offense. It would strain the requirement for certainty in criminal law stan-
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The Broadrick Court put this last matter in perspective by stating
that "[ w ]ords inevitably contain germs of uncertainty. " 1132 It continued:
[T]here are limitations in the English language with respect to being
both specific and manageably brief, and it seems to us that although
the prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on finding fault at any
cost, they are set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising
ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with,
without sacrifice to the public interest. 1133

Thus, as the cases show, absolute precision in legislative drafting is not
required. It is enough if "citizens who desire to obey the statute will
have no difficulty in understanding it." 113'
As this rather detailed analysis of the vagueness rule shows, there
is more to the rule than Colautti admitted. It is symptomatic of abortion jurisprudence that the ameliorating principles are largely ignored.
These should be kept in mind as the application of the vagueness doctrine is observed. 11311
One of the most commonly cited cases setting forth the rule against
vagueness is United States v. Harriss. 1136 Harriss was cited by Colautti for the vagueness rule.U 37 The proper analysis of a vagueness
claim was illustrated by the Harriss Court when it set out the vagueness rule 1138 and immediately followed it with a paragraph containing
dards too near the breaking point to say that it was impossible judicially to determine
whether a person knew when he was wilfully attempting to compel another to hire
unneeded employees. The Constitution has erected procedural safeguards to protect
against conviction for crime except for violation of laws which have clearly defined
conduct thereafter to be punished; but the Constitution does not require impossible
standards. The language here challenged conveys sufficiently definite warnings as to
the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. The
Constitution requires no more.
/d. at 7-8 (citations omitted).
1132. 413 U.S. at 608.
1133. /d. (quoting United States Civil Service Comm'n. v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
578-79 (1973)).
1134. Cohen v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (quoting Cohen v. Commonwealth, 467
S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1971)).
1135. An excellent explication and application of the vagueness rule is found in the concurring opinion of Judge Williams in Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 999-1002 (5th Cir.
1986) (rejecting the majority's finding of unconstitutional vagueness in a fetal experimentation
statute).
1136. 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
1137. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979).
1138. The rule, as stated in Harriss, is:
The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that
fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct
is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held
criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be
proscribed.
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two of the limitations on the expansion of the rule. It stated:
On the other hand, if the general class of offenses to which the
statute is directed is plainly within its terms, the statute will not be
struck down as vague, even though marginal cases could be put where
doubts might arise. And if this general class of offenses can be made
constitutionally definite by a reasonable construction of the statute,
this Court is under a duty to give the statute that construction. This
was the course adopted in Screws v. United States, upholding the definiteness of the Civil Rights Act. 1139

The Harriss Court proceeded to uphold the statute at 1ssue, even
though it involved restrictions on highly protected free expression, an
area in which stricter scrutiny is applied. 1140
The vagueness analysis, as set forth in Harriss, may be summarized as a two-step process. First, evaluate the statute in light of common understanding, technical use of terms, scienter requirements, applicability of its "hard core" to the plaintiff, and so on, to determine
whether vagueness exists. Second, determine whether a construction is
fairly possible which favors constitutionality and, if one exists, employ
it.
One indicator of a court's predisposition toward finding an abortion statute impermissibly vague is whether the court mentions the second prong of the Harriss analysis in setting out the rule. In the discussion of the following cases, the presence or absence of the second part of
the Harriss analysis should be observed.
Before Roe, the Supreme Court decided the abortion case of
United States v. Vuitch. 1141 That opinion was noteworthy for a clear
explication of the constitutional construction principle: "statutes should
be construed whenever possible so as to uphold their constitutionality."1142 Applying this principle, the Court construed a "health" exception to an abortion prohibition broadly to include mental health and,
thus, eliminated any ambiguity. 1143
This recognition of the rule and its appropriate application was
also evident in Doe v. Bolton. 1144 In Bolton, a Georgia statute was
challenged on vagueness grounds because it forbade a physician to perform an abortion except when it was "based upon his best clinical judgHarriss, 347 U.S. at 617.
1139. /d. at 618 (citations omitted).
1140. /d.
1141. 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
1142. /d. at 70.
1143. /d. at 71-72.
1144. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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ment that an abortion [was] necessary." 1146 The term "necessary" was
attacked as being standardless. The Court said, "The vagueness argument is set aside by the decision in United States v. Vuitch. " 1146 The
doctor was to consider all circumstances in deciding necessity, and, the
Court observed, such "necessity" of surgery "is a judgment that physicians are obviously called upon to make routinely." 1147 The Court also
noted that this "room" for a physician to make his "best medical judgment" operated to the benefit of the pregnant woman. 1148
This clear statement of the rule in Vuitch and its positive application in that case and in Bolton are in marked contrast to subsequent
constructions of abortion statutes by the Supreme Court. Perhaps this is
explainable by the fact that both of those cases had the effect of expanding the abortion rights of women. Subsequent constructions of statutes where vagueness was found were often employed to strike abortion
regulation by finding statutes to be unconstitutional. 1149
In Colautti, the Court was confronted with two vagueness challenges. They were focused on Section S(a) of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act:
(a) Every person who performs or induces an abortion shall prior
thereto have made a determination based on his experience, judgment
or professional competence that the fetus is not viable, and if the determination is that the fetus is viable or if there is sufficient reason to
believe that the fetus may be viable, shall exercise that degree of professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of the
fetus which such person would be required to exercise in order to
preserve the life and health of any fetus intended to be born and not
aborted and the abortion technique employed shall be that which
would provide the best opportunity for the fetus to be aborted alive so
long as a different technique would not be necessary in order to preserve the life or health of the mother. 1160
The first challenged phrase, "the fetus is viable or if there is sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable," was challenged as
unconstitutionally vague "because it fail[ ed] to inform the physician
when his duty to the fetus ar[ose], and because it d[id] not make the
physician's good-faith determination of viability conclusive." 1161
GA. Com: ANN. § 26-1202(a) ( 1968).
Bolton, 410 U.S. at 191 (citation omitted).
!d. at 192.
!d.
See infra text accompanying notes 1150-58 (discussing confirmation of this distinrtion
in Colautti).
1150. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6605(a) (Purdon 1977) (challenged portions emphasized).
1145.
1146.
1147.
1148.
1149.

1151. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 389 (1979).
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The Supreme Court agreed that this portion was ambiguous, that
this ambiguity was "aggravated by the absence of a scienter requirement with respect to the finding of viability," and, therefore, that "the
viability-determination requirement of [section] S(a)" was "void for
vagueness. " 11112
The first step in a proper vagueness analysis is to determine if
ambiguity exists. The Court did this, citing Harriss 1153 for the rule
against overly vague criminal statutes. 11114
The second step is to determine if a construction can fairly be
found which resolves the ambiguity. However, the Court neither cited
this rule-although Harris had just been cited for its vagueness principle-nor made any effort to find a saving construction.
The Colautti Court virtually conceded that a different construction
rule existed where abortion rights were being expanded than where
they were being restricted. The Court noted the Vuitch and Bolton constructions favoring constitutionality, but distinguished them on the
ground that they "afford[ ed] broad discretion to the physician," unlike
the statute at issue in Colautti. 11511
Moreover, the Colautti Court found the vagueness at issue to be
compounded by the lack of a scienter requirement. 1156 A construction
recognizing a scienter requirement was possible in Colautti because, as
the Court noted, "the Pennsylvania law of criminal homicide, made
applicable to the physician by section S(d), conditions guilt upon a finding of scienter." 1157 The relevant provision was distinguished, however,
as applying only to "caus[ing] the death of another human being."m8
The Court refused to include within the definition of "caus[ing] the
death of another human being" a physician's negligent failure to ascertain the existence of a viable fetus which caused that fetus' death. 1159
In Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, as briefly
noted earlier, the Supreme Court struck down a regulation requiring
"humane and sanitary" disposal of fetal remains. 1160 The city of Akron
contended that the statute was merely "to preclude the mindless dumping of aborted fetuses onto garbage piles." 1161 In Planned Parenthood
1152. /d. at 390.
1153. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
1154. Colautti, 439 U.S. at 390 (noting also the higher standard where the ambiguity inhibited exercise of constitutionally protected rights).
1155. /d. at 394.
1156. /d.
1157. /d.
1158. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2501 (Purdon 1973).
1159. 439 U.S. at 394-95.
I 160. 462 US. at 451-52.
1161. /d. (quoting Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 573 (E.D.
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Association v. Fitzpatrick, 1162 a district court had upheld the term "humane" against a vagueness attack. 1163 That statute required the Pennsylvania Department of Health to "make regulations to provide for the
humane disposition of dead fetuses. " 1164 The district court noted that
the parties agreed that incineration would be appropriate and that the
Commonwealth was only protecting the public health by precluding
"the mindless dumping of aborted fetuses on to garbage piles." 116 ~ The
court noted that, if "humane" were construed to require "expensive
burial," it "may very well invade the privacy of the pregnant woman
and burden her decision concerning an abortion." 1166 This opinion was
summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court in 197 6.U 67
With this body of law available to it, the City Council of Akron
passed Ordinance No. 160-1978, "Regulation of Abortion." 1168 The ordinance contained a clear severability clause 1169 and the requirement
that " [a]ny physician who shall perform or induce an abortion . . .
shall insure that the remains . . . are disposed of in a humane and
sanitary manner." 1170 This ordinance was enforced by misdemeanor
penal ties. 1171
While the imposition of such penalties heightens the level of scrutiny, the general rules described above still do not require impossible
standards. By comparison, the Supreme Court has upheld criminal or
quasi-criminal statutes against vagueness challenges to such terms as
"crime involving moral turpitude," 1172 "restraint of trade," 1173 "any offensive, derisive or annoying word," 1174 "connected with or related to
the national defense," 117 ~ "fair and open competition," 1176 and other
similar phrases. 1177 If such phrases may be construed, despite criminal
penalties, to be sufficiently clear for constitutional purposes, then the
Pa. 1975), affd mem. sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976)).
1162. 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
1163. !d. at 572-73.
1164. !d. at 572.
1165. !d. at 573.
1166. !d.
1167. 428 us 901.
1168. Akron, 462 U.S. at 421.
1169. The clause provided that "should any provision ... be construed . . unconstitutional .
" AKRON ORDINANCE
. . such unconstitutionality ... shall not extend to any other provision
No. 160-1978 § 1870.19.
1170. /d. § 1870.16.
1171. !d. § 1870.18.
1172. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231 n.15 ( 1951 ).
1173. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
1174. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
1175. Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941).
1176. Old Dearborn Co. v. Seagram Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
1177. See Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223,231 n.15 (19~1).
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phrase "humane and sanitary" would seem to be a candidate for similar construction.
As noted by the United States, as amicus curiae, "( t]he phrase 'humane and sanitary' appears in countless laws regulating health and
safety. Congress has even mandated the 'humane ... disposal of excess
wild free-roaming horses and burros.' As a familiar regulatory formula,
the phrase 'humane and sanitary' resembles the phrase 'informed consent,' which the Court in Danforth held not to be vague." 1178
Justice O'Connor, dissenting in Akron, agreed:
In light of the fact that the city of Akron indicates no intent to require
that physicians provide 'decent burials' for fetuses, and that 'humane'
is no more vague than the term 'sanitary,' the vagueness of which
Akron Center does not question, I cannot conclude that the statute is
void for vagueness. 1179
The fact was ignored by the Court that there was already precedent in Fitzpatrick for not construing "humane" to require a "decent
burial". The fact that the ordinance was passed after Fitzpatrick, and
presumably in its light, was ignored. The fact that the city of Akron
argued for the construction of Fitzpatrick as the intent of the city council was ignored. The fact that, even without this precedent, a saving
construction, excluding a "decent burial," was possible was ignored.
The fact that severance of the term "humane" was available, leaving
the undisputed term "sanitary," was ignored. Rather, the Court elected
to speculate that a "decent burial" was being required and threw out
the usual rules of construction along with the ordinance. Nowhere did
the Supreme Court note its duty to apply a constitutional construction.
The hostility of the Supreme Court to abortion regulations and the
employment of the vagueness doctrine to strike them down is also reflected in lower court opinions. Again, express recognition of the duty
to employ a constitutional construction serves as a predictor of the
court's intent to strike the statutes.
The hostile approach was evident in the Seventh Circuit opinion
in Charles v. Daley. 1180 The appellate court held unconstitutionally
vague a 1983 Illinois statute which required a certain standard of care
of a "physician or person assisting in . . . a pregnancy termination"
performed after the fetus is "known to be viable." 1181 This was held
1178. Brief for the United States, supra note 35, at 20 (citations omitted).
1179. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416,475 (1983)(0'Connor,
]., dissenting).
1180. 749 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1984), appeal dismissed sub nom. Diamond v. Charles, 476
u.s. 54 (1986).
1181. Daley, 749 F.2d at 455; ILL. REv. STAT. ch.38, para. 81-26 (1983).
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vague on the ground that the statute did "not specify
which party,
physician or assistant, must make the viability determination." 1182 A
1983 amendment defined "viability" to be dependent on "the medical
judgment and determination of the attending physician." 1183 A 1984
amendment of the specific section at issue made it explicit that the attending physician's determination controlled. 1184 This made the legislature's intent clear.
However, even under the unamended 1983 version, 1185 it was clear
that the legislature intended that the attending physician should make
the determination. Furthermore, such a constitutional construction was
plainly permitted under the amended 1983 version due to the definition
of viability, which made the attending physician's decision controlling.
Under the usual rules, where such a constitutional construction is
plainly permitted, the federal court is obligated to give a statute such a
construction. Instead, the court elected to violate the well-settled rule, to
which it made no reference.
Numerous other examples exist of the federal courts' hostile construction of state abortion statutes. 1186 The 1987 case of Planned
1182. Daley, 749 F.2d at 459.
1183. /d. at 455.
1184. H.R. 1399, 1984 Ill..
1185. This version was declared constitutional by the district court. Charles v. Carey, 579 F.
Supp. 46<+, 466, 469 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
1186. In 1986, an Ohio district court in Haskell v. Washington Township found a zoning
resolution impermissibly vague. 635 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ohio 1986). The problem was that the
resolution failed to define "abortion clinic." /d. at 561. Since a number of conceivable arrangements could be classified as abortion clinics, it was held that no sufficient warning was given by
the statute to persons attempting to comply with it. /d. at 562. The court noted that when "persons affected ... are a select group with specialized understanding of the subject being regulated
the degree of definiteness required to satisfy due process concerns is measured by the common
understanding and commercial knowledge of the group." /d. at 561 (quoting Fleming v. United
States Dep't of Agric., 713 F.2d 179, 184 (6th Cir. 1983)). Even specialized knowledge, however,
would not enable a doctor to know whether a general practice facility equipped to do abortions
would be considered the same as a facility that performed abortions exclusively and advertised
itself as an abortion clinic, said the court. /d. at 562. With misdemeanor penalties attached, such
vagueness proved fatal in the view of this court. /d. at 561.
However, the standards set out by the Supreme Court require a more sympathetic approach.
In United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. I, 7 (1947), the Court declared, "That there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the line on which a particular fact
situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal
offense." Certainly anyone who operated a facility solely to perform abortions would know the
facility was an abortion clinic. Many clinics of this type exist and account for a large proportion of
abortions performed. The Abortion Profiteers, supra note 1034, at 2. While it is preferable for
legislative bodies to precisely define terms used, the Supreme Court has determined that the Constitution only requires the warning of the proscribed conduct to be sufficiently definite "when
measured by common understanding and practices." Petrillo, 332 U.S. at 8. "Common understanding" would certainly include clinics devoted exclusively or principally to the performance of
abortions within the concept of "abortion clinic." The Haskell court's approach violates the princi-
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Parenthood Association of Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati demonpie, recently given fresh impetus in United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987), that
"[a) facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid''
The Northern District of Ohio was exemplary in its handling of vagueness issues in the 1986
case, Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Rosen. 633 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ohio 1986). The
plaintiffs had argued that a statute providing that "[n)o person shall knowingly perform or induce
unmarried, under eighteen years of age, and unemancian abortion upon a woman who is
pated" without meeting statutory requirements was vague. !d. at 1133; OHIO RFv. Com: ANN. ~
2919.12 (B)(1)(a)(Page Supp. 1985). They contended it was undear whether "knowingly" applied to the performance of the abortion or the physician's determination of the woman's status.
Rosen, 633 F. Supp. at 1133. The court noted an affirmative defense sertion which protected
physicians from strict liability where misrepresentation of status had occurred and found the scienter element to apply to both clauses. !d. at 1134. The same court rejected vagueness challenges to
the terms "reasonable efforts" and "reasonable cause to believe," observing that "[bjy insisting on
definitions of commonly understood words, plaintiffs only confuse their meanings." !d. Such terms
"must be interpreted in the context of the conduct they modify, as they are in other legal settings,"
and "[ t[he scienter element in the criminal offense ameliorates any slight uncertainty in these
words." !d. (citing Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 492 n.18 ( 1983); Colautti
v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979)).
The decision of the Eastern District of Louisiana in the 1984 case, Margaret S. v. Treen, 597
F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984)(Margaret S. (II)), achieved mixed results. First, the court held a
provision void for vagueness which required a physician to advise a woman "[o[f the anatomical
and physiological development of the particular unborn child at the time the abortion is to be
performed or induced, according to the best medical judgment of the attending physician." LA.
RFV. STAT ANN. ~ 40:1299.35.6(B)(3)(West Supp. 1981). It is noteworthy that, after initially
quoting the statute footnote, Margaret S. (II), 597 F.Supp. at (,57 n.15, the court ignored the
phrase "according to the best medical judgment of the attending physician" throughout the rest of
its discussion. !d. at 661-64. In fact, in its discussion, the court restated the provision as requiring
that the woman be informed of the " 'anatomical and physiological development of the unborn
child at the time the abortion is to be performed.'" !d. at 661. This restatement completely ignored the "best medical judgment" clause of the provision. !d.
Building on this misrepresented base, the Margaret S. (II) court noted the plaintiffs' arguments that the statute was impermissibly vague in that "it is impossible for a physician to determine with accuracy the precise gestational age of a fetus," and that, therefore, the "physinan
would be required to describe a range of fetal development of several weeks." !d. They further
argued that the statute was vague, because it did not specify "the amount of information a physician must impart." !d. The court agreed that, since a physician muld not "determine fetal age
precisely," it would be impossible to comply with the statute. !d. at 663 (citing with approval its
prior case construing the predecessor to this statute). This conclusion completely ignored a whole
clause of the statute, which only required the physician's "best medical judgment" on the matter.
Such "rewriting" of the statute in order to invalidate it is inexcusable. If the statute is read
properly, compliance is rather simple, and no "range" of fetal development need be given. Further, "best medical judgment" was never challenged as itself vague. In fact, the roncept is mmmonly used without challenge. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191-92 (1973)(upholding
against a vagueness attack the requirement that a physician determine that an abortion is "necessary" based on his "best clinical judgment"); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. at 379, 3%-')7
(1979)
The murt also agreed with plaintiffs that a doctor would have difficulty knowing how much
detail was required in describing fetal development. Margaret S. (II), 597 F. Supp. at 663 (citing
with approval its prior case construing the predecessor to this statute). However, this provision is
no more vague than Section 40:1299.35.6(B)(5), which the court upheld. Senion (B)(S) required
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the patient to be informed of "the type of method or technique which will be utilized in the
abortion, the means of effectuating the method or technique, and the medical risks and consequences of the method or technique to be utilized." There was no prescribed level of detail in that
provision, either. However, the court noted that Danforth set forth the informed consent requirements "as the giving of information to the patient as to just what would be done and as to its
consequences." 597 F. Supp. at 665 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67 n.B). The district court
held that, under the Danforth standard, Section 40: 1299.35.6(8)(5) was constitutional, 597 F.
Supp. at 665 (citing Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d at 1019),
observing that "[t]he statute requires the woman to be informed of the nature of the abortion
procedure and the risks associated with it, directives which were specifically approved in Danforth." 597 F. Supp. at 665 (citing in accord Bellotti, 641 F.2d at 1019; Hodgson v. Lawson, 542
F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1976); Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476). Ironically, this was no more specific a directive than that which the district court had just overturned, but it was upheld because in Danforth,
in 1976, the Supreme Court had applied the normal construction rules and had already approved
more vague language than this district court would allow.
The district court in Margaret S. (II) did uphold a provision allowing for emergency exceptions to the statute's restrictions. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.12 (West Supp. 1981).
Plaintiffs contended that adequate notice was not provided as to the required conduct, Margaret S.
(II), 597 F. Supp. at 667, as the statute required "physicians to determine what constitutes an
'immediate threat and grave risk to life or permanent physical health.' " /d. The court rejected
this notion, because "physicians make determinations of the existence of medical emergencies that
threaten a patient's physical health on a regular basis." /d. Surely doctors involved in caring for
pregnant women make determinations regarding the stage of their pregnancy on a regular basis.
The logic rejecting a vagueness challenge to this latter provision requires also a rejection of the
vagueness challenge to the "informed consent" provision, providing for information regarding fetal
development. This is especially so where only "best medical judgment" is required. Thus, these
holdings on vagueness are inconsistent.
The 1982 case of Women's Medical Center of Providence v. Roberts, 530 F. Supp. 1136
(D.R.I. 1982), provides a further example of the amnesia of the courts when an abortion statute is
to be construed. Reading Roberts, one would never know that the Supreme Court had established
a duty to give statutes a constitutional construction where possible. The well-settled rule was
conveniently forgotten. While Roberts noted the rule against unconstitutional vagueness, it was
silent about any obligation on its part to avoid vagueness by giving a constitutional construction to
the statutes under review. !d. at 1145.
The amnesia was evident in the Roberts application of the vagueness doctrine. The court first
found the term "abortion" vague, noting that it had not been defined and could mean "both doctor-induced and spontaneous fetal loss." /d. Also, "a physician can be said to 'perform' an 'abortion' both when he initiates the termination of a pregnancy and when he performs an operation to
complete an otherwise incomplete, spontaneous miscarriage." /d. While a precise definition would
be ideal, as discussed above, the Supreme Court does not require so much. The "common understanding" test would quickly resolve the options the court listed. Clearly, the statute at issue referred to doctor-induced terminations of pregnancies. Where such a constitutional construction was
permissible, the court ought to have resolved the vagueness issue with such a construction.
The Roberts court decided that nearly the entire statute must fall due to this ambiguity. /d.
However, it proceeded to find other ambiguities. The statute at issue required disclosure to the
pregnant woman of "all medical risks, both physical and psychological, associated with the particular abortion procedure to be employed, consistent with good medical practice." R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 23-4.7-2(3)(1956). In its discussion of vagueness, the court ignored the phrase "consistent with
good medical practice" and decided that the provision was too vague, because "new risks associated with undergoing an abortion are constantly being discovered." Roberts, 530 F. Supp. at 1145.
With the neglected phrase included, the statute is no more vague than "informed consent," which
the Supreme Court in Danforth held not to be vague by properly giving the term a constitutional
construction. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.B (1976).
The Roberts court then turned to the portion of the Rhode Island statute which required a
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strates that the trend continues unabated. 1187
The ordinance at issue in the Cincinnati case required hospitals,
woman to be advised, "consistent with good medical practice," of "all medical risks, both physical
and psychological, to herself and the fetus," if she carried the fetus to term. R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 234.7-2(5)(1956). Ignoring again its duty to constitutionally construe state statutes, the court decided
the concept of "psychological risks to the fetus" was unconstitutionally vague as a "meaningless"
term. Roberts, 530 F. Supp. at 1145. This jocular approach ("Doctors simply would not know
what to say to a patient" /d.) is inappropriate. If no psychological risks to the fetus from its birth
were apparent to the doctor, none need be communicated to the patient. If the concept was impossible for the court to live with, it should have applied the permissible construction that psychological risk applied only to the woman and not the fetus. The state legislature was obviously attempting to include all sorts of potential harm to all parties involved within its provision. A sympathetic
approach, not a hostile one, was required by the established rules of constitutional construction.
This doctrine was violated by a demand for precision not required by the Constitution.
The Roberts court also considered the requirement that a woman be told whether she is
pregnant and that a copy of her pregnancy test be made available to her before an abortion is
performed. R. I. GEN. LAWS§ 23-4.7-2(1)(1956). The court discussed blood, urine, and physical
examination tests, and how for the latter a physician could arguably "comply with the statute by
making available a copy of his report to the patient." Roberts, 530 F. Supp. at 1149. Rather than
construing the statute in precisely that manner to remove any possible ambiguity, the court backed
away from a constitutional construction and found the provision void for vagueness. /d.
That the Roberts court was capable of sympathetic construction was evident in its treatment
of the requirement of disclosure regarding "the nature of an abortion." R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 23-4.72(2)(1956). The court interpreted this to mean "an explanation of the medical nature of an abortion" and not "a philosophical or moral discussion," thus upholding the provision. Roberts, 530 F.
Supp. at 1149 (emphasis in original). The court cited Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67 n.8, as controlling
with its construction of "informed consent" as "the giving of information to the patient as to just
what would be done ... ."/d.; Roberts, 530 F. Supp. at 1149. Once again, the contrast between
the constitutional requirement and the near-impossible precision required by the lower courts (and
recent Supreme Court cases) in abortion cases is remarkable.
The construction employed by the Roberts court, when it did consider the "consistent with
good medical practice" clause, is instructive. The court was faced with two possible constructions
of§ 23-4.7-2(3) and (5): (I) that all risks must be disclosed (regarding abortion or carrying the
fetus to term), or (2) that all risks "consistent with good medical practice" must be disclosed. The
court stated that, since no construction of the statute had been made, and since this was a criminal
statute, it could "only conclude that doctors will be forced to disclose all possible complications ...
." Roberts 530 F. Supp. at 1151 (emphasis in original). The conclusion does not, of course, follow
from the stated premise. The duty to employ constitutional construction applies in criminal cases,
as seen in the Supreme Court cases above. The absence of a prior construction in no way requires
one to elect a construction which will render the statute unconstitutional. Rather, one is required
to select the construction which will preserve the constitutionality of the statute, where fairly possible. A saving construction was possible here, as the phrase "consistent with good medical practice" clearly qualified the phrase "all medical risks." Further case-by-case analysis is beyond the
scope of this article. However, analysis of the following cases in light of the principles set forth in
the text is illuminating. Cf Thornburgh v. Amer. College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 737
F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1984); Eubanks v. Brown, 604 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Ky. 1984); Schulte v.
Douglas, 567 F. Supp. 522 (D. Neb. 1981); Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340 (D.N.D. 1980);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679 (W.D. Mo. 1980);
Mobile Women's Med. Clinic v. Board of Comm'rs, 426 F. Supp. 331 (S.D. Ala. 1977); Rados v.
Michaelson, 396 F. Supp. 768 (D.R.I. 1975); Montalvo v. Colon, 377 F. Supp. 1332 (D.P.R.
1974); Henrie v. Derryberry, 358 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Okla. 1973); Friendship Med. Center v.
Chicago Bd. of Health, 367 F. Supp. 594 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
1187. 822 F.2d 1390 (6th Cir. 1987).
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clinics, and laboratories to dispose of aborted fetuses by interment, deposit in a vault or tomb, cremation, or otherwise as "approved by the
Commission of Health." 1188 Any of the medical facilities which dispose
of fetuses was required to first obtain a permit from the commissioner,
who was to determine that the proposed "facilities, methods, and capabilities" were suitable for "sanitary" disposal, "consistent with public
health and safety." 1189
The federal district court decided that the ordinance was Impermissibly vague. 1190 No vagueness was found with interment, entombment, or cremation, but the phrase "otherwise disposed of in a manner
approved by the Commissioner of Health" was found to be vague, especially as the Commissioner planned to issue no regulations under the
ordinance. 1191
The Sixth Circuit, in reviewing the case, noted the permitted use
of "humane" in Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 1192 where
the term was to guide the rule-maker, and the rejection of "humane" in
Akron, 1193 where the term was to guide the physician. The Cincinnati
appellate court noted Akron's closing acknowledgement that the city
could " 'enact more carefully drawn regulations that further its legitimate interests in proper disposal of fetal remains.' " 1194 The Harriss
rule requiring "fair notice" 11911 was given, but the companion rule requiring constitutional construction was ignored. 1196
The city of Cincinnati argued that the listing of specific methods
of fetal disposal avoided unconstitutional vagueness. 1197 The court of
appeals decision acknowledged that the listed methods were not
vague, 1198 as did a concurring opinionY 99 However, it insisted that the
1188. /d. at 1392 (citing CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL Com:§ 749-1).
1189. !d.
1190. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 635 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.
Ohio 1986).
1191. /d. at 471.
1192. 401 F. Supp 554, 573 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
1193. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 ( 1983).
1194. Cincinnati, 822 F.2d at 1397 (quoting Akron, 462 U.S. at 452 n.45).
1195. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. at 617 (1954).
1196. Cincinnati, 822 F.2d at 1399.
1197. /d.
1198. /d.
1199. /d. at 1400, (Merrit, J., concurring). The concurrence stated, in a cryptic passage, that
"the vagueness of the ordinance is not cured by its more specific language," because "the specific
means of disposal prescribed by the ordinance constitute an impermissible burden on a woman's .
. right to an abortion." /d. Of course, the presence or absence of a burden does nothing to create
or remove vagueness, so the concurring opinion's argument must be that the burden makes the
ordinance unconstitutional whether or not the vagueness is cured. Possibly, a heightened scrutiny
was being argued, but heightened serutiny does not make vagueness itself. The concurrence expresses no disagreement with the fact that the three explicit modes of disposal are not vague. /d.
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granting of authority to the commissioner to specify other methods
made the statute unconstitutionally vague. 1200
Analysis of this claim shows its flaws. First, if the commissioner
promulgated regulations, those would have to be challenged after passage and not in a facial challenge. So it was in Fitzpatrick, which
found the Pennsylvania statute not unconstitutional on its face. 1201 Furthermore, if the state can employ the term "humane," as was done in
Fitzpatrick, 1202 to guide the rule maker, then certainly "sanitary" and
"consistent with public health and safety" may be so used. These were
not challenged, nor could they be under Akron. 1203 The Supreme Court
had declared little more than a month before this case was decided that
"[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that
no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." 1204
Because the Cincinnati ordinance was valid as against anyone who disposed of fetuses in any manner without obtaining a prior permit from
the commissioner, it easily passes the hurdle of facial ambiguity.
Second, if the commissioner enacted no regulations setting forth
other methods of disposal, then only interment, entombment, and cremation remain. These had not been challenged for vagueness (nor could
they reasonably be), but, rather, their sufficient clarity had been conceded. Any medical facility administrator neither employing one of
these disposal methods, nor having obtained permission for an alternative method, would be on notice that he or she had violated the ordinance. Moreover, before one could even employ one of the specified
methods of disposal, a review of one's methods and facilities is required
and a permit must be granted indicating approval. Where one has "access to [an administrative authority] for a ruling to clarify the issue" of
statutory compliance, a vagueness challenge is even more difficult to
sustain. 12011 As the dissent in the Cincinnati case observed, "[i]f for
some reason the plaintiffs ... cannot tell whether the particular disposal method used by their laboratory ... is a method explicitly approved
by the ordinance ... [or] approved by the Commissioner of Health ...
all they have to do is ask the Commissioner of Health." 1206 Likewise, if
they feel their method is sanitary and not dangerous to the public
1200.
1201.
1202.
1203.
1204.
1205.
& Sons v.
1206.

!d. at 1399.
401 F. Supp. at 572-73.

!d. at 572.
Akron, 462 U.S. at 452 n.45.
United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987).
Cincinnati, 822 F.2d at 1403 n.3 (Nelson, J., dissenting)(quoting Joseph E. Seagram
Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 49 (1966)).
!d. at 1403.
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health or safety, they may simply seek approval. 1207
Whatever other complaints Planned Parenthood may have had
against the Cincinnati ordinance, the ordinance was not vague under
the application of the normal rules of vagueness. The impression is left
that vagueness was a convenient means to the end of striking down the
fetal disposal ordinance. 1208
(3). Deference. In a federal system, incorporating a separation of
powers among co-equal branches, federal and state governments, and
trial and appellate courts, it is necessary that all parties practice mutual
respect, appropriate deference, and a commitment to remaining within
allotted boundaries. If not, major disruptions in the carefully balanced
system occur, usually accompanied by injustices which the checks and
balances were designed to limit. The overarching principles of respect
and restraint have been expressed in such doctrines as abstention and
deference and in such terms as comity and federalism. Without respect
and restraint, however, the doctrines are easily devoured by exceptions.
Abortion is the exception which swallows all rules.
The undisguised hostility of the Court in Thornburgh toward
Pennsylvania's efforts to assert its compelling interests revealed a failure of requisite respect. 1209 In dissent, Justice White, joined by now
Chief Justice Rehnquist, explicitly addressed the lack of deference:
The majority's opinion evinces no deference toward the State's
legitimate policy. Rather, the majority makes it clear from the outset
that it simply disapproves of any attempt by Pennsylvania to legislate
in this area. The history of the state legislature's decade-long effort to
pass a constitutional abortion statute is recounted as if it were evidence of some sinister conspiracy.' 210

He added that the real problem was the Court's "changing [of] the
rules to invalidate what before would have seemed permissible." 1211
The disrespect of the Court was also evident in Thornburgh and
other cases, as discussed earlier, in the seeking of unconstitutional constructions rather than constitutional ones.
Roe was the consummate example of the refusal of the Court to
remain within its constitutionally assigned boundaries. The lesser trespasses have flowed rather easily from this initial transgression.
A growing hostility seems evident in the recent opinions in Akron
1207. ld. If approval is not granted, that is, of course, not a vagueness issue.
1208. Of course, given the court's approach, it is not surprising that it did not see fit to sever
the offending provision. !d. at 1399.
1209. Thornburgh, 47(, U.S. at 751-54, 759.
1210. !d. at 7'!8 (White, J., dissenting).
1211. /d. (White, J, dissenting).
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and Thornburgh. Indeed, Akron has been viewed by many as a turning
point in the hostility of the Court toward abortion restrictions. 1212 Of
course, anomalies have been present throughout modern abortion case
law, but some examples will demonstrate that, excluding Roe itself
from consideration, things are getting worse.
In Bellotti v. Baird (!), 1213 the Supreme Court held that a district
court should have abstained from deciding the constitutionality of a parental consent statute. 1214 The Court noted that, under what is commonly known as the Pullman abstention doctrine/ 215 it is appropriate
to abstain "where an unconstrued state statute is susceptible of a construction by the state judiciary 'which might avoid in whole or in part
the necessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or at least materially change the nature of the problem.' " 1216
The Bellotti (/) Court refused to accept the assertion that the state
supreme court would inevitably decide the statute in an unconstitutional manner. 1217 It noted that the presence of a state supreme court
procedure for certification helped the analysis, although it was not
mandatory. 1218 Also, where the issue was one of the "relative burden"
on the abortion right rather than "total denial of access," it became
easier equitably to consider abstention. 1219 Finally, the Court observed
that abstention could always be raised by a court sua sponte. 1220
By contrast, Akron failed to follow the principled approach of Bellotti (/). In Akron, the Court quoted the abstention rule 1221 but refused
to apply it, although both the statutes at issue in Bellotti (/) and Akron
involved the applicability of parental consent statutes to mature minors.
Justice O'Connor, in dissent, argued for the usual application of the
abstention doctrine. 1222 She observed:
In light of the Court's complete lack of knowledge about how the
Akron ordinance will operate, and how the Akron ordinance and the
State Juvenile Court statute interact, our 'scrupulous regard for the
rightful independence of state governments' counsels against 'unnecessary interference by the federal courts with proper and validly administered state concerns, a course so essential to the balanced working of
1212.
1213.
1214.
1215.
1216.
1217.
1218.
1219.
1220.
1221.
1222.

Brief for the United States, supra note 35, at 16.
428 U.S 132 (1976).
/d. at 151.
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)
Bellotti(/), 428 U.S. at 147 (quoting Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959)).
/d. at 147-48.
/d. at 151.
/d.
/d. at 143 n.lO.
462 U.S. at 440.
/d. at 469.
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The Akron Court found distinguishing features between the laws at
issue to explain the disparate treatment. 1224 At heart, however, the real
problem seemed to be the familiar approach of seeking unfavorable
constructions of statutes, where abortion regulation was involved, rather
than favorable ones. 12211
In Thornburgh, the Court declared that a federal court need not
abstain from addressing the constitutional issue, "pending state-court
reviews," if "the unconstitutionality of the particular state action under
challenge is clear." 1226 However, the unconstitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute was not clear, as the dissenters demonstrated by employing the usual adjudicatory principles. 1227
The federal courts have also been reluctant to sever offending portions of statutes, preferring instead to strike down the whole statute.
This approach is usually hostile to the wishes of the legislatures, which
would generally prefer truncated regulation of abortion to none. A
prime example was the refusal of the Akron Court to sever the term
"humane" from the unchallenged term "sanitary" in Akron's fetal disposal ordinance. 1228 Clearly, Akron would have preferred a "sanitary"
fetal disposal ordinance to none at all. The hostility of lower federal
courts to severance in abortion contexts often mirrors that of the Supreme Court. 1229
1223. /d. at 470 (citations omitted).
1224. /d. at 441
1225. The Akron majority declared that "we do not think the . . ordinance . . ts reasonably susceptible of being construed to create an 'opportunity for case-by-case evaluations of the
maturity of pregnant minors.'" /d. (quoting Bellotti (II), 443 U.S. at 643 n.23).
1226. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 756.
1227. /d. at 782-883 (Burger C.J, White, Rehnquist & O'Connor, J.J., dissenting). As
many constitutional constructions of the Pennsylvania statutes were possible, and as the thrust of
Pennsylvania's enactments was informed consent, protection of the fetus, and reporting, questions
of "relative burden," rather than "total denial of access" under Bellotti (/) abstention, was proper.
Bellotti (/), 428 U.S. at 151.
In the federal courts, abstention has received disparate treatment in the abortion context. See,
e.g., Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 493 n.21 (rejecting abstention); Indiana Planned Parenthood Affiliates
v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983)(rejecting abstention); Scheinberg v. Smith, 659
F.2d 476, 480 (5th Cir. 1981)(rejecting abstention); Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 584 F. Supp. 1452,
1457-58 (N.D. Ill. 1984)(rejecting abstention); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo. v.
Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679, 693-94 n.24 (W.D. Mo. 1980)(rejecting abstention); Wynn v. Scott,
449 F. Supp. 1302, 1311-14 (N.D. Ill. 1978)(rejecting abstention); Mobile Women's Med. Clinic
v. Board of Comm'rs, 426 F. Supp. 331, 335 (S.D. Ala. 1977)(rejecting abstention); Rodas v.
Michaelson, 396 F. Supp. 768, 775-76 (D.R.I. 1975)(rejecting abstention); Montalvo v. Colon,
377 F. Supp. 1332, 1335 (D.P.R. 1974)(rejecting abstention); Henrie v. Derryberry, 358 F. Supp.
719, 726 (N.D. Okla. 1973)(abstaining).
1228. 462 U.S. at 451-52.
1229. See, e.g., Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1981)(rejecting severance); Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 584 F. Supp. 1452, 1464 (N.D. Ill. 1984)(rejecting severance);
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The Supreme Court has also been willing to substitute its own
findings for that of a lower court. In Thornburgh, the majority struck
down the Pennsylvania abortion reporting requirements on the basis
that "[i]dentification [was] the obvious purpose of th[o]se extreme reporting requirements." 1230 Justice White observed the divergence from
the usual rule:
Where these 'findings' come from is mysterious, to say the least. The
Court of Appeals did not make any such findings ... and the District
Court expressly found that 'the requirements of confidentiality . . .
prevent any invasion of privacy which could present a legally significant burden on the abortion decision.' Rather than pointing to anything in the record that demonstrates that the District Court's conclusion is erroneous, the majority resorts to the handy, but mistaken,
solution of substituting its own view of the facts and strikes down the
statute. 1231

Justice White continued, stating that "the majority's action
[was] procedurally and substantively indefensible. " 1232 It was procedurally wrong for going to the merits, as will be discussed later, and for
"reflect[ ing] a complete disregard for the principle embodied in Rule
52(a), that an appellate court must defer to a trial court's findings of
facts unless those findings are clearly erroneous." 1233 The rule is applicable to findings in a preliminary injunction action and applies to the
Supreme Court in equal measure as other federal courts. 1234
In Danforth, the Court made a finding without any basis in the
evidence when it found that prostaglandin abortions were unavailable
in Missouri. 12311 The Missouri legislature had determined that prostaglandin abortions were far safer than the saline amniocentesis
method. 1236 The district court cited findings based on scientific testimony that the saline method could cause severe complications. 1237 In
fact, the Chief of Obstetrics at Yale University, in testimony before the
district court, strongly "suggested physicians should be liable for malpractice if they chose saline over prostaglandin after having been given
Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679, 699 (W.D. Mo.
1980)(employing severance); Wynn v. Scoll, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1314-15 (N.D. Ill. 1978)(employing severance); Rodos v. Michaelson, 396 F. Supp. 768, 775 (D.R.I. 1975)(rejecting
severance).
1230. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 767 (White, J., dissenting).
1231 !d. at 805 (White, J., dissenting)(citation omitted).
1232. !d. (White, J., dissenting).
1233. !d. (White, J., dissenting).
1234. !d. (White, J., dissenting).
1235. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79 (1976).
1236. 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1373-74 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
1237. !d. at 1372-73.
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all the facts on both methods." 1238 Other methods were also available
besides prostaglandin which were also safer than the saline method. 1239
Thus, the district court found the legislative ban on saline abortions a
legitimate regulation advancing the state's interest in maternal
health. 1240
The Danforth Court reversed the district court on the basis of the
unavailability of prostaglandin in Missouri. 1241 As a careful study of
the evidence by the dissent noted, this ruling was not based on any
facts. 1242 Justice White stated, "[ t]here is simply no evidence in the record that prostaglandin was or is unavailable at any time relevant to this
case." 1243 He advocated the normative rule, that the Court could not
strike down a state statute without evidence and that the state did not
bear the burden of establishing the constitutionality of one of its
laws. 1244 Justice White concluded with a comment on the majority's
violation of the rules: "I am not yet prepared to accept the notion that
normal rules of law, procedure, and constitutional adjudication suddenly become irrelevant solely because a case touches on the subject of
abortion." 12411
Another Thornburgh example further illustrates the diminishing
deference of the Court. The Thornburgh Court allowed a temporary
injunction to stand against the enforcement of the parental consent statute at issue. 1246 The district court had issued the injunction pending
promulgation of court rules for implementation. 1247 These rules were
issued while the case was before the Supreme Court, leading the district court to declare itself without jurisdiction. 1248 The Supreme Court
sent the matter back to the lower court because "this development
should be considered by the District Court in the first instance." 1249
Two problems appear upon examination of this action of the
Court. First, in Ashcroft, an identical situation was treated differently
when a parental consent provision virtually identical to Pennsylvania's
had been held constitutional, despite the fact that no procedural rules
1238.
1239.
1240.
1241.
1242.
1243.
1244.
1245.
1246.
1247.
1248.
1249.

Id. at 1373.

!d.
!d. at 1374.
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 77-79 & n.12.
!d. at 98 (White, J., dissenting).
!d. (White, J., dissenting).
!d. (White, J., dissenting).
!d. (White, J., dissenting).
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 758 n.9.
!d.
!d.
!d.
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had yet been established. 12110 The Court said, "There is no reason to
believe that [the state] will not expedite any appeal consistent with the
mandate in our prior opinions." 1261 In Thornburgh, the statute was
found constitutional/ 262 but the same presumption that "the State
[would] provide for the expedited procedures called for by the statute"
was not extended to Pennsylvania; 1263 thus, the Court enjoined the
statute.
Justice O'Connor observed another incongruity between the two
cases:
I add only that the Court's explanation for its refusal to follow Ask-

croft-that the new rules 'should be considered by the District Court
in the first instance' -does not square with its insistence on resolving
the rest of this case without giving the District Court an opportunity
to do so. 1u'
This latter theme will be taken up later.
Finally, the hostility of the Thornburgh Court was evident in its
impugning of state legislative motives. The Court treated Pennsylvania's assertion of its compelling state interests as a "sinister conspiracy."1266 Rather than examining the statute on its face, the Court purported to go behind the scenes and determine the true intent of the
legislators. It termed the informed consent provisions "poorly disguised
elements of discouragement for the abortion decision" and declared that
the lack of similar disclosure requirements for other medical procedures
"reveal[ed] the anti-abortion character of the statute and its real
purpose. " 1266
This inappropriate concern with legislative motives is present in
the lower federal courts as well. For example, the Third Circuit opinion in Thornburgh was even more excoriating than the Supreme
Court's. The appellate court declared the debate on the legislation
"scant," 1267 the bills to which it was attached "unrelated," 1268 and the
1250. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 491 n.16 (1983).
1251. /d. See also Roe 410 U.S. at 166 (declining to enjoin state enforcement of the state
abortion statute).
1252. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d at 297.
1253. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 833 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
1254. /d. (O'Connor, J., dissenting)(citation omitted).
1255. "The history of the state legislature's decade-long effort to pass a constitutional abortion statute is recounted as if it were evidence of some sinister conspiracy." Thornburgh, 476 U.S.
at 798 (White, J., dissenting). "Appellants claim that the statutory provisions before us today
further legitimate compelling interests . . . . Close analysis ... shows ... an effort to deter a
woman from making a decision that ... is hers to make." /d. at 759.
1256. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763-64.
1257. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 288 (3rd. Cir. 1984).
1258. /d. at 288-89.
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whole enactment motivated by "a pervasive invalid intent. " 12119 It did
note that it could not invalidate the whole regulatory scheme simply by
finding an invalid intent, but must "instead review the various provisions ... independently, and on their own merit." 1260
That the Thornburgh appellate court did not invalidate the whole
act at once made little difference, for the hostility to the perceived invalid legislative intent permeated the whole of the opinion, resulting in
virtually the whole act being struck down anyway. The step-by-step
treatment of the various provisions of the statute seemed a mere
mechanical procedure to accomplish a foregone conclusion. The court
had already decided and declared that the legislature's motives were
inappropriate. It even quoted a newspaper article, which revealed that
one of the co-sponsors was pro-life in his viewpoint on abortion. 1261
This focus on the legislators' motives was declared inappropriate
by the Supreme Court in United States v. O'Brien. 1262 The O'Brien
opinion declared it "a familiar principle of constitutional law that this
Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the
basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive. " 1263 The Court continued:
"What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not
necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes
are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork." 1264
Furthermore, the notion that legislators may not have opinions in
opposition to abortion, and express them, is erroneous. The Supreme
Court has declared that both municipalities and states may express "a
preference for normal childbirth" over abortion. 12611 Not only may the
state have a preference, it may also further its preference by expenditure of public funds. 1266 The first amendment applies to pro-life legislators equally with other members of society, giving them a right to free
expression on the subject of abortion.
Much of the confusion in this area has arisen from a misinterpretation by federal courts of a passage in Roe. Justice Blackmun wrote in
Roe, "[W]e do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas
may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake. " 1267
1259. !d. at 292.
1260. !d.
1261. !d. at 288.
1262. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
1263. Id. at 383.
1264. !d. at 384. See also Akron, 479 F. Supp. at 1194 (rejecting a "legislative motive" test
in an establishment clause challenge to an abortion statute).
1265. Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977)(per curiam); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at
325.
1266. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
1267. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
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The Court did not say that the state could not adopt a view of when
life begins. It merely declared that, in doing so, the state could not
implement its view by depriving women of the right to abortion. The
Court made it clear that states could adopt viewpoints on abortion, as
already noted, in Maher. 1268 In fact, Roe explicitly left open the question of when life begins, and has not addressed it again. Justice Blackmun stated, "we need not resolve the difficult question of when life
begins." 1269 The matter of when individual human life begins is a scientific fact for the Court to recognize, not a legal question for it to
decide.
In Akron, however, Justice Powell, writing for the majority, declared a provision which said "that 'the unborn child is a human life
from the moment of conception,' " was "inconsistent with the Court's
holding in Roe v. Wade that a State may not adopt one theory of when
life begins to justify its regulation of abortions. " 1270 Roe said no such
thing, but the majority said it had and the lower courts listened.
In Charles v. Carey, 1271 a district court, relying on the Akron
statement, struck down a statute referring to a fetus as a "human being" and went so far as to question the propriety "of the term 'death' in
conjunction with the term 'fetal.' " 1272 The appellate court declared the
term "fetal death" to be unconstitutional as well. 1273
Another district court, in Eubanks v. Brown, 1274 struck down as
unconstitutional a statute defining a " 'fetus' as 'a human being from
fertilization until birth.' " 12711 The term "human being" was defined
"as 'any member of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until
death.' " 1276 These definitions were "unconstitutional because they incorporate[ d] into the law a definition of life as beginning at fertilization, a theory which the Supreme Court ha[d] not adopted, and which
the Supreme Court ha[ d] held may not be used by a state in a statute to
justify its regulation of abortion." 1277 Likewise, in Poe v. Gerstein, an
appellate court concluded that since, under Roe, a fetus was not a person, it could not be called a "child." 1278
1268. Maher, 432 U.S. 464.
1269. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. Of course, by requiring permissive abortion laws, the Court
implicitly decided the issue of when life begins.
1270 Akron, 462 U.S at 444.
1271. 579 F. Supp. 377 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
1272. /d. at 379-80.
1273. Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1984).
1274. 604 F. Supp. 141 (W.O. Ky. 1984).
1275. /d. at 144.
1276. /d.
1277. /d.
1278. 517 F.2d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 1975), affd sub nom. mem. Gerstein v. Coe, 428 U.S.
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It should be noted that simple use of the term "unborn child" in a
constitutional definition of viability was allowed in Danforth, without
comment by the Court. 1279 Moreover, there is an incongruous circularity to the Supreme Court's reasoning. In Roe, the Court surveyed state
law treatment of the unborn and concluded: "In short, the unborn have
never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense." 1280 If
the fetus is not a person, because it is not treated as such in the law,
does it follow that the fetus may not be treated as a person in the law,
because the fetus is not treated as a person in the law?
A state ought to be able to declare its belief that a fetus is a person, a child, or a human being from conception. If the Constitution
requires a free abortion choice for women, the state would be unable to
implement its view by banning abortions. That is all that Roe declared.
The notion that the Supreme Court is the censor of the words and
findings of state legislators is unsound.
In a recent Sixth Circuit case, Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati, the dissenting opinion addressed the free expression rights of lawmakers:
[T]he right to criticize the current orthodoxies-whether constitutionalized or not-is explicitly protected by the same constitution that has
been held implicitly to prohibit state and local governments from
making it a crime to procure a first trimester abortion. For the Cincinnati City Council to adopt a resolution expressing open disapproval of Roe v. Wade and petitioning for a return of the Constitution
to the status quo ante 1973 would probably anger many of the plaintiff clients even more than they were angered by adoption of the fetal
disposal ordinance actually passed-but that would hardly make such
a resolution unconstitutional. 1281

Of course, this is so, as even a fair reading of Roe admits. It is typical
of abortion jurisprudence that such basic notions as first amendment
rights get lost in the flurry to overturn statutes regulating abortion,
even first amendment rights in the most sacred realm of political
debate.
Justice O'Connor, in Akron, stressed a point which capsulizes this
discussion well. She wrote:
[W]e must keep in mind that when we are concerned with extremely
sensitive issues, such as the one involved here, 'the appropriate forum
for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature. We should not
901 (1976)
1279. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63 (1976).
1280. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
1281. 822 F.2d 1390, 1405 (6th Cir. 1987)(Nelson, J., dissenting).
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forget that "legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and
welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts." ' This
does not mean that . . . we defer to the judgments made by state
legislatures. 'The point is, rather, that when we face a complex problem ... we do well to pay careful attention to how the other branches
of Government have addressed the same problem.' 1282

c. Rush to judgment. Further evidence of the growing hostility of
the Court toward abortion restrictions was evident in Thornburgh,
where the Court rushed to judgment on the merits from the appeal of a
grant of a preliminary injunction.
Four months after Pennsylvania passed its regulations in 1982,
but shortly before the statute was to go into effect, the plaintiff abortion
providers filed a two-volume compendium of forty affidavits. 1283 These
later became the basis of a court-ordered stipulation. 1284 The state was
forbidden to contest plaintiffs' facts unless they were able to offer evidence at the hearing for a preliminary injunction. 1285 Because of the
limited time for preparation, no testimony was offered at the
hearing. 1286
No major injustice was imposed, however, because the parties
were assured the stipulation would be used solely for purposes of the
hearing. 1287 The district court denied nearly the whole requested injunction.1288 Two days later, the appellate court enjoined the entire Act
pending appeal. 1289 The appeals were argued, then reargued following
the Supreme Court's decision in Akron and its companion cases. 1290
Then the appellate court went to the merits, holding the Act largely
unconstitutional. 1291
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the appellate court
had erred in going to the merits rather than limiting its scope of review

1282. Akron, 462 U.S. at 465 (O'Connor,

J.,

dissenting)(citation omitted).

1283. The motion for preliminary injunction was filed on Octolwr 29, 1983, four months
aftrr the An was passed. The Act was to take effect on December R. The plaintiffs rollected
extensive affidavits during this time. At a meeting with counsel on November 18, the district murt
ordered the parties to submit a stipulation of uncontested facts by November 30. However, no
contesting of facts was allowed unless evidence was presented at the hearing on December 2. As a
result, the "unusuallv mmplete" (as Justice Blackmun called it) record was lopsided heavily in
favor of plaintiffs. Brief for Appellant at 35-49.
1284. !d. at 35-49.
1285. !d.
1286. !d.
1287. !d.
1288. !d. at 7-8.
1289. !d.
1290. /d. at 8.
1291. !d.
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to whether the district court had abused its discretion. 1292 The Court
admitted that such a standard of review is normally appropriate. 1293 It
then cited two cases of dubious applicability as creating an
exception. 129"
Thornburgh's end result was to work a great injustice on the state
of Pennsylvania, since under University of Texas v. Cumenish such use
would not have been made of its stipulations and the State had received
no notice that it was being subjected to expedited proceedings. 1296 Further, the new rule created by the Court will leave parties uncertain
whether a final ruling on the merits will result from a preliminary
injunction motion. 1296 The likely result will be that preliminary injunction hearings will become full-scale trials. 1297
Justice O'Connor iterated the thesis of the present article well. She
observed, "If this case did not involve state regulation of abortion, it
may be doubted that the Court would entertain, let alone adopt, such a
departure from its precedents. " 1298
By contrast, in the earlier case of Singleton, the Court unanimously held that the appellate court had erred in going to the merits of
the case, as the state had not had adequate opportunity to present evidence or arguments in defense of the abortion regulations. 1299 This was
ignored in Thornburgh. 1300 The Singleton Court stated the general
rule "that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not
passed upon below." 1301 It continued with a commentary which the
Thornburgh Court ought to have reread:
In Hormel v. Helvering, the Court explained that this is 'essential in
order that parties may have the opportunity to offer all the evidence
they believe relevant to the issues ... [and] in order that litigants may
not be surprised on appeal by final decision there of issues upon
which they have had no opportunity to introduce evidence.' We have
no idea what evidence, if any, petitioner would, or could, offer in
defense of this statute, but this is only because petitioner has had no
opportunity to proffer such evidence. Moreover, even assuming that
there is no such evidence, petitioner should have the opportunity to
present whatever legal arguments he may have in defense of the
1292.
1293.
1294.
1295.
1296.
1297.
1298.
1299.
1300.
1301.

Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 757.
Id. at 755.
Id. at 819-226 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
/d. at 816-817.
/d. at 826 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
/d.

/d.
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 119 (1976).
See, e.g., Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 752-754, 755-57.
Singleton, 428 U.S. at 120.
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statute. 1302
These inconsistencies within abortion jurisprudence create a climate of unpredictability in the courts. As in Thornburgh, one may be
surprised by a decision on the merits before having opportunity to present one's case. Cases such as Singleton, while correctly decided on the
issue of going to the merits, give one no notice of when and where
abortion jurisprudence will go astray from the usual rules. A comparison of Singleton and Thornburgh indicates a failure of the principle of
stare decisis as well as a violation of the rules of self-governance. Under
the rules of Singleton, Thornburgh should have been remanded for a
trial on the merits. The hostile tone of Thornburgh and its radical result seem indicative of the increasingly defensive mood of the Roe majority because of the general scholarly rejection of its handiwork in Roe,
the skillful assaults of Court dissenters on Roe, and, perhaps, the loss of
yet another member of the pro-Roe majority (with the call of Chief
Justice Burger for reconsideration of Roe). 1303

4.

Value of rules

The value of the normal rules of procedure and adjudication seems
so obvious as to need no recital. However, since the rules have suffered
so much violation in abortion jurisprudence, a reminder seems appropriate. As Justice O'Connor observed in Thornburgh, "no legal rule or
doctrine is safe from ad hoc nullification by this Court when an occasion for its application arises in a case involving state regulation of
abortion." 1304 The Court's action in Thornburgh, she declared, was "in
contravention of settled principles of constitutional adjudication and
procedural fairness." 130 ~
These "settled principles" assure predictability, stability, and consistent results-notions related to the goals of stare decisis. They also
allow a normal and detailed development of constitutional law after
time for reflection and step-by-step development. Further, obedience to
the normal principles lends legitimacy to the Court's decisions, avoids
the appearance of result orientation, and maintains the appearance of
neutrality.
Transgressions into the realm of the legislature are problematic
because the Court is ill-equipped to do legislative work. Its decisions
carve social policy into the granite of constitutionality, which should
1302.
1303.
1304.
1305.

/d. (citation omitted).
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 785 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
476 U.S. at 814 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
/d. at 815 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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more properly be written in sand as experiments which may be easily
erased if unworkable or unjust upon reflection. Legislatures, by contrast, can write, alter, and erase social experiments as the seasons of
social change pass by.
In Rescue Army v. Municipal Court/ 306 the Court summed up
the special virtue of the rule requiring avoidance of constitutional issues
where possible. Such a policy is not "merely procedural," but is "one of
substance, grounded in considerations which transcend all such particular limitations. " 1307
That policy, declared the Rescue Army Court, had its roots in the
particular role of judicial review in our governmental scheme and included considerations of the "comparative finality" of its decisions, respect for "other repositories of constitutional power," the necessity of
each part of government "to keep within its power, including the
courts," and "the inherent limitations of the judicial process, arising
especially from its largely negative character." 1308 For those concerned
with private rights under such a system, the Court noted:
On the other hand it is not altogether speculative that a contrary policy, of accelerated decision, might do equal or greater harm for the
security of private rights, without attaining any of the benefits of tolerance and harmony for the functioning of the various authorities in
our scheme. For premature and relatively abstract decisions, which
such a policy would be most likely to promote, have their part too in
rendering rights uncertain and insecure. 1309
However, the Court noted, in Rescue Army, the choice had long since
been made, and wisely so, for the rule of restraint not only maintains
the Court in its proper place but preserves individual rights as well. 1310
These rules, then, are not a mere product of "the fussiness of
judges," but are designed to prevent the courts from becoming "roving
commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation's
laws." 1311 The health of the national government and the ultimate protection of individual rights rests in great measure on observance of these
rules of respect and restraint. They ought to be observed even in the
realm of abortion jurisprudence.

1306. 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
1307. /d. at 570.
1308. Id. at 571.
1309. !d. at 572.
1310. !d.
1311. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 131 (Powell,
413 U.S. 601, 610-11 (1973)).

J,

dissenting)(quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
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Abortion jurisprudence is not only incoherent internally, it is incongruously related to the precedents in which it is purportedly rooted,
to the medical procedures to which it is allegedly related, and to the
state interests by which it is supposedly delimited. The unprincipled
rhetoric of Roe and its progeny have yielded a body of judicially-crafted
policies inconsistent with the canons of sound jurisprudence on which a
liberal democracy depends.
The tangent set by Roe's unconstitutional departure from the
norm has led abortion jurisprudence far from the path of the rest of the
law. A correction in the angle of the trajectory is required. The most
direct and constitutionally defensible correction is the reversal of Roe.
Lynn Wardle has listed several reasons why the principle of stare
decisis is no obstacle to reconsidering Roe v. Wade. 1312 First, he
noted 1313 Justice Powell's declaration of a Court duty to "reexamine a
precedent where its reasoning or understanding of the Constitution is
fairly called into question. And if the precedent or its rationale is of
doubtful validity, then it should not stand." 1314 Roe has been relentlessly criticized, subjected to continuing efforts to rewrite its rationale,
and rejected by the co-equal administrative and legislative branches of
government. 13111 Clearly the Court has a duty to reexamine Roe.
Second, underlying the doctrine of stare decisis is the principle of
consistency, which should require the Court to bring the abortion privacy doctrine into harmony with the rights of the unborn in other contexts.1316 In 1983, Justice Brennan remarked that "the same respect for
the rule of law that requires us to seek consistency over time also requires us, if with somewhat more caution and deliberation, to seek consistency in the interpretation of an area of law at any given time." 1317
As has been demonstrated, Roe and its progeny are anomalous across
the legal landscape and especially in the highly relevant area of fetal
rights. A startling inconsistency occurs when an unborn child in one
hospital room is being aborted, while in the room next door another is
being medically treated, with full legal protection, simply because one
mother prefers to abort her offspring and the other does not. 1318 Rights
dependent on the preferences of another are inconsistent with the usual
1312.
1313.
1314.
1315.
1316.
1317.
1318.

Wardle, supra note 19, at 251-57.
/d. at 252.
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 627-28 (1974)(Powell, J., concurring).
Wardle, supra note 19, at 252.
/d.
Arkansas Elec. Coop. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 391 (1983).
Wardle, supra note 19, at 254.
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concept of rights. 1319 "That the attempt of a distressed woman to kill
her child shortly after birth is deemed a repugnant criminal act of child
abuse or attempted homicide while the attempt of the same woman to
kill the same child shortly before birth is deemed a fundamental constitutional liberty is an arbitrary discrepancy too large to ignore," observes Wardle. 1320
Third, a reexamination of cases which "marked a significant departure" from precedent is recognized by the Court as especially appropriate.1321 As shown above, continuous protection of the unborn, by legal restriction of abortion, had been in place from the inception of the
United States and for centuries before. The unprecedented scholarly
outcry over Roe is further evidence of the abruptness of the departure
of Roe from what had gone before.
Fourth, abortion jurisprudence has "deviated substantially from
reasonable and workable methods of constitutional analysis," and has,
instead, resorted to a rigid formalistic reliance on stare decisis (while, at
the same time, gutting Roe of content). 1322 Justice O'Connor observed,
in her Akron dissent, that "[ t ]he Court's analysis . . . is inconsistent
both with the methods of analysis employed in previous cases dealing
with abortion, and with the Court's approach to fundamental rights in
other areas." 1323 Lower courts have followed this "regressive formalism," reaching extreme results. 1324 "When the underlying principles
are so unworkable that rigid application of stare decisis results, it is
time to reconsider the precedent," argues Wardle. 1325
Fifth/ 326 "[ s ]tare decisis has a more limited application when the
precedent rests on constitutional grounds, because 'correction through
legislative action is practically impossible.' " 1327 The ultimate task of
the Supreme Court in adjudicating claims of constitutional right is to
interpret and apply the Constitution. If a line of cases, upon more mature reflection, appears unconstitutional, then the cases must be overruled. Stare decisis is less binding in constitutional adjudiction precisely
because the Justices' first loyalty must be to the Constitution and not to

1319. !d.
1320. /d.
1321. /d. at 255 (citing Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 627 (1974)(Powell, J.,
concurring), Monnrll v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695 ( 197R), and Thomas v.
Washington Gas Light Co .. 448 U.S. 261, 273 (1980)(Strvens, J., plurality opinion)).
1322. /d. at 256.
1323. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452-53
( 1983)(0'Connor, J., dissenting).
1324. Wardle, supra note 19, at 257.
1325. !d.
1326. !d.
1327. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272-73 & n.18 (1980).
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their prior pronouncements. Of course, where cases such as Roe have
not been overruled, then such precedent should be followed, including
implementation of the state interests declared to be compelling. This
has not been done, making the abortion right even more anomalous,
absolute, and unconstitutional. The case for overturning Roe is more
powerful now than when Roe was conceived in 1973. 1328
Justice Brandeis said that the Court had "often" overruled its
prior decisions involving constitutional interpretation. 1329 In fact, the
Court has expressly overruled its precedent over one hundred times/ 330
and it has done so sub silentio numerous other times. 1331 One commentator has observed:
The practice of overruling error has been defended by the conservative nineteenth century Chief Justice Roger Brooke Tanney and
championed by the liberal twentieth century Justice William 0.
Douglas. The necessity of jettisoning past mistakes is a belief that
belongs to the ideology of no party and no faction and is as much an
institution accepted by the whole Court as judicial review itself. 1332
Cases have been overruled after a history of one hundred and four
years 1333 and, on rehearing, granted to the same parties within one
year_Iaa4
However, some voices may be heard proclaiming that abortion law
is such a settled part of the legal landscape that reversal is unwarranted. Some decry the possible reversal of Roe by a new Court constituency as a politicizing of the Supreme Court. One commentator remarked, "The fate of the abortion right is ... riding on whether or not
the Roe supporters remain on the bench through President Reagan's
term, and if they do remain, on who the next president is and who he
nominates to the Supreme Court." ~
133

1328. See generally Wardle, supra note 19 (setting forth the many reasons why the Court is
better equipped to handle the abortion issue now than it was in 1973 and why the constitutional
imperative is even more pressing).
1329. Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
1330. Pfeifer, Abandoning Error: Self-Correction by the Supreme Court, in ABORTION AND
THE CoNSTITUTION: RFVERSIN(: RoE v. WADE THROUGH THE CoURTS 5 (D. Horan, E. Crant
& P. Cunningham eds 1987).
1331. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 135-56 (discussing the implicit overruling of
Gary-Northwest).
1332. Pfeifer. supra note 1330, at 7.
1333. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), overruling City of New York v. Miln, 36
U.S. (II Pet.) 102 (IR37).
1334. Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943), overruling Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S S84
(1942).
1335. Comment, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians: Return to Hoe?, 10
HARV. JL. & PuB. Po,L'Y 711, 727 (1987).
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Such a view implies that constitutional law is merely a matter of
the current political views of five justices. Such a notion, of course, is to
be rejected. Rather, Justices have a duty to put away their personal
philosophies and interpret the Constitution by means of neutral principles. That this is easier at some times than others is no reason to abandon the pattern and goal.
However, where past Court constituencies have politicized the
process, it is not politicizing it further to reject such unconstitutional
activities and return to the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Refusal
to do so would be to abandon the Court's ultimate loyalty to the
Constitution.
Had the Court in the past allowed itself to be bound by unconstitutional precedent merely because it was entrenched and reversal might
be disruptive, this nation would yet be shackled to Plessy v. Ferguson1336 and Lochner v. New York. 1337
As recently as 1985, Justice Blackmun, author of Roe, declared
that "when it has become apparent that a prior decision has departed
from a proper understanding" of the Constitution, the prior decision
must be overruled. 1338
A Supreme Court refusal to overrule Roe v. Wade merely because
it is claimed to be entrenched would be the ultimate illustration of the
super-protected nature of the abortion right. It would also be a sacrifice
of the Constitution on the altars of political expediency and personal
ideology.
Typical of the political approach is Laurence Tribe's book, God
Save This Honorable Court. 1339 In his book, Tribe warns of the "constitutional storm" from which the Court must be preserved. 1340 Upon
close examination, however, it becomes clear that the storm he fears is
the appointment of justices who will adhere closely to the Constitution.1341 It seems obvious that, given the Court's duty of loyalty to the
Constitution, any proposed justice who did not adhere closely to the
Constitution ought to be rejected. That such faithfulness is viewed as a
vice demonstrates the flawed analysis of Professor Tribe.
Moreover, Tribe's solution to what he views as politicization of
the Court is itself politicization of the Court. He advocates the active
examination of judicial nominees on the basis of their political views
relating to certain of his favorite doctrines, especially the abortion pri1336.
1337.
1338.
1339.
1340.
1341.

163 U.S. 537 (1896)(separate but equal doctrine).
198 U.S. 45 (1905)(economic substantive due process).
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985).
L. TRIBE, Goo SAVE THIS HoNORABI.t: CouRT (1985).
/d. at xix.
/d. at 41.
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vacy right. 1342 Those failing his litmus test should be rejected.
Surely an appeal to neutral principles of constitutional adjudication is in order at this point in history. If certain doctrines are jeopardized by such an approach, there ought to be no cry of politicization. To
remedy past political transgressions of the Court is not a politicized act
but an exercise of loyalty to the Constitution and a fulfillment of the
judicial mission. Thus, there is no principled reason not to overturn

Roe v. Wade.
V.

CONCLUSION

In 1973, the Supreme Court, in Roe v. Wade, set out on an abrupt
angle away from the rest of the law. The decision was firmly rejected
by the legal community. The criticism continues regarding the failure
of the Court to anchor the abortion privacy right in the Constitution.
As the Supreme Court and the lower courts have followed the trajectory set by Roe, abortion jurisprudence has strayed further away
from the normal rules of law and has made the abortion privacy right a
super-protected right. The anomalous treatment of the abortion right is
evident in its special judicial protection, as compared with the usual
treatment of cases involving other privacy rights, fetal rights in other
contexts, other permitted medical regulation by the states, procedural
and adjudicatory rules, and the employment of stare decisis. As the
Court has repeatedly rebuffed efforts by the legislatures to protect the
compelling state interests declared in Roe, the right to abortion has become nearly absolute.
These anomalies undermine the principles of stare decisis, on
which the Court has relied to uphold the abortion privacy right since
Roe, and the rule-of-law foundation upon which the Constitution rests.
Roe itself was an unconstitutional usurpation of power not granted to
the Court by the Constitution. Continued adherence to Roe violates the
Supreme Court's duty to uphold the Constitution.
The only principled remedy is to overrule Roe v. Wade. By so
doing, the Court may return the matter to the political forum, where it
properly belongs under the Constitution of the United States.

1342. /d.
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